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# CROSS CURRENTS

**A QUARTERLY REVIEW**  
*to explore the implications  
of Christianity for our times*

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CLAUDEL	•	MORA	•	COLLINS
BOOTH	•	REGIS	•	PINCKAERS

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(My commission expires March 30, 1957)

M. BLEICHER

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# CATHOLICISM IN POLAND

## THE CHURCH CONFRONTS A NEW SITUATION

*The publication of this summary of the events of recent years in Poland does not mean that CROSS CURRENTS is now entering into competition with the various organs of American journalism. Our quarterly appearance would forbid the attempt, nor do we have the resources or the organization to offer even a superficial review of such major recent developments as the revolution in Hungary, the continuing crisis in the Middle East, the struggle towards racial integration in the United States, the Presidential elections, etc. Of course, we will be glad to unearth discussions in depth of such developments, if we can exhibit articles which transcend the inevitable limitations of weekly—or even monthly—deadlines, but the major emphasis of the review will doubtless remain intellectual and largely speculative.*

*The article that follows, however, is one whose subject area, relative completeness, and attempt at objectivity, recent journalism can hardly be said to have rendered superfluous. We present it as a continuation of the discussion of the problems dealt with in "The Church of Silence"—articles by Albert Gervais and Father Albert-Felix Verwilghen, Spring 1956—with considerable awareness of the fragility of the Polish experience, and the humility born of the knowledge that events do not wait on editorial decisions.*

*The report not only represents an extremely pertinent supplement to recent journalistic references to the subject, but is a good representation (from the issue of Dec. 10, 1956) of the quality of that unique journalistic enterprise, INFORMATION CATHOLIQUES INTERNATIONALES (bi-monthly, \$5.00 a year, 163 Blvd. Malesherbes, Paris 17e, France). This*

*publication, edited by Catholic laymen, presents recent events of particular concern to the religious world, reviews the record of a particular problem and presents documentary information on a wide variety of topics. The journal as a whole is a model of taste and that haute vulgarisation so necessary in a time of mass education. If we cannot yet have its American counterpart, we may hope that journalists—in both the secular and religious press, educators and librarians—will soon make far more use of it.*

### INTRODUCTION

For several months there have been developments in Poland of considerable importance. The process of destalinization and of democratization of the regime and of the party in power (the United Labor Party), has gone ahead with vigor. Unlike the situation in Hungary, those in control of the administration—at least, the majority of them—have not tried to deceive an awakened public opinion. Returned to power after years of disgrace and imprisonment, Wladyslaw Gomulka has not yielded either to Russian threats or the intrigues of Polish Stalinists. Although no one can yet say if the Polish situation has stabilized, we can already affirm that methods of government, and public and administrative life, have undergone profound modification in the direction of an unquestionable enlargement of personal freedom and freedom of expression.

In the area of religion, the changes have not been less important. Cardinal Wyszynski has been re-established in his functions as primate of Poland. Those

bishops who had been removed from their dioceses by administrative decision have been re-installed. There seems to be no restriction on the movement of the bishops or on their freedom to communicate with Rome. Negotiations have been undertaken between the government and the episcopacy with a view to a settlement of problems that are still unsolved. There is talk of a trip to Rome by Cardinal Wyszyński, and it is no longer out of place to speak of eventual negotiations between the Holy See and the People's Republic of Poland.

We present this report on the Catholic Church in Poland without pretending to give a complete picture of the actual state of affairs and of the developments since 1953. It is too soon for that. But at least we think we have assembled here the most reliable data on the essential elements of the situation.

#### *The Problem of Sources of Information*

IN COUNTRIES where news is freely diffused, where freedom of movement is not restricted, and freedom of press, religion and association is assured, or in particular cases where the Catholic religion enjoys a privileged situation—in nations like Italy and Brazil which claim to be fundamentally Catholic, it is very difficult to get together the facts and the fundamental data which would allow one to have an accurate idea of the situation of the Church, the state of religious feeling and the actual practice of religion. Studies in religious sociology have brought us some salutary surprises in this regard. How then can we pretend to have an exact knowledge of the Church in those countries where all these means of information are lacking?

Until quite recently, *all* sources of information on the religious situation in Poland were by their very nature, un-

certain. It is worthwhile to examine them briefly:

(1) information distributed directly and officially by the Polish government, whether by radio, the official press agency or the official party newspaper. Without being false, these releases could not help giving a distorted and incomplete image of reality. For example: mention would be made of the rebuilding of churches and of mass pilgrimages to Czestochowa, but nothing would be said of the progressive elimination of religious education. Besides, from the official point of view, "freedom of religion" rarely included anything but "freedom of worship" in the most restricted sense.

(2) information published in what remained of the Catholic press, which was under official censorship. In fact, this was the most important source, for there were concrete facts. For example, when *Tygodnik Powszechny* announced that so many seminarians had been ordained on a particular day, one was able to draw conclusions regarding the number of priestly vocations, and in addition to know that the bishop in question was still exercising his functions. Here too there were sometimes episcopal declarations, as well as the statement of the positions of "Catholic Progressives." Sometimes, despite circumlocutions, one could find a timid echo of the apprehensions and resistance of Catholics to attitudes and decisions of Communist authorities. On the other hand, there would be nothing on the pressures undergone by the clergy and bishops, arrests of priests and religious, confiscations, the removal of certain bishops, etc.

(3) information diffused by the rare press agencies and newspapers who, during the cold war, had been able or wished to keep a correspondent at War-

saw. Submitted to censorship at their source, these dispatches were usually only resumés of official hand-outs.

(4) news diffused by the various organizations of Polish emigrés, by press and information agencies outside Poland, by propaganda offices (especially in Austria and Germany), by radio (Radio Free Europe, etc.). Such information was of very uneven value, and could rarely be verified. All dispatches were offered as coming from an "authoritative source," but for obvious security reasons, it was never possible to reveal it. Often the desire to wage a propaganda war was more insistent than a care for truth. Periodically there were announcements of the death in prison of Bishop Baraniak and Bishop Adamski, or a serious illness of Cardinal Wyszynski. The claim was made, too hastily, that the Polish press had been completely silent during the illness of the Holy Father, when precisely for the first time, the contrary was true; it was said that the Catholic University of Lublin was suppressed, when it was a matter of suppressing the Theology Faculties of Warsaw and Cracow, transforming them into a single "Theology Academy." Communist propaganda had a field day using the obvious falseness of these reports to discredit *en bloc* all news coming from such sources. The eagerness to believe and spread such alarmist news was particularly regrettable, as a good number of real facts were diffused to the West only through the agency of these groups.

(5) the very prudent but infrequent reports from *Osservatore Romano* and Vatican Radio.

(6) finally, information gathered on the spot by visitors and journalists, western representatives who attended a congress in Poland, etc. These reports were often limited to impressions on the at-

tendance in church, exterior manifestations of piety, or conclusions drawn from conversations with more or less official personalities. Too often *a priori* options (usually, we must say, in favor of the Government) led these travelers to see only one aspect of reality. Graham Greene was unable to meet Cardinal Wyszynski, and to our knowledge none of the western visitors who published their impressions on Poland went to the seminaries to inform themselves as to the conditions of life and the studies of future priests. In addition, they were unable or did not wish to inform themselves as to the concrete functioning of diocesan institutions, or the very real meddling of civil authorities in religious affairs on the local level.

Must we underline that apart from such general affirmations as "Poland, an almost totally Catholic country," we know almost nothing in precise terms of the religious sentiment in various milieu, or about religious practice among the working class? Indeed, we have at hand practically none of the materials necessary for a study of religious sociology in Poland.

#### *The appreciation and interpretation of facts*

Less brutal, more circumspect, also less efficacious than in other People's Democracies, the persecution of the Catholic Church in Poland has been an obvious fact until quite recently. The removal of Cardinal Wyszynski was its culmination. When bishops are prevented from filling their functions, when priest-catechists are expelled from schools, when anti-religious propaganda is displayed in all official publications, *without believers being allowed to have their own voices heard*, when administrative trouble-seeking reaches the point of restraining, in fact, even freedom of the obligatory teaching of religion in

worship, when judicial traps are laid for priests and religious, it is not to be doubted that the Communist power, for reasons inherent in Communist ideology, is waging a struggle against religion and the Church.

We can speak of "Communist persecution." But we risk obscuring the problem, of introducing confusion and making attempts at solution more difficult, by also classifying under the heading "Communist persecution"—already sufficiently burdened and painful—those measures which, although taken by a Communist government, have nothing specifically Communist in them, and are to be situated within the permanent conflict between Church and State. Long before there was Communism in the world, governments had laicized public education, denied the civil effect of religious marriage, secularized the holdings of the clergy, claimed to exercise a right of observation, control, and "presentation" over the nomination of bishops, and in the modern world there is scarcely a State in which the requirements of the Church and of the State have not given rise to negotiations and official compromises (concordats), or semi-official agreements.

It is true that in the minds of Communists in control, measures which in themselves scarcely differ from those taken by a Louis XIV, a Joseph II or a Cavour, are means aimed at fighting the "alienation" which religious belief constitutes in their eyes. Nevertheless, it is hardly likely that in the future a democratic Polish government would be able, or would wish to re-establish the civil effects of religious marriages, to be totally disinterested in ecclesiastical nominations, to restore totally the lands and revenues of the Church and of Catholic organizations, or to re-establish secondary education, etc.

It seems to us that for a proper appreciation of the facts, there is no point in indissolubly tying together the problems on which no compromise is possible (absolute *right* of religious teaching, freedom of communications between the episcopacy and Rome, guarantee of the free exercise of all sacerdotal functions, including the apostolate in all its forms) with questions which have always been the object of negotiations between Church and State (even when the latter was officially Christian) and which have received various solutions.

In the same way, when the Polish State, by menace or constraint, obtained from the episcopacy an "oath of fidelity" whose form and content were debatable, it is right to regard it as a contribution to the struggle against religion, and an attempt to discredit the bishops. But when the Polish bishops, in unanimity with the nation, affirm their attachment to the permanent acceptance of the Oder-Niesse boundary, we would be wrong in seeing the adoption of such a position only the effect of "Communist pressure." This would be as unjust and "simplistic" as to consider certain declarations of western ecclesiastics, for example, favoring the Atlantic Pact, as "the defense of American or Vatican interests." Inversely, Communist propaganda has constantly tried to present the resistance of the bishops as anti-social, anti-popular, anti-democratic, indeed anti-national, even when it was a matter of measures which in any country, under whatever social or political system, bishops would have opposed with a categorical *non possumus*.

Finally, a clear appreciation of events will not be gained by taking the point of view that when persecution is intensified in a Communist country, Catholicism is attacked in its living works, and will be destroyed if the regime en-

dures, and when persecution slackens, saying that Catholicism has given proof of its vitality.

*"The Victory of the Church"*

THIS IS THE TITLE that the special correspondent of LE MONDE in Poland gave to the final article of his series on "Gomulka's Poland."

On the 28th of September 1953, the Polish government "removed" Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, archbishop of Warsaw and Gniezno, primate of Poland; it "authorized" him to retire to a monastery. According to the official communiqué, Cardinal Wyszynski had abusively—and "stubbornly"—used his ecclesiastical functions to undermine the accord between the government and the episcopacy, in order to lead a subversive action and create an atmosphere favorable to Poland's enemies. The government added, without further details, that the Cardinal's "agitation" was clearly revealed at the trial of Bishop Kaczmarek of Kielce (just condemned to twelve years of imprisonment). It also insinuated that his activities were such as to menace the western frontiers of the People's Democracy of Poland; finally the government declared itself "anxious for a complete normalization of relations between it and the hierarchy."

At this time Josef Cyrankiewicz was president of the Council. On the 28th of October, with Cyrankiewicz still president of the Council, the government announced simply that as a result of a conversation with two representatives of the party and the government, Cardinal Wyszynski had taken up again his duties as primate of Poland.

What had occurred? Had the Cardinal denounced his mistakes and promised to begin again? Was the People's Democracy no longer exposed to hostile activities, were its western frontiers def-

initively assured, had relations between the hierarchy and the government been normalized? Apparently nothing had changed, except one detail: Poland had stopped being a satellite country.

*From the Poznan Riots to the Return of Gomulka*

It has often been pointed out that revolts break out only when tyranny has already relaxed. In June 1956 Poland had already been engaged for several months on the road to "destalinization," and the "democratization" of the Communist regime. The Government had already dismissed the chiefs of the secret police, had removed the courts from the fearful control of the "security organs," had considerably relaxed the strictness of censorship, and had begun to apply a less ambitious political economy which aimed at raising the well-being of the population.

As the result of a dispute on standards of work and salaries, there were worker manifestations in Poznan on June 26, 1956. Everyone knows what followed: fights with the police, riots, buildings set on fire, men wounded and killed on all sides, the intervention of the army. (Some of those demonstrating shouted, among other slogans, "Free Cardinal Wyszynski!") The Polish authorities showed real presence of mind. While Moscow fumed against "this new provocation of imperialist agents," Cyrankiewicz went to Poznan, and declared that the demands of the workers were justified, that only those who had committed crimes against common law should be prosecuted, and that far from being halted by these events, democratization would continue at greater speed. The Poznan trials were regular and sentences were moderate. At the same time, work went ahead on individual revision of all the condemnations pronounced



during the "stalinist" period, and authorities did not hesitate to bring to light the abuses of power of that period.

Everywhere public opinion manifested itself in the press, in meetings, and on the street. It is probable that the Polish leaders were less enclosed in their bureaucratic armor than their Hungarian colleagues; they felt that public opinion was formulating an essential claim: the realization of a true independence.

Only one Polish Communist had remained popular, precisely because he had not hesitated to risk prison and even death in order to defend, against the Russians, the right of Poland to follow its own "road to socialism." Appeal was made to him to hold back the flood. Gomulka and his friends knew both how not to give in to the Soviet leaders who came to Warsaw to attempt a last intimidation with the help of troop movements, and also how to avoid a violent explosion of anti-Soviet feeling: they spared their country the fate of Hungary.

In the dramatic events of October, the situation of the Catholic Church was certainly not among the major preoccupations of the groups which confronted each other. But now it was no longer a question, in a euphoria which was noticed by all observers, only of a "return to legality," "the reparation of wrongs," and a "politics of truth." During the events, the representatives of the hierarchy had abstained from intervening; a spontaneous movement nevertheless seemed to have been organized, everywhere at once, to demand the liberation of Cardinal Wyszynski. While *SLOWO POWZECZNE* published an appeal for the restoration of the Primate of Poland to his duties, and petitions were signed all over the country, the five Catholic deputies in the Diet were re-

ceived by Gomulka and presented the most urgent demands of Catholics, and in first place, the liberation of the Cardinal. It hardly seems that the Polish government made this request a matter for bargaining; together with Cardinal Wyszynski, five other bishops again took up their duties, including Bishop Adamski, bishop of Katowice, who, "removed" and then liberated, had just been arrested again.

Catholics and Communists were unanimous in praising the political sense of which Cardinal Wyszynski gave evidence on his return to Warsaw. Last August, during the great national Polish pilgrimage to Czestochowa, an empty throne had symbolized the enforced absence of the primate. It is said that the Polish authorities, some time previously, had proposed to re-establish him in his functions on the occasion of this pilgrimage, on the sole condition that he make a statement which would permit them "to save face." As his reply, Cardinal Wyszynski had simply said to the emissaries, "Wherever I am, I will continue to pray for you."

Freed two months later, without conditions, he resumed his duties without effacement, but also without ostentation. He went to Lublin, to Lodz, to Gniezno, to Czestochowa; he began to visit all the parishes of Warsaw. In his allocutions, he spoke of recent years as of unhappy trial, but which should not prevent one from working for the future. He never ceased to insist on the failure of materialism, but never presented the Church as a besieged fortress whose defense ought to be the sole concern of Catholics. One essential preoccupation recurred in all his sermons: Catholics, especially the young, ought, by assiduous and honest effort, to form their judgment and acquire knowledge which would permit them to exercise it

freely, in the light of faith. He asked them to keep calm, have a sense of balance, and not to disturb, by violent reactions, an experience which was certainly still fragile, but which was perhaps promising for the future. "Today," he said, "it is not a question of showing that Poles know how to die heroically; they have always shown that; we must learn to live with courage and lucidity." The Cardinal rejoiced in seeing the State give evidence of a greater comprehension of the Church and of religious faith; this comprehension, he hoped, would continue to grow.

As for the new Communist regime of Gomulka, from the moment when brought to power thanks to a strong pressure of public opinion, it affirmed its will to take this opinion into account, it was hardly able, in a strongly Catholic country, to persevere in an attitude of hostility, administrative annoyance, calumnies against the hierarchy and priests, and anti-religious propaganda drawing arguments from the most out-moded arsenal of anti-clericalism. The effort made by a good number of Communist intellectuals to rethink the problem is significant from this point of view. Very schematically, and on the basis of articles published by the Polish Communist press, we may summarize their position as follows:

If, on the economic level, the bureaucratic and authoritarian method has proven bankrupt and falsified the meaning and direction of the socialist experience, the failure of authoritarianism is still more obvious on the ideological level. Unless it wants to become petrified, Marxist ideology must renounce state protection and the monopoly of the means of expression, and accept confrontation and honest dialogue. The open meeting with opposed philosophies will not endanger the *material bases* of

the building of socialism. It will even have this advantage, that the opponents of socialism will no longer be able to associate, in their propaganda, the violation of consciences and the nationalization of industries, esthetic conformism with the management of industries by the workers, the distribution of land with religious persecution, etc.

It is a question, in a certain sense, of separating materialist ideology from its compromises with an established power and a conservative bureaucracy, even if they are of Marxist origin and inspiration. The Christian cannot help being struck by the similarity between this attitude and those Catholic movements which, in the last century, began to affirm that it was necessary to separate the Church from all compromises in fact with monarchy, to give up holding on to the protection of political power, and that the risk of competition and free confrontation must be taken. Obviously, this point of view is not shared by all Polish Communists; for many, the problem remains circumscribed by the fight against "religiosity," "superstition," against the "exploitation of religious sentiment by reaction," etc. But the rigid party line in this area has disappeared.

#### *Catholic Progressives and Recent Events*

The Polish "Catholic Progressives," whether of the *Pax* group, or the "Commission of Lay and Religious Catholic Militants for the National Front," have never claimed to represent all or even the majority of the Catholic Polish population. Practically alone in being able to publish Catholic papers and books, and the only Catholic group in the local and regional organisms of the National Front, they enjoyed a monopoly of fact. Apart from the bishops, they alone were able to serve as interlocutors with the

Communist government. But today the Church in Poland is no longer a *Church of Silence*; the bishops are able to make themselves heard in Rome as well as in Warsaw. Catholics who were not part of these "progressive movements" can have their say. Already Catholic intellectuals who were silent up to now are publishing their declarations. Catholic groups are being formed in which pre-war leaders of Polish Catholic Action are resuming their role.

The Catholic "Progressives" felt, even before the events of October 1956, that their situation had become extremely uncomfortable. On one hand accused of clericalism, on the other of collaboration with the Communists, they have been anxious for some time to explain themselves before public opinion. The monopoly which we exercise, they said in substance, was not desired by us, and in spite of the mistakes we may have made, we have always sought to make Catholicism in general profit by our role, by maintaining the possibility of publishing Catholic books and journals (the accomplishments of *Pax* in the area of publishing are far from negligible), aiding as well as we could both Catholics and non-Catholics who were victims of the discriminations and persecutions of the Stalinist period, and in showing the Marxists that a Catholic is not necessarily a reactionary, etc.

It would be unjust and absurd to classify the Polish "Catholic Progressives" with the collaborationists of the German occupation. It was clear from the beginning that the social and economic transformations undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe after the war would be far more enduring than the ephemeral conquests of the Third Reich. The breaking up of the great landed estates and the nationalization of key industries will remain acquired facts, even if the

government of these countries ceases to be Communist. In any case, the Catholics and the Church will have to get accustomed to live in completely different conditions than before the war; the "Catholic Progressives" thought, it seems, that between the refusal to admit the new world and a total absorption into Marxism, a narrow path was offered to them which allowed them "to cooperate, as Christians, in the common task, and safeguard the hopes of the Church in the world of tomorrow."

#### Boleslaw Piasecki

It is too soon still to render a serene and definite judgment of their action. But it may be said already, that from beginning to end the disturbing and controversial personality of Boleslaw Piasecki, their leader, weighed heavily on their activity and on the way it was accepted.

Before the war Piasecki was a leader of a movement of Fascist tendencies. After fighting with the Polish resistance during the Nazi occupation, he was arrested at the end of the war by the Russians. Liberated in little-known conditions, he then organized the "Catholic Progressive" Movement, *Pax*. If in traditionalist and conservative Catholic circles, he was always considered a renegade whose conversion to "advanced" social ideas was never completely disinterested, a number of his friends, nevertheless, who came from different groups, had complete confidence in his sincerity. It was Piasecki who elaborated the doctrine and political policies of the "Catholic Progressives." In 1955 his book *Essential Problems* was put on the Index by the Holy Office; Piasecki had it withdrawn from circulation.

On the 16th of October, on the eve of what is already called "the Polish October Revolution," Piasecki published,

in SLOWO POWSZECHNE, an article entitled "The Meaning of the State," in which he warned against all haste in the process of "democratization." The Communist press immediately accused him of siding with the Natolin faction (Polish Stalinists), suspected him of plotting against Gomulka, and reproached him with his pre-war political record. At the same time a certain number of *Pax* left the movement in order to dissociate themselves from the article in question. Piasecki's friends defended him publicly, and even personalities who were not members of *Pax* pleaded for his good faith and gave testimony of his courageous attitudes during the Stalinist period.

Nevertheless, it indeed seems that the article in question was part of a political maneuver, of which Piasecki had become the more or less voluntary instrument. Today it is known that he wrote and published it without having notified his colleagues of the *Pax* administration. It is also known that just previous to this time he had a number of contacts with the Natolin group which was then planning a putsch aimed at preventing Gomulka's return to power. Indeed, some claim that for reasons which go back to 1945, or even to 1938, Piasecki was controlled by the Stalinists and forced to go along with their policy.

#### *Division of the Pax Group*

Whatever the situation, the initiative of Piasecki deeply divided the *Pax* group. Some of its leaders and militants felt that, whether in good or bad faith, Piasecki had placed the movement on the wrong side, against the current of historical evolution. Several directors, notably Horodynski, Ketrzynski, Lubien-ski, Micewski, tried in vain to have him modify his attitude. Placed in the minority during a new general assembly of

*Pax*, they had to resign their mandates. One of them declared: "Certainly Piasecki has not taken sides against the democratization of socialism, but in fact, he is in the enemy camp, on positions which are those both of the Stalinists and of those Catholics reactionaries who are indifferent to the evolution of socialism, and show an aversion to all deeply popular movements such as that which has brought Gomulka to power. Thus, in these unprecedented historical conditions, it is once again the party of order and the party of movement which oppose each other; Piasecki has chosen the former. I fear that it is by reason of his political antecedents that his sympathies go toward authoritarian structures rather than to an attempt at socialist democratization."

The first result of the successive ruptures among "Catholic Progressives" is to deprive those among them who refuse both communist reaction and a bourgeois restoration of any means of expression.

#### *A step ahead towards the solution of the problem of ecclesiastical organization of the former German territories*

On December 1, 1956, Vatican Radio confirmed that three new Polish bishops had been consecrated at Gniezno at the end of October, before the liberation of Cardinal Wyszynski. They were three priests who had already exercised, from 1945 to 1951, the functions of administrator in three ecclesiastical departments which were made up, by Cardinal Hlond, from the former German territories placed under Polish administration by the terms of the Potsdam treaty. One of them, Bishop Nowicki, was named coadjutor *sedi datus* of Danzig. The two others, Bishops Kominek and Bensz, just as Bishop Wilczynski, auxiliary bishop of Sandomierz, and Bishop

Jop, actually capitular vicar of Cracow, will administer, as vicar-generals of the Cardinal-Primate, the districts of Breslau, Warmia, Opole and Pila.

It is a question there of a provisory solution—but one which can last a long time—of a problem which had weighed continually on the relations between Church and State in Poland. In the accord of April 14, 1950, the Polish episcopacy resolved to ask the Holy See "that the ecclesiastical administrative centers, which enjoyed the rights of resident bishops, be changed in a permanent manner to episcopal ordinariates." (art. 3) The Holy See, besides its rule of not anticipating the conclusion of a peace treaty in the recognition *de jure* of a new frontier line (although there have been exceptions), would have even less disposition to accede to the requests of the Polish hierarchy because of the hostility of the Polish government. At this time the Holy See seemed disposed to name titular Polish bishops, and place them as apostolic administrators, at the head of the territories in question. The Polish government preferred the policy of "all or nothing", banished the priests who were charged with the administration of these territories (decree of January 26, 1951), and replaced them with "capitular vicars," pretending that these territories had been definitively established as dioceses. In all Polish publications these "vicar generals" were henceforth designated as "ordinaries."

Today in the modified international situation, when the arguments of the cold war no longer dominate political reason, the Polish government accepts an intermediary solution. There is reason to point out, in this regard, that if the three new Polish bishops were consecrated only at the end of October, they must have been named some time

before (although *Osservatore Romano*, which generally announces the ecclesiastical nominations, made no mention of it, which would tend to confirm persistent rumors according to which official contacts had been taken between Rome and Warsaw before the events of October and the liberation of the Cardinal-Primate. If the measure taken by the Holy See does not include in itself any political concession, it is none the less of a kind, in the actual climate, to be received with satisfaction by the new Polish government.

It is understandable that this aspect of the situation has not escaped political observers in Bonn. "Doubtless," writes *Le Monde's* correspondent in West Germany, "the Holy See has officially or semi-officially attempted to pacify Bonn. Nevertheless, neither at Bonn or Rome have they sought to hide that it is a concession to the thesis regarding the Oder-Niese line as a 'peace frontier.' Juridically the Vatican continues to consider this dispute unsettled until a peace treaty is concluded. In fact this compromise starts it on the road of a transformation of the status quo to an enduring frontier, and gives Gomulka the pledge of good faith for which he was waiting."

#### *Rome-Warsaw Relations*

On September 14, 1945, the provisional government of the Polish Republic denounced the concordat signed with the Holy See in 1925, claiming it had been violated by the naming of German prelates on Polish territories occupied by the Reich. (The Holy See denied the accusation, specifying that the German prelates in question had only been *temporarily* assigned the duties of *apostolic administrators*. In addition, if there was always a Polish ambassador to the Holy See, it was that of the Polish Govern-



ment of London, which only the Spanish Government continued to recognize, and whose authority was rejected by the anti-communist Polish emigres. The problem of re-establishing diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Poland will pose itself sooner or later. It should not be insoluble, if the Polish government consolidates its position and perseveres in its present direction. (We must not forget that, even in 1952 the Holy See had an apostolic nuncio to the Yugoslav government, and that it was the latter who took the initiative in breaking diplomatic relations).

*Toward the Re-establishment  
of Religious Teaching*

On December 8, the Polish Agency P.A.P. announced the publication of a communique growing out of a commission composed of two ministers and two bishops. The communique declared that "In the course of these meetings the representatives of the government have declared themselves ready to eliminate obstacles which were raised in the previous period for the full freedom of religious life." On their side, the representatives of the episcopate "have proved that at the conclusion of transformations undertaken in public life... the authorities of the State will find among the ecclesiastical hierarchy a full comprehension of their efforts." The communique announces a law guaranteeing the influence of the state in the respect of ecclesiastical prerogatives, on the nomination of bishops. On the other hand, religious teaching will be re-established into State schools. It will have faculty status. Professors will be designated in accord with the Church. They will be paid out of the State budget. Chaplains will have access to hospitals and prisons where they exercise their ministry.

### TOMORROW

NO ONE BELIEVES that everything will go smoothly from now on, that shocks and jolts will be eliminated of themselves, in an atmosphere of reciprocal benevolence. But inversely it will be inaccurate and dangerous to say that "nothing has changed." The Polish evolution, notably in the religious area, can no longer be classed as a "tactical" reaction decided on by world communism and orchestrated by the Kremlin. It has been pursued *against* Moscow. It does not fit into any familiar frame-work and requires of Catholics, both in and out of Poland, an effort of reflection based on new data. In her relations with civil society, the Church has always admitted the necessity of making a distinction between *thesis* and *hypothesis*. It is certain that in the Holy See the events in Poland are followed attentively, without illusion but with an open mind. The rare comments of *Osservatore Romano* show the clear desire of the Vatican not to say anything that would push the Polish leaders back to intransigent positions, and make the efforts of Cardinal Wyszynski more difficult, or even allow the impenitent Stalinists to claim that they were right rather than Gomulka and that "nothing can be done with Catholics."

Nothing has been definitely saved, but there is no fatality. The comparison between Poland and Hungary—apart from any value-judgment—shows that the same causes can give birth to very different developments and results. It is important to see reality in all its aspects, even if this disturbs our habits of lazy schematization.

To give a tentative conclusion to this attempt at understanding the problems of the Church in Poland today (which would have to be supplemented by a similar study of the problems of the

State and of Polish society in general), we do not believe we can do better than to repeat two passages of the book of Father P. A. Michael, *Problèmes religieux dans un pays sous régime communiste* (Editions Fleurus, 1955).

If we only spoke of the negative aspects of Communism, we would confirm Communist adherents in their convictions, and they would not believe us. They would see us only as their adversaries, whose motives were as selfish as anyone else's, not as those whose mission is *testimonium perhibere veritati*. And if the faithful learn, from another source, the positive aspects of Communism, we would lose their confidence, and our warnings would remain ineffectual....

The problem which the Church faces today is not primarily a political or strategic problem, but a religious one. As we have said before, it is not Communism which should dictate to Catholicism what it ought to do or ought to be, but before that and apart from that, beyond any threat from that quarter, it is Christ and our faith which shows us the way....

translated by JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

### Note

The dossier in *Informations Catholiques Internationales* makes constant reference to its own back issues for reports it carried on specific events over the past few years; it also included a chronology of events in Poland since 1953, a map of Poland showing diocesan divisions, and brief quotations from allocutions of Cardinal Wyszynski after his return to Warsaw (some of these quotations were used in American press reports, and appeared in *LIFE*). Added for documentary purposes were recent French press comments on the religious situation in Poland, and that of Philippe Ben, in *Le Monde* (Nov. 30, 1956) is worth quoting:

"The persecution was relatively moderate because the Communist regime was never as solidly established in Poland as in the other People's Democracies and because the Catholic Church was stronger in Poland than elsewhere....

"Does the 'October Revolution,' whose first result in the religious sphere was the liberation

of Cardinal Wyszynski, mark the end of the struggle between the regime and the Church? Before saying that, we must review the record of that struggle. There is no doubt that Polish Catholicism emerges from the experience with victory. To show this there is far more evidence than attendance at Mass. The number of priests is greater than before the war (when it was already high). Although the Church has lost some of its wealth, thanks to the generosity of the faithful, it still has considerable material support. There are many Catholic publishing houses, and large stocks of books and religious articles, for which there is a wide demand. Last but not least, 90% of the children receive instruction in their catechism. Even party members, government workers and members of the secret police have their children baptized and are married in church, although often secretly.

"Some leaders believe that religious feeling has never been stronger; at any rate, attendance at services is greater than it was in bourgeois Poland. But they maintain that much of this is not the expression of authentic conviction. They believe that people go to church because it is—or was until recently—the only way of showing their opposition to the regime....

"...It is impossible to verify this claim, but whatever its degree of truth, it indicates the failure of Communism. Many young people go to Mass who did not go a few years ago. Then they went to Communist meetings, were active in party affairs, youth organizations and unions. Their disillusionment has put them on the road to the Church....

"In the present situation national unity is the *sine qua non* of the preservation of the October Revolution. Poland cannot afford the luxury of a struggle between religion and the State. Gomulka knows this. There are also indications (since verified by the recent Polish elections—Tr.) that the Catholics, even those most opposed to Communism, are ready to support Gomulka, at least temporarily, because they see in him the only way to avoid Soviet domination.

"Nor is it necessary to believe that Polish Catholicism is irremediably opposed to the social changes that have followed the war. A leading Catholic said: The Church does not only emerge victorious from the battle with Stalinism. It also emerges purified. The Church today has lost its reactionary pre-war appearance, it is closer to the workers and peasants. If this is true, we must conclude that the Church accepts the fundamental structures of

Polish socialism: nationalization of industries, agrarian reform. Moreover, it can hardly be otherwise, for few people in Poland want to return to the old ways.

"A *modus vivendi* seems indeed possible between the Church and the regime. The personality of Cardinal Wyszynski is such as to make this easier. He is not at all like Cardinal Mindszenty, who is obviously still thinking too much of restoring the old order. The Primate of Poland has until now refrained from making any political statements, limiting himself to issuing appeals to national unity and internal peace. He has reassured the representatives of

the government by forcefully demonstrating that he is no supporter of a political party...

"Gomulka and his worker party can tolerate the existence of many Catholic organizations, as long as they are content to publish journals, and compete with each other. What they could not tolerate is the formation of a Catholic party...

"It seems that the great majority of the Polish clergy, and first of all the Cardinal, whose intelligence and good sense have been praised by many Communists, understand the situation very well and are exercising a moderating influence on the masses."

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# BASIC CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE

GOTTHARD BOOTH

## ILLNESS IS A REMINDER OF THE PURPOSE OF LIFE

THE CONCEPT and phrase "psychosomatic medicine" mark the end of the phase in Western civilization during which body and soul were believed to be substantially different: one gross matter following mechanistic laws, the other immaterial spirit potentially free, but during life more or less completely imprisoned in the body. Empirical medicine, as it progressed in the use of mechanical, physical, and chemical methods, became aware of the fact that a certain number of cases did not react as expected according to the laws of physiology. In some such cases physiological conflicts were obviously of influence. Some psychiatrists, such as Jung, even added the concept of a specific psychological energy to the forms of energy known from physics. The first step toward psychosomatic medicine was the demand that each case be studied for physical and for psychological pathology. Such studies found that 60% of the cases of stomach ulcer had a weak stomach and a normal soul, while 40% had a psychopathic soul which made the normal stomach sick.

About simultaneously with this development in medicine, physics arrived at a new concept of the world. Studying the behavior of atoms minutely, physi-

cists found the old dichotomy of matter and mind an illusion. Two discoveries were of particular significance:

1. Rutherford discovered that there is no matter which *contains* various forms of energy, but that the physical world is identical with electrical energy; electrons which like solar systems operate in empty space.

2. Planck found that the electrons do not follow immutable, deterministic laws. The immutable laws of classical physics had been derived from experiments with large groups of electrons and under specific, simplified, conditions. The individual electron behaves in an absolutely unpredictable manner. The more complex the structure of the electron system, the more significant the freedom of the electron becomes.

Schroedinger, a physicist, recently analyzed the fact of heredity from the point of view of atomic physics. His findings should be mentioned, because they illustrate the qualities of fate and of freedom which are inherent in living organisms. The constancy of living forms through the succeeding generations is transmitted through the genes. Each gene is a big and relatively stable molecule. A certain number of them change from time to time due to the irregular behavior of the electrons composing the molecule. Thus the genes of contemporary horseshoe crabs have not changed for millions of years. The genes of some horseshoe crab, however, did millions of years ago and this broke the chain of apparent determinism. A new step in evolution had taken place, with many more to follow until man joined creation.

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*Dr. Booth's article appeared in PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, January 1951. A fuller treatment of his thought is in "The Concept of Health," in THE CHURCH AND MENTAL HEALTH, ed. Paul Maves, Scribner's, 1953.*

Similarly in human brains most of the processes go on the same way as they did thousands of years ago and in all of us alike. Yet a certain number of the processes are different for large groups of individuals, such as the various constitutional types. Finally in each individual at times unique and unpredictable processes take place. The functioning of our organs and our actions and reactions toward the world are identical with the electronic processes. They represent the metrical aspects of what constitutes in our unconscious and conscious lives, growth, experience, aspiration, and decision. There is no borderline between the material and the immaterial parts of the living organism, between somatic and psychological realities. The only valid distinction to be made is the distinction between what we can interpret psychologically, and what we do not understand. Under the influence of psycho-analysis we have experienced a steady widening of our knowledge about the psychological significance of our organs and of their diseases. All body organs form part of our personality.

**B**EFORE GOING into the specific concepts of psychosomatic medicine I shall give you a somewhat detailed description of a particular disease. I have chosen Parkinsonism for various reasons; partly because I made a special study of it, partly because it is relatively rare and therefore not likely to involve people subjectively. It is also a relatively modern disease and it highlights certain problems of our age. As to basic principles, there is no qualitative difference between Parkinsonism and other diseases as far as psychology goes. There are no "psychosomatic diseases" as one still reads in professional and popular articles and books. The old idea of "normal people with a sick body" and of "psychopathic people with a healthy

body" has to be abandoned. There are only healthy and sick personalities.

From the traditional point of view Parkinsonism appeared to be a tragic accident. Until the disease process becomes manifest, the individual has usually been a particularly normal individual in his physical and psychological aspects. Then, without provocation, his muscles become more and more rigid, his posture and extremities become bent. Hands and feet are in constant tremor which stops only during sleep or while some willful action takes place. The longer the disease lasts the fewer actions are possible. Eventually the patient becomes completely paralyzed. The anatomical study of the brain reveals that certain areas of the brain have degenerated. Judged from the point of view that disease is the result of some abnormality, there was no explanation, either physical or psychological, which could explain why this particular patient contracted Parkinsonism.

Psychosomatic medicine taught us to look more closely into the lives of patients. It studied the biography of people not for what went wrong, but with an impartial interest in what specifically happened to them.

In the case of the future Parkinsonian we find that he *inherited* a constitutional disposition toward action. Not only did he show preference for using his muscles, but also for enterprise in general. In comparison to his brothers and sisters he applied himself more strenuously to his work. Furthermore, he tried to identify himself with the domineering one of his two parents. All this, for reasons which I have given in medical papers previously, must be considered the result of an inherited disposition. Other influences in the life of the later Parkinsonian seem to be *external accidents*; the domineering parent happened to be a moralist. Further-



more, as a child he was in a competitively weak position regarding his brothers and sisters; the last one of a great number of siblings, an ugly duckling among good-looking ones; the parents suffered economic setbacks at a critical point of his development. The combination of all these tendencies and circumstances accounts for a personality who is bound to succeed, because he is anxious to improve his performance and positions. At the same time he is not an ordinary go-getter, but scrupulously honest, and ready to give up his own advantage for some moral purpose. This adds to his external success the reputation of having an angelic character.

All this development finally reaches the critical point where the quasi-religious concern with success meets with defeat; either external difficulties have become excessive, or the inner vitality has been reduced by age or conflicts. At this point the disease process begins. Its essence is that the personality regresses from realistic satisfactions to a level of merely symbolical satisfactions. In his years of health the individual proceeded from action to action with a feeling of freedom. He *wanted* to act. In the course of the disease the patient becomes more and more the victim of biological tendencies which force him to act. The kind of activity into which he is forced must be considered a caricature of his original personality; his muscles are in a state of constant tension, and hands and legs are shaking. The whole body is kept in a rigid position. The shaking increases when an attempt is made to stop it by force. The old tendency to assume the dominating role is also evident in the fact that the patient may be completely unable to move on command, but acts normally under the influence of emotions or in his sleep. The anxiety about success appears in the fact

that the patient is unable to try such actions with which he failed once. Each failure restricts his range of initiative more and more as he is more weighted down by shame on account of past failures.

Eventually the patient may become completely bedridden and dependent on external help. But even in this state the need for domination persists; he expects to be helped exactly according to his individual expectations, just as he had given help previously according to his own individual standards. He is hard to please because his behavior had not been motivated by sympathy with others, but by moral judgment. To the environment it often appears incomprehensible how such an active, ambitious, individual can possibly bear his helpless condition. If one analyzes the character of the disease symptoms, however, it becomes obvious that they satisfy the basic tendencies of the individual on a symbolic level. More than in his days of health the fully developed Parkinsonian is the very image of a rigid man, impatiently bent on action. His masklike face denies subjective feelings, his steady gaze suggests that he is concerned exclusively with the goal of his contemplated action.

**I**N OUR WESTERN culture we are too inclined to assume that what man desires most of all is realistic satisfaction of an increasing number of objective needs. It seems therefore highly significant that the deeper biological tendencies of the organism are more intent on maintaining the dynamic orientation of the personality than on material satisfactions. When the specific personality development is frustrated in the outer world, the outer world is sacrificed rather than the individual attitude. In order to maintain the latter the patient expresses it symbolically, accepting at the

same time pain and frustration in his object relationships.

The treatment of the Parkinsonian proceeds on two levels:

1. By means of drugs the balance in the nervous system can be changed in favor of a more relaxed functioning of the motor system.

2. The influence of the physician can be brought to bear on the personality orientation of the patient. The physician attempts to bring the patient to insight into the one-sided character of his past unthinking system of values. On the one hand, he is relieved from his deep feelings of shame by being made to understand that his disability is as honorable as a wound, received in a just war. On the other hand, he is made conscious that action, success, and morality are not the supreme values of human existence, but the charity and acceptance of others are values without which human existence would be impossible. Such strengthening of neglected sides of the personality is partly achieved by verbal suggestion. It is more important, however, that the physician himself act according to his words; he must be free from anxiety regarding his own success. Any suggestion that the physician considers improvement as a result of his or the patient's being "good," is likely to bring a relapse into paralyzed moralistic anxieties.

I hope that the details of this particular disease process will give a more concrete background to the following remarks which will be concerned with a formulation of the principles of psychosomatic medicine.

First of all I wish to stress the importance of the individual personality structure. Under the influence of democratic ideology medicine and psychology have been too emphatic about "common human nature," about the difference between "normal" and "abnormal"

people. While it is a fact that each human being is equipped with the same organs and functions, they actually play very different roles in different human beings. The different body types have been found to be associated with specific personality types. I mentioned before that for the adjustment of the later Parkinsonian the motor system played a predominant role from childhood on. People who later become subject to high blood pressure have a very different attitude; they do not rely on action so much, but rather on their capacity for identification with the cultural group. An aggressively dependent attitude seems to characterize the later sufferer from stomach ulcers.

The personality patterns associated with different organ systems are not easily detected. It is easy to distinguish psychotic personalities, but in most diseases there is no gross mental pathology, only variations of intensity. Such typical variations can only be found by comparison of large groups of patients and by use of objective personality tests. So far there has been increasing evidence that disease always befalls the function which has been leading in the personality orientation. People are capable of standing a great deal of frustration as long as it concerns a function not particularly valuable to the individual, be it feeding, or activity, or sex. Sexual frustration plays an important role for the neurotic type, but not for most schizophrenics.

**D**ISEASE BEFALLS the leading function at the point where it is frustrated by the life situation. The organ carrying the leading function becomes affected, first functionally and finally structurally. The relationship between disease and the dominant function is very important. In the mechanistic period of medicine disease was explained as the

result of organ weakness. Actually the opposite is true; the strongest function is likely to become the victim of disease. "The first will be the last . . ." The principle which underlies the organ selection of disease was first discovered in the field of psychiatry. Jung found that neurosis and psychosis occur when the most differentiated function of the individual becomes ineffective, as in the case of a brilliant thinker who is faced with a situation which requires intuition. Under these circumstances the formerly leading function becomes unconscious and the underdeveloped, neglected function is forced into action. Since the underdeveloped function is likely to be on a childish level, the situation usually remains unsolved and the differentiated function stays paralyzed. An example of this underdeveloped function is the Parkinsonian with his underdeveloped sense of sympathy which makes the formerly angelic person an ungracious patient.

Although the formerly leading function becomes ineffective with respect to practical purposes, the disease process maintains it in the center of the personality orientation. In the days of health the individual is hardly conscious of his particular orientation. It seems natural to him to be active, acquisitive, possessive, or whatever it may have been. He assumes that everybody is this way and something is wrong with those who are too obviously different. In the days of illness, however, conscious attention is focused on the diseased function and its representative organ. Thus the function finds satisfaction symbolically, although its satisfaction means practical defeat.

The most obvious example is the case of obesity which Shakespeare already recognized as the result of a frustrated sense of self-importance. Symbolically

the fat person becomes more weighty and impressive while realistically he pays heavily for it in terms of effectiveness and social valuation. Falstaff describes the cure for obesity, when the body of Hotspur gives him a momentary glimpse of realistic prestige: "If I do grow great, I'll grow less, for I'll purge, and leave sack, and live cleanly as a nobleman should do."

To sum up the principles of pathogenesis: disease occurs when the representative organ function fails to meet the demands of the life situation. The diseased organ satisfies the original attitude of the personality on a symbolical level. Previously neglected functions become the leading ones, but in a primitive form. Disease thus is part of a compensating process in which the first becomes the last, and the last the first.

Treatment of disease can be attempted in two fundamentally different ways: The frustrating situation can eventually be changed in favor of the leading function. This would make realistic satisfaction possible once more. At short range this principle may be expedient, but it leaves the patient in danger of running into the same situation again later on. This is most likely in the case of the more serious chronic ailments, because the individual has usually built for himself a one-sided life situation which amounts to a formidable trap.

The more constructive treatment attempts a new orientation of the personality. Previously neglected sides of the personality are brought into the foreground, the old favored side is recognized in its limitations.

Sometimes this re-orientation takes place spontaneously, often in the form of a conversion experience. Under the impact of the disease a man may become aware intuitively of the limitations of his past life. In cases where the patient

becomes religious, sceptics often suspect a utilitarian motive, a wish to propitiate God and thus to gain magic help. I feel that there is no reason for sneering at such conversions, even where they are to some extent insincere. The fact of the reorientation itself contains an element of valid experience.

CONVERSION COMES close to the problem of *sacrifice* in its relationship to health. Religious practices all over the world have developed the idea of sacrifice; the voluntary surrender of something valuable to deity. When we realize the danger of one-sided overdevelopment for the individual, we recognize that voluntary sacrifice of an overvalued function may be an effective method of warding off the involuntary sacrifice brought through disease. In our Western culture there is the particular danger of one-sided development, because it is so much concerned with the worship of progress and competition. It easily seduces man to concentrate on the one function which is best developed in him and therefore most apt to be useful in his competitive struggle. Against this tendency Christianity has urged the concept that pride is the greatest sin. Although at short range the pursuit of pride seems to be more rewarding in this world, the long range view sees the principles of spiritual and of wordly health in agreement.

In discussing the causes of disease I pointed out the fact that even the seriously crippled and suffering patient derives satisfaction from the mere symbolical expression of his leading attitude. This observation suggests that symbolical activities and experiences are of vital significance for the health and happiness of the individual. Particularly in our age of technical progress we have become impressed too much with practical efficiency and have become unaware of the

values inherent in the experience of passive attitudes and orientations. The aim of psychoanalysis is mainly the reorientation of the personality. It is important for the patient to experience the unknown and neglected possibilities of his soul. This may not have any obvious effect on his external life in terms of efficiency and success, but it may bring him peace of mind and protection against a serious breakdown.

The services and sacraments of the Church appeared to be related particularly to the neglected and undeveloped side of the Western man which is concerned with his existence as a human being beyond the limitations of his specific and overemphasized individuality. The symbolic equality of participation in the services of the Church seems to me the positive counterpart to the sacrifice of pride, as demanded by Christian ethics.

The sick are particularly in need of this experience of relatedness. As has been discussed previously, the very fact of sickness denotes that the individual has stressed his specific and unique individuality so much that he defeated himself in terms of the world of everyday reality. Thus he is isolated from ordinary human fellowship, but he is also spiritually isolated by the one-sidedness and anxiety in which he tried to succeed by relying on his own strength and endowment. Communion and unction are sacraments in which the consciousness of the sick and isolated individual is drawn back into the experience of his basic humanity and common relatedness to God. In this way he may become able to use those sides of his personality which he had neglected because they did not serve the purposes of his ego. He may gather strength for recovery for a new life, or he may at least become reconciled.

**T**O SUM UP the principles of psychosomatic therapy, the individual may be helped by adjusting the external situation in favor of his frustrated attitude. At least in the case of seriously sick personalities, the value of this method is limited. The physician must answer the question: does the consciously frustrated side of the personality deserve charity, or rather the side which the individual had neglected in the past? More often the latter seems to be the case. With the exception of the rare cases of spontaneous conversion, rational psychotherapy and religious means can be effective.

It would appear that religion and science are becoming more and more able to speak the same language and to bend their efforts in the same direction. This justifies the expectation of an improvement of therapeutic results for those cases where priest and physician cooperate. I am under the impression that to some extent those expectations are fulfilled increasingly. On the other hand, I consider it dangerous optimism to add psychosomatic medicine to the numerous political and sociological schemes by which the millenium is supposed to be brought into this world. We are liable to do a great deal of damage if we forget our human limitations and concentrate too much on the concrete good we think we should achieve.

Due to our technological concern with efficiency we are liable to overestimate the importance of external achievement. "They also serve who only stand and wait" expresses an attitude toward life which was hard to grasp for Milton, but it has become harder since his days. The experiences of psychosomatic medicine suggest that it is most important that our weaker functions participate in the orientation of our lives. Outstanding achievement through concentration on our specific strengths seem to be a

threat to health, and we need to resist the temptation of our culture which promises us rewards for one-sidedness. The balanced use of our functions, the intention and orientation of our lives, those are the long range tasks of medical hygiene.

So far medicine has treated disease as an evil. Psychosomatic medicine suggests that disease has a positive, spiritual aspect, too. It is an unconscious self-revelation of the limitations of individuality. It suggests that the direction and intent of our common human functions are more valuable than their worldly achievements. In this respect each case of disease must be considered not only an evil to be fought, but also as a reminder of the purpose of life. By this I mean that all human actions and efforts aim toward something which transcends achievement in this world. It may be better that a patient die earlier, reconciled to the meaning of his experience through disease, than to prolong his physical existence by a few years of anxiety and bewilderment.

I do not propose that indifference to the practical challenges of life is the answer, nor that institutionalized religious practice would be. I feel that we physicians should do all the good we think we can do, but we should do so with fear and trembling lest we overestimate our purpose and values. In particular the physician should be wary of ambitious concern with his achievement, but keep his mind on the particular needs of the individual patient. Prolongation of life and removal of symptoms are easily overestimated. Psychosomatic medicine may be able to make some contributions toward a more comprehensive concept of health. This new concept would probably be related to the religious concept of being at peace with God.



# MODERN DRAMA AND MUSIC

PAUL CLAUDEL

**O**FTEN IN THE COURSE of my career as dramatist the problem of the union of music and drama, the word and the note, has inevitably presented itself to me as it had done to many of my predecessors in the most different countries and the most remote ages. Everyone will have in mind the voluminous literature devoted to this question by Richard Wagner, and if any man seemed capable of finding a solution, it was certainly the great genius, who was magnificently gifted both as dramatist and musician. And it would be unjust to say that he totally failed in this immense undertaking. "Tannhäuser" is, on the whole, a grand drama, admirably composed, in which the music poignantly amplifies and colors the emotions of the characters. In my opinion it is the work in which Wagner's soul found its most authentic and complete expression. "Lohengrin" would also be a great success if it were possible to stretch it on new canvas, as is done with old pictures, and to strip it of the romantic frippery that renders it nearly unbearable today. As to "Tristan," I object to its uniform, monochrome tone and also to the dramatic mediocrity of the libretto. When a gentleman and a lady have repeated throughout two whole acts: "I love you" — "You love me," the spectator thinks this enough; if he discover that in the

third act it is all beginning over again, he is driven to despair and seized with a desire to flee that all the solos of the clarinet are incapable of appeasing.

Instead of choosing as my subject the drama and music, I might have chosen love duets, and I should thus have had an opportunity of working off an old grudge, which is probably in the back of your mind as it is in mine. But I might have been carried away by it. I should like, however, to make here a brief comment. The presentation of a love duet on the stage is fraught with difficulties. During the war, everyone witnessed the awkward plight of artists who had to sing a national anthem and — to render their part more heroic — thought it well to carry a flag. But how unwise this was! One can do only two things with a flag: either brandish it at arms length or passionately crush it to one's breast. When these two gestures — that have nothing very novel about them — have been repeated several times, the audience feels its emotion subsiding. Now, the case is exactly the same with love duets. The actor who takes the lover's part can do only two things with the prima donna: either hold her at arm's length in order to view his good fortune the better — all the while vigorously shaking his head — or passionately clasp her in his arms. And the audience gets about the same pleasure from these two gestures, when they have been made a number of times, as from the business of the flag. It should be added that the two performers, while they are engaged in these minor gymnastics, have a more serious and difficult task to perform — they must attend to a hard ticklish score. This somewhat detracts from the sincer-

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*The late Paul Claudel was the greatest dramatic poet in France since Racine. This article, of special interest to those who recently saw the Barrault production of CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS in New York, appeared in the YALE REVIEW, Oct. 1930, and the copyright is held by the Yale University Press.*

ity and conviction of unreserved plastic expression, especially when the Isolde that Tristan is to handle has, as is generally the case, a certain amplitude of figure.

But to return to my subject, the union of music and drama.—

As the reader has doubtless already become aware, I am not a musician. It is, therefore, not from the point of view of music that I shall approach the question. I go to the opera as rarely as possible, and I have had little experience on this side. So far as I can see, a regular opera is composed of a series of musical numbers, connected by some sort of action: say, solos, choruses, duets, ballets, overtures, trios, septets and so on affording an opportunity for the musician to exercise his talent. In short, it is a concert in fancy dress, the intervals and transitions of which are more or less filled up by some vague noise. Only, in a concert, the singers can stand motionless if they choose, while in an opera they feel bound to indulge in conventional, ridiculous gestures of absolutely no use for their essential purpose, such as the long-drawn elaboration of some dizzy F. I shall not speak of the costumes, the scenery, and staging, which are generally wretched and which will before long become insufferable to the most patient audience. A little while ago I was present at a performance of "Carmen," and I had the feeling that it is soon going to be difficult to make the public believe that all Spaniards are clad in green boleros and sky-blue tights, even though the latter are adorned with a pretty yellow band.

If you prefer another definition of the opera, I might say that it is a dramatic action offering an occasion for several situations upon which the orchestra and the actors comment lyrically. For whatever a singer may do, his business

is not to act but to sing and to express the movements of his soul with his voice rather than with his limbs.

Of course, there is no form of art, however mediocre and absurd, that will not yield to genius or to that mysterious force, often so oddly applied, which we call "conviction." And genius and conviction sometimes manage to do something even with the opera. Of this strange outcome I can give a few examples, such as Gluck's "Orpheus," Beethoven's "Fidelio," Berlioz's "Trojans," Wagner's "Tannhäuser," Verdi's "Rigoletto." Recently, however, I had an experience which gave me pause. I was present at a performance of "Don Giovanni," at the Metropolitan Opera House, and after a few moments devoted to a refreshing nap, I found, to my great amazement, that I was following the piece with some interest. And yet it would have been difficult to imagine a form of art and, I must own it frankly, a kind of music more repugnant to my taste. That mysterious force called "conviction" was operating upon me, and I regretted having to leave before this experience had reached a decisive stage.

Wagner had a clear idea of the hybrid, artificial character of the opera and of the kind of suffering caused an audience by the fact that their minds are divided and that they do not know whether they have been invited to a play or to a concert. He tried to increase the importance of the drama, to immerse the actors more deeply in it (forbidding them to turn towards the spectators), and to carry all the action along on an orchestral flood, a continuous torrent of passion and desire sustained by remembrance and a sort of nostalgic remorse. In fact the lyrical commentary, which the old opera simply assigned to a tenor or a soprano, Wagner reserved entirely

for the orchestra. Let us suppose, for instance, that the composer wants to express this idea: "How beautiful the weather is today; I believe it is a good time to take a walk." In an Italian opera, the tenor would come to the footlights, with a hand on his heart, and supported by a few discreet chords would have no difficulty in imparting his feelings. Wagner, on the contrary, would paint for us with the orchestra all surrounding nature in a mist of sonorous dreams, the singer playing a part in them and his voice emerging, as it were, accidentally. In reality a Wagner drama is a vast symphony, in which the true characters are the leitmotifs, and human beings intervene—in general, pretty laboriously—only to explain where we are, what has happened, what is happening, and what will happen. The human mouth therein is far less important than the silver mouth of the flute or the golden one of the trumpet, and it completely disappears in the continual breaking down of the harmonic superpositions in which the great artist delights. There remains only a submerged gesticulating image.

I am far from wishing to suggest that Wagner did not have a dramatic temperament; on the contrary, he had a very profound, if not an unerring, one. But every situation called forth in him sonorous upheavings which swallowed up the rest, and which subsided somewhat only to swell again into new waves a little farther on.

On the whole, I think that it would not be giving a bad definition of a Wagner drama to say that it is a symphony with a continuous programme and less action than the sonorous memory of an action.

**I** HAVE SAID enough of the way in which musicians have made use of the drama in the practice of their art. My real

purpose is to examine what use dramatists can make of music.

One use we can discard at the outset: it is the introduction of music in the guise of a prelude or a detached piece as, for instance, when one of the characters sings a little song or when some vocal or instrumental concert must, for some reason or other, take place. Nothing is more dangerous. The musician is never given his share, and he, as a rule, does not care a straw for the play, his only idea being to find a place for a little score. The action is kept standing still, on one leg, so to speak, until the performers make an end of their pleasant noise. Moreover, between the atmosphere of the spoken word and that of music there exists an almost distressing difference, and the passing from one to the other results in a complete destruction of the spell which the poor poet has been at such pains to cast over the spectators.

How is it, then, that not only the Greek theatre but all primitive theatres, up to and including the stage during the period of melodrama from 1840 to 1880, used music?

I got my first explanation of this fact at a performance of "*L'Annonce faite à Marie*" given in Paris at the Comédie des Champs-Élysées, with the assistance of M. Gémier. There is a scene in this play in which the head of a family, on the point of undertaking a long journey, breaks the bread for the last time with his children and his servants gathered around the table. This is an idea which looks natural on paper, but it is difficult for it to escape ridicule when presented on the stage. And indeed at the first performance I never witnessed that touching picture without feeling a shudder run along my spine as if I had heard a false note. Gémier, prompted by his vast dramatic experience, did not

hesitate a moment: "We must have some music," he exclaimed. They set going a *glockenspiel* of some sort, and the scene passed off triumphantly, the sound of the bells at once conferring upon it the atmosphere, the ambient, the dignity, and remoteness, which the words alone, in their thinness and bareness, were unable to provide. And the cinema, of course, offers many instances of the same kind. Any pantomime or dumb show is simply impossible without musical support.

I had carried the recollection of this incident to Japan where, for several years, I occupied a diplomatic post, and where I was a constant spectator at the admirable national theatre called "Kabou Ki," now unfortunately on the way to disappearance, like all things of beauty in this world, under the influence of our coarse, materialistic civilization. The long hours which I spent at the Imperial Theatre watching with emotion the unfolding of the heroic epics of the Genrokou period were for me a true professional school of drama. Unluckily this was rather late, at a time when I had given up all dramatic ambitions—the more so as the modern stage, taken up by ecstatic debates of amorous psychology, would collapse under the heavy buskin of a hero or a demi-god. I then understood what dramatic music is, that is to say, music used by a dramatist, not by a musician, not aiming at the realization of a sound-picture but giving impulse and pace to our emotions through a medium purely rhythmic and tonal, more direct and more brutal than the spoken word. We are, let us say, at the denouement of a play. The atmosphere is stormy. Somebody arrives. Something is going to happen. It is one of those situations where in Europe a whole orchestra would be used. In Japan you have only a little

yellow man perched on a platform, with a tiny cup of tea by his side and in front a tremendous drum, which it is his role to beat. I will call him the director of thunder. Those single hollow thumps, repeated at first at long intervals, then more vigorously and rapidly until the frightful, expected apparition comes at last, racking our nerves, are enough without any orchestra or score to put us in the desired ambient. In the same way, when anger rises and two human cocks are on the point of coming to blows, or when some peremptory intervention occurs, three or four hard, sharp clacks with a bat on the stage floor are enough to silence speech and to make way for authority. So a teacher raps his desk with his ruler to call his class to attention.

To take another example: in "Tristan and Isolde," when the lovers, after drinking the fatal potion, cast on each other distracted looks and suddenly feel burning passion take the place of hatred in their souls, the tremolo of the violin, like the vibration of a soul on the verge of breaking, is all the dramatist needs to have, and the rest of the orchestral commentary seems useless. The sound, the rhythm, the tone of cymbals or a bell do not form with the spoken word so sharp a contrast as does music which belongs to another sphere. On the other hand, the directing of a modern orchestra, whose path is implacably traced by little black signs and measure bars on the rigid stave, has not sufficient life and suppleness. On the Japanese stage the musician is himself an actor. He watches the development of the drama, which he freely punctuates, at the right moment, with whatever instrument, guitar, lyre, or hammer, may have been placed in his hand, or simply with his voice—for this is a magnificent element in the Japanese theatre that I have fail-

ed to mention. Side by side with articulated voice goes the inarticulate voice—grumbling, exclamation, doubt, surprise, all the human feelings expressed by simple intonations in charge of those official witnesses of the play sitting squat in their little boxes. When we are in the grip of the play we are grateful to the anonymous fellow who utters cries for us and assumes the task of expressing our feelings by something less conventional than plaudits or hisses.

Music in the classical drama of Japan and of China has also another rôle, which is to express continuity. It is the *current* of the story, as we speak of the *current* of a river. It is the latent revenge of narration upon action, of duration upon incident. Its business is to give the sensation of the flow of time, to create an ambient, an atmosphere, for in life we not only speak or act, we listen, we are surrounded by something vague, diverse, and changing to which we must needs give attention. According to this conception, music does not aim at sustaining and underlining the words; it often precedes and provokes them, it invites expression through feeling, it sketches the sentences leaving to us the task to finish them. It follows a path parallel to our own. It attends to its special business while we, our ears filled with its murmur of memories, forebodings, and counsels, read at sight *our* score. When necessary it weaves behind the drama a tapestry of sounds, the colors of which both divert and relieve the spectators, and suffuse with their pleasing suggestions the dryness of a description or of an explanation. Such music is to the ear what a back-scene is to the eye. In the same way the sound of a waterspout or of cages full of birds agreeably mingles with our conversation and carries along on a stream of reverie the prose of our everyday affairs.

And since the wanderings of my thought have led me to speak of China I should like to say a word about a great actor who recently gave in New York a series of performances and whom I had much pleasure in seeing once more. I mean the famous Mei Lan-fang. Mei Lan-fang takes only women's or girls' parts, but he acts them with such airy grace that, in the manner of a transcendent mirror, he divests them not only of all sexual suggestions but even, if I may say so, of their temporality. He is neither man nor woman: he is a sylph. All the sentiments and emotions, owing to the delightful fluidity of his postures, are not so much expressed as transposed by him—to the domain of music. It is music, a long melopoeia of the violin emphasized by the drum, which takes possession of that elegant body, from the nervous spring of the legs up to the last articulated detail of his resourceful hands and sharp-nailed fingers, and which regulates the whole outline of the mimic sentence. His feet give the impetus, his arms draw the general line upon which the nimble phalanges inscribe dainty *appoggiaturas*. The very singing of that charming being, like the humming of a flying insect, only serves to associate the man more intimately with the melodious solicitation and the soul with the action of the body. It is an enchanting spectacle.

FOR A WRITER theories are only the—often temporary—scaffolding that serves to prop his productions. And so it seems to me that instead of keeping to the domain of dreams and doctrines it might be more interesting if I were to add a few words about a work to which the various ideas just stated served as accompaniment and support. I have in mind a play for which I received an order from a producer who, after



showing intemperate enthusiasm, refused to accept it. This fact, by the bye, only resulted in advantage to me, for my play, "Christopher Columbus," thus abandoned by Herr Max Reinhardt, was eventually performed with Darius Milhaud's music at the Staatsoper in Berlin. It is of this play, which has been published by the Yale University Press with Jean Charlot's illustrations, that I should like to speak before bringing this article to a conclusion. The conditions of the contract, laid upon my desk by the invisible powers whose virtual and imperious agent Herr Reinhardt had consented to be, contained interesting possibilities. The work was to be an historical drama, and, up to that time, I had written only works of pure imagination. Music and, it was specified, choruses were to play an important part. So all through the writing of the drama I had to bear with some implied collaborator who, naturally, could be no other than my friend Darius Milhaud, with whom I have been for years on terms of close intimacy in both ideas and feelings. My rôle, then, consisted in looking on Christopher Columbus, in turning over the leaves of his history and legends, in evoking the principal scenes, one after the other, and in waiting for the questions, objections, and comments which the musician, through the collective medium of the orchestra and chorus, would have to present in the name of the public—that audience surrounding a great man and a great event which is composed of all peoples and of all the generations.

A life, a work, a destiny, the most sublime that can be, that of the inventor of a new world and the welder of God's earth, is unfolded on the stage, and the reactions and emotions provoked in us by that spectacle do not remain unexpressed. By turns murmuring

applause and issuing a challenge, the public follows all the incidents of the drama—that anonymous power which we call Opinion, the opinion of which the press today has become the mouth-piece, the opinion of posterity which supports, espouses, opposes, or reinforces the opinion of Columbus's contemporaries.

In such a drama music plays an entirely different part from what it has previously played down in front of the stage. It is no longer a simple resonator; it does not merely accompany a song; it is a true actor, a collective person with diverse voices, whose voices are reunited in a harmony, the function of which is to bring together all the rest and to disengage little by little, under the inspiration of a growing enthusiasm, the elements of the final hymn.

Pascal has very justly said: "Prolonged eloquence is tedious." I am inclined to modify his thought thus: "Prolonged music, prolonged poetry are tedious." The soul is not all the time in the same state of tension, and this applies to the spectators as well as to the actors on the stage. It needs, now and then, to come down to earth, if only to find a new base from which to spring again. For the author, and with him the spectators, it is advantageous to do as the wine-tasters do in France, who, at intervals, suck a piece of lemon to wash out their mouths and so be better prepared to appreciate the next sip of nectar. A drama thus understood is not a monotonous flight midst the uninterrupted purring of the orchestra or the versification. It is a series of outbursts and abatements.

I mentioned Wagner earlier in this article. The glory of that great man was his understanding that all things which partake of sound, from speech to song, are bound together by subtle links reach-

ing across different realms, and that music is inherent in whatever is realized in time, whether it merely imposes rhythm upon those realizations or gradually colors them with various tones and raises them at last to the full expression of the orchestra and of song. His only mistake was in not establishing degrees between reality and the lyrical state, and by this he impoverished his palette of sounds and narrowed the scope of his flight. With him we do not penetrate little by little a conquered or deserted world; we are placed at the outset, through an enchanted blending of tones and the incarnation of the brasses, in a narcotic atmosphere in which everything happens in a dream.

Milhaud and I, on the other hand, have tried to show how the soul gradually reaches music, how the sentence springs up from rhythm, the flame from fire, melody from speech, poetry from the coarsest reality, and how all the means of sonorous expression, from discourse, dialogue, and debate, sustained by simple beatings of the drum, up to an eruption of all the vocal, lyrical, orchestral riches, are gathered in a single torrent at once varied and uninterrupted. In a word, we wanted to show music only in the state of full realization, as a cryptic language portioned out among the pages of a score, but in the nascent state, rising and overflowing from some violent feeling.

Christopher Columbus is seen dying in the Valladolid inn, whither he has crawled to ask the King for the means to sail once more. And at that moment, as all his past on the point of reaching its final issue reappears before his eyes, the hero, so to speak, divides into two and becomes for us both spectator and judge of his own epic. Scene follows scene. We see the line of the horizon towards the West! The dove, image of

the Holy Ghost, crosses the sea and comes to Genoa, bringing to the hands of a child its fluttering message. The sailor at the Azores receives intercepted revelations from beyond the Ocean and from beyond the Tomb. Genius strives against creditors and courtiers, against the envious and the skeptics. The captain quells rebellion. And then comes the hour of the Passion: the censure and bickering of petty minds; the Discoverer of the Globe lashed by a cook to the mast of his ship and buffeted by the rage of men and the fury of the elements; the prodigious ingratitude of the whole world, one woman excepted. Death approaches, and, finally, the dove, that, as in the days of the Flood, escapes and bears a branch plucked from the newly risen world to the bosom of the Pantocrator!

All this is not performed in the void. Every voice, every word, every act, every event calls for an echo, an answer. They bring about and diffuse a kind of collective, anonymous roaring as of a sea of generations following one another, looking on and listening.

This I have called the Chorus. It is not the Chorus of the ancient drama—that troop of commentators and self-appointed advisers that no protagonist, if he were ever so little eloquent, had any difficulty in enlisting on the Mediterranean quays. It is, rather, the Chorus which the Church, after the triumph of Christianity, invited to enter the sacred edifice to become an intermediary between the priest and the people, the one *officiating*, the other *official*. Between the speechless crowd and the drama developing on the stage—and if I may say so, on the altar—there was needed an officially constituted interpreter.

"Christopher Columbus," as it was given in Berlin and may be given some

day in America, may be interesting also because of another novelty. This novelty originated from a desire to have no walls—for eyes or for ears—to submit to no ready-made stage spectacle, so that instead we might evoke for ourselves our own music and scenery and paint its ever-changing surges on the panels of the magic box in which we are confined for an instant. In a musical drama whose characteristic is the transformation, under the action of time, of disconnected events into one melodic line, why should we admit immobile scenery? Why not let the images suggested by poetry and sound be exhaled like smoke and be caught for a moment on the screen, gradually to disappear and give place to other visions? Why, in a word, not make use of the cinema? Everyone has indeed noticed that a fixed piece of scenery, an unchanging backdrop, once the first effect has been produced, tires and displeases the eyes and tends to spoil the poetic illusion by the admixture of an inferior element rather than to keep it up. Then why not treat the scenery like a simple frame, like a conventional foreground behind which a

path is open to dreams, to memory, and to imagination? When a stream of music, or action, and poetry is carrying away the soul of the spectator, why meet it with a sham sky as trivial and gaudy as the walls of a coffee-house? Why not devise, instead of that inert cloth, a surface sensitive to thought? Why not use the screen as a magic glass in which all sorts of images and of suggestions, more or less dim in outline, may pass, move, join, or part? Why not open the door of that indistinct world where ideas are born from sensations and where the phantom of the future mingles with the ghost of the past? For the expression of the finest *nuances* of feeling, memory, and thought, why not utilize the infinitely subtle harmony of shadows? Movements, values, clusters of forms and appearances continually decomposed and recomposed, this is all the cinema and it is also all music. It seems to me, therefore, that these two arts are naturally destined to contract an alliance, the formula for which America, better than any other country, might help the artist to discover.

# THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC TREATMENT OF SCRUPULOUS PATIENTS

On some aspects of the transference situation

GEORGE MORA

IT IS ESSENTIAL in our opinion, in order to consider the psychological problems of the scrupulous patient, to accept a position which takes into consideration two basic principles. On one side, one must recognize, besides the conscious life, the validity of the unconscious life, as it has been described by modern psychology; on the other side, one must recognize the validity of the traditional teaching of Catholic theology, as it has been transmitted to us through the Church.

From the point of view of psychology, one realizes that the action of every man is in relation to forces proceeding from the deep sources of the personality since birth and even before birth so that each action seems to be the expression of all the previous life of the individual.

From the point of view of philosophy and theology, one cannot deny that man is in a very particular situation in the universe, namely that he is free in his action and that there is a complete system of values towards which he must assume a position.

It is, today, largely accepted that many actions receive their motivation from the unconscious life. The super-ego, this

deep, almost instinctual force, is the basis of many of our actions. It is a force which develops in the early years of life from the profound levels of the personality.

In man, there is a moral conscience, and not just a super-ego. Man is in a unique situation in the universe: though made of dust, he is, however, similar to God. These are the boundaries of life, which, extending from biologic determinism on one side, to free will on the other, give to man his existential meaning.

Moral conscience, this faculty of recognizing his own actions as good or bad, distinguishes man from all the other beings of the universe. The actions of each one of us—whether we profess to be religious or not—acquire a character of good or bad and give to us a personal satisfaction or a sense of discomfort. To state that this is a very personal evaluation, and therefore subjected to mistakes, would be to give an interpretation overdetermined in the sense of psychologism.

To recognize his own actions as bad, that is to have the feeling of a fault, without having the possibility of being forgiven, would be a condition extremely untenable and pessimistic of human nature. Man was not left in this condition. The sacraments instituted by Christ with His redeeming work and continued by the Church, offer to man the possibility of being forgiven not once but many times. And the extension of the forgiveness can be practically unlimited, in relation to the gravity of the offense. The

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man who approaches the sacrament of penance goes back in his mind to the actions he has accomplished, to the thoughts he has had, and recognizes himself as a sinner. This is a normal phenomenon, due to the presence of moral conscience in human nature.

The self-examination which precedes confession is also an expression of the total personality of the individual. It can be thorough, taking into consideration his more or less obsessive structure; it can be limited by an unconscious refusal of the subject to recognize his own faults; it can be, on the contrary, exaggerated by a masochistic tendency of the subject towards his own faults.

If it is true—as we have stated above—that super-ego and moral conscience cannot be considered separately, one cannot deny that there is an uninterrupted continuum between one and the other. How can we notice whether the sense of guilt that the person expresses is due to an objective situation or is only the expression of an obsessive and masochistic personality? One would think that this is a problem almost insoluble, because of the indistinct limits between conscious and unconscious sources of guilt.

It would be in fact an insoluble problem if confessions were made directly to God without any other intermediary. But in the Catholic confession the work of the priest is essential.

We will not enter here into the theological structure of confession, and we will limit ourselves to some considerations of a psychological nature. Man is not alone in this world. He lives in a society, in a culture, in a particular environment. Even more than this, he is in intimate, personal contact with other human beings similar to himself. It is in his childhood—through a relationship based on dependency and love with

the adult, in general with the mother, that he establishes the first solid relationship with another person. The way in which this first relationship has taken place will influence all successive relationships. This is a very important datum, well established by modern psychology.

The instinctual need of the human being to love and to be loved is then satisfied in this basic relationship of the child with his mother and in all the successive relationships of the being with other beings. From the psychological viewpoint one could almost say that love exercises an action of re-enforcement among men. That is, it is a force which increases as it gives itself, which receives (always) more than it gave. One can see that modern psychology has at this point reached conclusions which are in accord with the teaching of love given to men by Christ.

Of all human relationships, that of two beings—an "I" and a "thou"—is a very particular one. This type of relationship often acquires a special character. Consider for instance the relationship between husband and wife, or between a son and a mother, or even between a pupil and a teacher. We become aware of the almost mysterious character of this relationship, which in recent years has been elaborated in detail by some existentialist schools of psychiatry.

One of the reasons for the complexity of this dual relationship—in which there is almost an interpenetration of being—is the fact that events of childhood and of adolescence are re-enacted much more intensely in the situation of dual relationship than in other situations.

The penitent who approaches a confessor is in a particular type of dual relationship, which we will try to de-



scribe here from a psychological viewpoint.

On one side the penitent is in the position of a child who approaches the father to ask for forgiveness of sins. He becomes a child again not only from a symbolic point of view—as it is in fact written in the Gospel—but also from a psychological point of view. That is, he re-experiences, in a certain way, the feelings and the conflicts which characterized his relationship with his own father. Feelings of inferiority, of identification, of ambivalence can arise and become effective at any moment.

On the other side, confession is essentially an act of responsibility, one could even say, the act of responsibility "par excellence." Because it is the only act in which man, on his own initiative, thoroughly evaluates his thoughts and actions in relation to God. The offense of man against God, even if limited in itself, acquires an unlimited character, since one of the terms of the relationship is God who is unlimited. Man's attitude of extreme responsibility while examining his sins stems from this. It is an attitude very different from the first one—that of the child facing the father. Here on the contrary it is the grown-up, in all the maturity of his personality and his judgment, who enters the presence of another grown-up, and through him, that of God himself. Still, we have to remember that in this adult personality infantile traces can still be effective because they are not integrated.

In front of the penitent arises the personality of the confessor. He is the representative of God, and as such his actions are above analysis, and he can be considered as having a determined psychological structure. We will confine ourselves to considering the development of his personality, the un-

conscious motivations which have contributed to his vocation, the tendencies which have motivated him toward a certain Order more than another. All this has to be considered from a psychological viewpoint. It does not have anything to do with the theological validity of the sacrament, which is independent of these factors. The confessor symbolically assumes the role of "father." On the other hand, he is also a man, a man like all the others, a child of the eternal Father.

ONLY SOME of the problems raised by the penitent-confessor relationship can be touched here. The question is evidently very complex. An intricate dynamic of relationships develops, many complex situations play a role, more or less clear, in the penumbra of the confessional. The types of sins that the penitent relates, the circumstances which have accompanied them, the echo that they have raised in his conscience, all this certainly affects the confessor, perhaps arouses in him unconscious feelings in relation to his personal life, to his own sins. The tone of voice, the expression of the penitent, even his silence, can influence the dynamic of this relationship.

Of the two personalities involved in this relationship, we will limit our analysis to the one of the penitent. It is not necessary to repeat here the data that modern psychology—especially of psychoanalytic inspiration—has supplied to the knowledge of the mechanism of the scruple. Common experience shows that persons suffering from scruples are incompletely developed from a psychological viewpoint, that their infantile complexes have not been solved, and their personality presents traits typically obsessive. In their insatiable need for perfectionism, they are unable to differ-

entiate between important and unimportant things.

They are individuals who have suffered in the expression of their aggressivity, who color many relationships with others by a marked ambivalence, whose actions are accompanied by an indubitable sado-masochistic character. In fact, more than their real acts, their violent repressed desires are at the origin of their feelings of guilt, while their obsessive actions (the scruple) act as a self-punishment, because of the uncomfortable feeling which they arouse.

If the analysis is carried further, one discovers that they are isolated individuals, narcissistic, unable to express true love, and true charity, who constantly remain as cold as angels of marble.

A step further, and one realizes that the rigid and revengeful attitude that they attribute to God is nothing else but a projection of their own aggressivity and of their own rigidity; their God is nothing but a narrow-minded guardian who gets lost in the details and forgets the essential.

They attribute to themselves the role of highest judges because the image that they have of God is an expression of their unconscious. In a word (and we accept here the views of certain modern psychiatrists who, in our opinion, have clarified this point very well), they put themselves in the place of God, they attribute the absolute of God to an idol. They feel guilty because they are guilty. But the sense of guilt has been transferred from the real cause to their neurosis. This means a complete overthrow of all the values in relation to which each man receives his true meaning.

Thus we discover the two sources of their trouble: on one side, a certain pathological structure to their personality, on the other side a feeling of pride, of isolation, a misappreciation of

the hierarchy of values—both constantly interacting.

If it is easy to admit in the personality the presence of unconscious forces; it is considerably less easy to reduce to unconscious forces the attitude of the penitent, which is generally attributed to moral conscience. In other words, the act of pride which has been mentioned above is certainly the expression of a troubled personality; but it does not lose, nevertheless, its character of a free act. Otherwise, we would be denying the intrinsic character of a free act of confession, which remains essentially an act of responsibility.

As we have mentioned, the action of the priest is essential in the Catholic confession. This is a very important fact, even from a psychological viewpoint, as the priest is generally the first one to become aware of the scrupulous nature of the troubles expressed by his penitent. From a practical viewpoint, the first question which arises is that of the attitude of the confessor to the penitent who presents a trouble psychospiritual in nature.

In a case like this, the confessor's duty is to attempt to clarify the personality of the penitent to himself. Can this personality be considered normal, or not? Is the penitent's trouble a recent or an old one? Did the penitent receive a distorted religious education, based only on punishment, and on fear of God? Has the penitent been made aware of the abnormal character of his scruples, and how has he accepted this?

These questions could be multiplied the more the confessor knows the penitent; they are also motivated by the type of relationship which is established between the confessor and the penitent.

Though well aware of the defects and the limitations of every classification, we find a certain advantage, from a practi-

cal viewpoint, in dividing the scrupulous patients into three groups. In spite of the disadvantages, this division will contribute to a clarification of the problem.

First, there are the mild cases, in which the scruple consists in the exaggeration of normal characteriological traits of the personality. These are rigid and meticulous individuals whose scruples develop on the occurrence of some occasional circumstances: for instance, during adolescence when the reactions of the personality to external events are more disordered. Others have been impressed by a strong sermon on hell and on the fear of God; or they experience a feeling of guilt because of an accident or of a death in the family; or they have been sick and their personality is weaker than usual. They are individuals whose personality may be considered normal, in spite of some peculiar characteriological traits. It is possible that the obsessive tendencies of their personality are relieved by the type of work they perform. In this case, no trouble appears at the surface.

In severe cases, the scruple is a typical mental symptom. It is accompanied, in fact, by other mental symptoms very evident: hysteric spells, stereotyped behavior, sudden changes of humor, incongruous actions, at times, epileptoid constitution. The content of the scruple can be rather bizarre, even to the point of giving the impression that the subject is not in contact with reality. These cases are rather easily recognized and the subjects are usually referred to a psychiatrist without delay. The religion they claim to follow is nothing else but one of the forms of expression of the psychosis. However, these are extreme cases which, in our experience, are rather rare.

More frequent are the cases of middle severity; they also present the great-

er variety of problems. They are subjects who present obsessive and compulsive symptoms very clearly. A detailed history of these cases never fails to reveal troubles of their psycho-sexual development, while their actual behavior reveals important troubles in the field of aggressivity. One realizes that these subjects have a tendency to represent all things in opposing terms of good or evil, repeating in such a way a concrete and magic type of behavior, typical of children. They lack spontaneity; their attitude toward others is basically mechanistic and dehumanizing. In the attempt to live in the absolute, they refuse to get involved in life. In the attempt to reach perfection, they idealize themselves, they create a false image of themselves. Their thoughts are constantly turned to themselves; they unconsciously place themselves in the center of their universe. Doing so, they isolate themselves and lose more and more contact with reality, a fact which has the effect of making their condition worse. Unconsciously, they imagine that they are interesting cases, especially to their confessor. What is worse, deep in themselves, they think they are innocent, "angelic," even when they accuse themselves of the worst sins. In dealing with them, one has at times the feeling that their behavior expresses an intense need of being protected—especially from the impulses of their aggressivity. For this reason, they turn to religion, which, with its mysterious and supernatural elements, offers to them, in their opinion, the best protection. In numerous cases, their behavior, no matter how abnormal, is the only behavior possible. In view of the level of development reached by their personality and of the fundamental weakness of their ego, their behavior makes possible the highest functional expression of the personality

at that particular moment. One often has the feeling that their contact with reality can break at any moment. In many of them, the symptoms they present (including the scruple), constitute the best defense against extreme anxiety and at times even against a latent psychosis which is at the basis of their personality; while, on the moral level, the symptoms are the expression of a defense against a "bad conscience."

Therapeutically, the attitude of the confessor in severe cases is very clear and his decision simple: they are mental patients who have to be referred to the psychiatrist. The situation is very different when one deals with cases of mild or middle severity.

**I**T IS HERE that the transference between penitent and confessor plays a fundamental role, since most of the time the confessor handles the problem alone, often for a long time. In these cases the role of the confessor presents two aspects which are confluent and which overlap, even considerably, but which have to be considered separately in this study for reasons of clarity. In our opinion, the confessor exercises on one side a psychotherapeutic action, and on the other a sacramental action.

For the moment let us consider the first aspect. The emotional climate in which the confession takes place, the particular type of relationship between two human beings, doubtless influence the psychological condition of the penitent favorably. Let us consider the relief of being able to talk to someone who has the time to listen to everything that the penitent says (which is unique in itself in our modern culture where everything is hurried). Besides this, we should consider the cathartic value of the verbalization of the feelings and of the thoughts which can come to the surface

from the deep layers of the personality. Even if the confessor does not intend to exercise any therapeutic action (and this is the case very frequently), he exercises it simply because the situation of transference develops between himself and the penitent.<sup>1</sup>

We want to state here that we do not believe that the confessor has to exercise a psychotherapeutic action, unless when—being himself specialized in this field—he acts on a purely human level, outside of his sacerdotal ministry. But it is our conviction that a transference, considered as the relationship between two beings, takes place in the confession and that certain cases of improvement are due to it.

This does not prevent the belief that, for the "*vis curatrix animae*," determined by Grace, the sacrament in itself can determine a psychological improvement as well as the spiritual one.

We are convinced that the psychotherapeutic action of the confessor presents two fundamental aspects: one, an action of cathartic relief "from below" (easy to understand, from a psychoanalytic viewpoint); the other, an action of ontological reenforcement "from above." That is, by tracing again the route of the penitent's sins with him, the confessor presents him with the hierarchic scale of values which the neurosis had overthrown, and reveals his basic sin of pride. When the confessor instructs his penitent on the infinite goodness of God, on love which is the nucleus of the divine essence, on the respect which we owe to ourselves as creatures similar to God and which we owe to our brothers in Christ, as well as the spark of humanism always present in us, despite our worst sins, he presents that ontological clarification which certain Christian psychiatric schools emphasize more and more to-

day. The confessor is then in the presence of a very special opportunity to exercise, more or less unconsciously, that "personalistic therapy" which addresses itself to the low as well as to the high levels of the personality.

It is very true that the situation in which confessor and penitent are in relation to each other, cannot be defined as psychotherapeutic in the classical sense of the word. Confession, in fact, deals essentially with matters of direction and of forgiveness, while psychotherapy deals with analysis and explanations. It is true that the motivation which brings the sinner to the confessional is very different from that which brings the patient to the psychiatrist; in the first instance, the clear issues of moral conscience (namely a deep dissatisfaction with his own spiritual misery) are the basic ones, while, in the second instance, there is rather an internal desire to find a better psychological adjustment and a better social adaptation. Confession, being an act of love for God, is essentially an act of will. In psychotherapy, emotional factors play the major role. It is true that the confessor is invested with a supernatural authority which the psychiatrist does not have; that his activity is gratuitous because it is supported only by Christian charity, that in the confessional certain descriptions remain—and rightly so—veiled by discretion, and that the therapeutic instruments at the disposal of the confessor are very modest and limited. The psychiatrist, instead, offers services for which he is remunerated on the basis of professional relationships and disposes of therapeutic techniques much more numerous and effective.

However, in spite of all this, a common trait exists between the two, and a very important one, since it is true

that health, either physical or moral, is a positive value on the level of practical as well as of moral life, and that, as such, it has to be aimed at by both the priest and the psychiatrist.

In confession, the transference which is established between the priest and the penitent is based on love and Christian charity which the confessor represents. Disregarding the hypothesis, very suggestive, indeed, that the therapeutic force active in every psychotherapy derives (as some psychiatrists maintain) from the fact that the therapist represents the archetype Christ, there is no question that the person of the priest always represents an image of that of Christ. In this very same person the two aspects of Christ healing the sick and of Christ delivering men from sins are fused into a unit. Even better, these two aspects reinforce each other in the person of the confessor.

In our opinion, in the work of the confessor one finds the "trait d'union" between natural therapeutic action and supernatural sacramental action. The therapeutic action of reconstructing the hierarchy of values which he exercises on the penitent, of re-adjusting relative and absolute values, liberates this "unconscious God" who, according to certain authors, is present in each one of us, and makes the penitent more sensible to the action of the sacrament, more receptive to sanctifying Grace.

It is not possible to enter into the divine plan of salvation for men which escapes our rational comprehension, nor can we forget to mention that all tradition and all Christian teaching tend to consider mental health as essential to obtain sanctity. When one carefully examines the paradoxical work of certain saints (which is paradoxical only to our judgment, too rigidly based on the average and on mediocrities), one



recognizes the expression of strong and well-balanced personalities. If it is true that neurosis can be a painful, yet essential stage, on the way of Christian perfection, as certain Christian psychotherapists maintain, this remains nevertheless an exceptional proceeding of divine Grace, which goes beyond the limits of our judgment.

The description which has been represented here, of an integrating action of psychotherapy and of sacramental reality upon the part of the priest, is the optimum possibility which can take place. It is the ideal of psychotherapeutic action by the confessor, the re-integration of the hierarchic scale of values experienced in the "Erlebnis" of the transference.

However, things do not always go this way. There are cases in which a very strong and pathological attachment takes place between penitent and confessor, especially when this latter does not have adequate psychological knowledge. The penitent is then brought to consider the action of the priest essentially on the human level; a devaluation of the sacramental action necessarily follows. Without being aware of it, the priest plays a role, in his turn, in the neurotic mechanisms of the patient. A very difficult situation can then take place, while the neurosis progresses further.

For different reasons, a negative transference can also be established between the confessor and penitent. Some of these reasons are due to the psychological make-up of the scrupulous. They feel sinful, they repent, they confess, they receive penance. This succession of actions becomes for them like a routine to the point of constituting a vicious circle, an obsessive trait. It is then the compulsive repetition that psychoanalysis has well described and which in-

creases their neurosis. This does not mean, however, an acceptance of the Freudian thesis of religion as an obsessional neurosis. On the contrary, religion is here the way the neurosis of the scrupulous expresses itself.

Furthermore, the fact of presenting to the confessor the same problems, unsolved, increases the sado-masochism which is the basis of their personality. That is, on the masochistic side, they continuously feel guilty and need to come back to the confessional to receive a penance; on the sadistic side, their behavior means that they continuously doubt the priest's capacity for human comprehension, and, what is even worse, the value of the sacramental act that he performs. All this tends to minimize the adequacies of the priest, to make him more aware of his unsuccess. From this derives the priest's tendency to reinforce his sacerdotal authority in front of the penitent—to the disadvantage of his qualities of psychological comprehension. It is the beginning of a negative contra-transference upon the part of the confessor, which has the effect of making the situation worse. Very frequently the priest, who is not analyzed, is not conscious of this contra-transference and he thereby increases the neurotic needs of the penitent.

Even when the priest possesses psychological knowledge, dangerous situations of negative transference can occur if he tends to make excessive use of his psychological knowledge. A confessor who tries to discuss the problems of the scrupulous essentially from a purely psychological viewpoint, soon meets a tremendous resistance upon the part of the penitent who presents his problems only as religious ones. The scrupulous cannot be brought to admit, in spite of the tact used by the confessor, that his troubles are the consequences of a false psy-

chological and spiritual orientation of his being. On the contrary, he thinks that his case is a very complicated one, that his problems are difficult to understand and that he needs a confessor endowed with unusual knowledge and quality.

In all the cases of this type, as well as in many others, although the supernatural action of the sacrament remains unchanged, the psychological condition of the scrupulous is not modified; it can even become worse. It is in these cases that the services of the psychiatrist can be beneficial. Confronted with this new possibility, many new aspects of the problems must be considered: the way in which the scrupulous learns that his troubles need the intervention of the psychiatrist, the attitude more or less active of the priest toward the problem, the ideas that the scrupulous has built in himself of the psychiatrist and of his work (ideas largely influenced by the cultural environment in which the scrupulous lives)—and many other points deserve careful consideration.

When the confessor refers his penitent to a psychiatrist, all kinds of thoughts come to the mind of the penitent. He may have the impression that he is referred to someone else because his confessor does not understand him or prefers to reject him. Worse, he may imagine that to go to a psychiatrist represents an attack, a temptation to his faith. It is a particularly delicate moment, as it can carry very important consequences for the success of the therapy which will follow. Our clinical experience suggests that the essential point is that another transference will soon occur between psychiatrist and patient.

There is no doubt that if the scrupulous is referred to a psychiatrist who is not Catholic, or at least who does not recognize the importance of spiritual

values in men, a tremendous resistance, easy to understand, builds up in him. This means that he is brought to the assumption that his troubles are only of a psychological nature. On the other hand (at least in certain cases), a division of his transference will take place in the sense that, according to his typical concrete and magic way of thinking, the scrupulous will have an unconscious tendency to attribute positive or negative qualities to the two transferees—the one with the priest and the other with the psychiatrist. For the moment, the priest will represent for him the person who forgives or punishes, while the psychiatrist will represent the person who understands or who interprets wrongly. The transference toward one or the other assumes then a very ambivalent character.

On the basis of our clinical experience, one of the reasons for this ambivalence is due to the fact that the transference which is established between penitent and confessor is not analyzed—and cannot be analyzed, in our opinion—unless partially, in the elements which more clearly reflect the traces of unsolved conflicts of childhood. Thus, the neurotic elements of this transference cannot be integrated, except with difficulty, in the personality of the patient.

Furthermore, when we recall the beneficial role of a symbolic savior, common to the confessor as well as to the psychiatrist, we will recognize that there is a conflict with the unconscious feelings (positive or negative) the scrupulous patient has for the person of the priest or the psychiatrist.

Many patients have an unconscious tendency to prolong indefinitely this apparent contradiction between the two roles of the psychiatrist and of the priest. The most frequent form of de-

fense against analysis, employed by the penitent, consists in maintaining the separation between the two transferences and in employing one against the other. This is a point that psychiatric literature has recognized for a long time. But a series of situations exists in which the personality of the patient exercises its more or less evident neurotic role.

One should acknowledge here the importance of a good psychological preparation upon the part of the confessor before referring a penitent to the psychiatrist. One must admit that the ontological clarification offered by the priest facilitates and makes more acceptable the clarification offered by the psychiatrist, especially if they coincide on the essential points. This should make clear to the scrupulous that the two roles—and the two successive transferences—of the priest and of the psychiatrist do not oppose each other at all, but on the contrary, harmonize on the human level.

We believe, in fact, that two preliminary actions are essential upon the part of the psychiatrist: first, a confirmation of his respect for the spiritual values and for the belief of the patient; then, his approval of the work hitherto accomplished by the priest, which is always worthy of esteem, even if not accompanied by success, and his desire to continue in a fruitful collaboration with him, with full recognition of the secret nature of confession. All this already implies an ontological clarification similar to that given by the priest, in the sense of a definition of his own position toward the fundamental values of life.

The psychiatrist thus assumes his responsibility as a man, which, because of the role of identification, means an appeal to the patient to do the same. In the light of this clarification of posi-

tions, the patient's feelings of resistance decrease and a tendency develops, increasingly stronger, to superimpose the patient's transference toward the psychiatrist on the patient's transference toward the confessor. According to our clinical experience, one of the essential factors of success in the psychotherapy of the patient consists in the degree of superimposition of the two transferences. One sees the rapprochement between the positive and negative aspects which alternately characterize, for the scrupulous, the actions of the psychiatrist and of the priest. Taking place under the effect of a strong transference, this rapprochement facilitates a more adequate contact with reality. This does not mean at all that a fusion of the roles of the priest and of the psychiatrist occurs: on the contrary, a better contact with reality contributes to the ability to distinguish more clearly their respective roles and to recognize more completely the part played by the super-natural in sacramental action.

IN THE TRANSFERENCE between the psychiatrist and the patient, the transference between the priest and the patient is re-enacted, at least partially, and this explains the beneficial action which a good transference between priest and penitent can exercise on the later transference between psychiatrist and patient. Beyond this, the previous conflicts of childhood and youth are relived, re-enacted in the relationship of penitent-confessor. This time, however, they are analyzed in more detail, with the aim of finding a way toward psychological re-integration.

A close and sincere collaboration between the priest and the psychiatrist favors the success of the treatment. Besides the re-inforcement of the two transferences—toward the priest and then the

psychiatrist—their constant collaboration offers to the patient a concrete and personal example of love which should characterize the dual, and then group relationships, of men of good will.

As the psychotherapy progresses, the patient becomes increasingly aware of the psychological and spiritual meaning of his trouble. The area of unconscious guilt feeling diminishes slowly to a point reaching the normal limits compatible with existence; at the same time, the patient becomes progressively more receptive to the voice of moral conscience and, through it, to that of God.

He learns to accept his destiny and to realize his possibilities instead of tending to a sterile obsession with the absolute. The transference with the priest first, and then with the psychiatrist, has been the first meaningful experience since he lost the true meaning of life. This transference has been his first chance since he enclosed himself in the ivory tower of his egocentrism, the first expression of his new existential attitude toward life.

For the first time, he has experienced a stable and prolonged contact with another person who has shown interest and comprehension for his problems; he has succeeded in penetrating that unique and mysterious relationship of an "I" with a "thou," the only one which makes it possible for the two persons to exhibit their human and fundamental characteristic of free beings. He has learned that the essence of that relationship—in spite of its uniqueness—is found, more or less intensively, in all the other human relationships of life, of any nature, individual as well as collective.

This is an important aspect of the beneficial effect of transference in the treatment of these patients. A good transference offers them a concrete example of a relationship of an "I" to

a "thou"; a relationship which can be used as a model for many other relationships. On the way this transference is established will depend the possibility for the patient of being able to take part in other human relationships.

To treat a scrupulous person with psychotherapy does not mean that the patient may and must be rapidly cured of his troubles. Even after a long treatment, he will still retain his basic personality and psychological structure. In certain cases, the too rapid disappearance of the symptoms will have to be considered carefully. It is possible that the religious scruple disappears, but that other obsessional symptoms will appear. The patient may, in this case, get worse, because he will feel even more isolated, and deprived of the beneficial influence of the sacraments.

The essential change which must take place in him has to be considered from the viewpoint of his attitude toward his destiny: he must be enabled to recognize the positive aspects of life, to use the potentialities present in him, to understand the meaning of his human existence.

From a psychological viewpoint, he becomes aware of the fact that he has to renounce the infantile desire of protection which he found in the neurosis. But this means that he also can, at the same time, leave the realm of repression to enter that of freedom. He will be able to give a better expression to the instinctual tendencies of his personality without immediately feeling guilty. And if he feels guilty for something, this feeling of guilt will always maintain for him a correlation with God's mercy because he can finally understand that nobody can be tempted beyond his limits.

From the human viewpoint, the pa-

tient finally begins to understand the meaning of life, the limited and historical character of his existence. He becomes aware of the fact that as a man, he has a duty to accomplish in life, that this duty is a personal one, and that in order to accomplish this he must engage himself with all his being every moment of his existence.

From a theological viewpoint, one sees a true "metanoia" in the patient. It is the transition from the realm of Mosaic law and of Greek tragedy to that of Christian love, from the realm of tension to the realm of peace. Being in the realm of peace means to follow the voice of God, which expresses

itself through moral conscience, while the psychic apparatus assumes its role of "causa instrumentalis." To give one's self completely to the will of God means to reach the highest degree of freedom; because in this case there is no longer conflict but only the interior peace which Grace gives to one waiting for the eternal life.

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1 The term "transference" refers in particular to the relationship between psychiatrist and patient, in the psychotherapeutic process. While aware of this limitation, the term "transference" has been employed here to designate the long and deep relationship which can take place between confessor and penitent. When the penitent is scrupulous, this relationship can become particularly strong.



# PRAYER

LOUIS-MARIE REGIS

**I**N THIS STUDY we propose to consider briefly the place prayer occupies in the life of man as a religious being and then the role prayer plays in the activity of the theological virtues of every Christian. This analysis of the two complementary aspects of prayer will compel us to draw certain conclusions about the time which ought to be appropriated for prayer in the course of the day and about the obstacles which present-day living opposes to the activity of prayer.

## I

### *Prayer as the Climate of Every Kind of Religious Life*

Before we begin the doctrinal exposition which will establish the truth of this phrase, we ought to know the precise meaning of the words used to express this truth in order to understand the subject matter of this paper and to clear up any possible ambiguity. Our first section will be devoted to this work of clarification.

#### *What Is the Exact Meaning of the Words: Prayer, Climate, Religious Life?*

##### *Prayer:*

The first meaning of the word (*oraison*) comes from its classical usage: it designates a set speech (the speaker is called an *orator*) delivered in the pres-

ence of one or more persons to bring them to share the convictions of the speaker. Most of the time it designates the pleading of a lawyer before a judge whose favor he wishes to obtain.<sup>1</sup> The French language has preserved this classical meaning in the expression *oraison funèbre*.

Among the Scholastics, prayer designates an internal act of the practical intellect. It is an immanent act which may or may not be exteriorized in a verbal formula. It is an act by which the creature man submits his intelligence to the governing wisdom of God and places his intellectual activity in the interior of the divine plan as a distinctly new causal element. Taken in this technical sense, prayer is a moral activity, belonging to the virtue of religion; exteriorized in liturgical prayer, it is a bodily expression of our interior homage to the all-powerful divine Majesty.

In its present-day usage, prayer (*oraison*) has come to be identified with mental prayer. Excluding liturgical prayer which is embodied in words and external movements, it refers to activities and interior attitudes which scholastic theology has never included in its concept of prayer but has designated by other words. Mental prayer refers to a purely internal meditation at whose center are found intimately linked acts of prayer and devotion; the moral activity of the virtues of penance, humility, fortitude, temperance; the activity of the three theological virtues, as well as the Gifts of the Holy Spirit.

In the doctrinal exposition which follows we shall see both the advantages and the disadvantages of extending the

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meaning of the word *prayer* (*oraison*) and the errors this vague usage has engendered in religious minds and writings.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Climate:*

This word is borrowed from the language of geographers. The old Greek geographers, by describing the zones of the earth in relation to the sun, had established that the angle of incidence of the sun's rays varied with the bent or inclination (*klima*) of the earth's surface. As the angle of incidence changed, the conditions of heat and cold on the earth varied as well. In line with this evidence they confidently divided the known world into three zones or climates: the torrid, the temperate, the glacial (or frigid).

Usage passed quickly from this geographical phraseology to one that is more anthropomorphic. Climate designates the general conditions of temperature which favor or hinder human life and the conditions of a spiritual culture. The word *climate* then becomes synonymous with the human milieu; it designates a collection of elements which exercise an influence on the full development of the human being by conditioning his productivity in those fields where his activity can be brought into play.

Thirdly, the word *climate* is used metaphorically or analogically when prayer is spoken of as the climate of every kind of religious life. To prayer is attributed the capacity of influencing the development of the religious life, since it creates conditions favorable to the life's full flowering. Prayer brings the religious life to a flourishing condition and allows it to bring forth spiritual fruits of the sweetest savor.

#### *Religious Life:*

This expression can and should designate the life of every man who has come to the age of reason and recognizes by a kind of instinctive knowledge that he is dependent on a transcendent being to whom he offers service and homage.<sup>3</sup> Quite simply, religious life is that moral virtue of human life which consists in paying one's debt to one's Creator, a debt no one can exempt himself from, no matter under what external form the debt appears.

The expression *religious life* can also signify a state of perfection of that justice towards God which the creature owes to his Creator. This state consists in a kind of consecration of the whole man to the service of God to Whom he owes everything. In this sense, religious life exists in all religions, even non-Christian.

Finally, religious life designates the life of the evangelical counsels practised according to a rule approved by the Church Christ founded. From the nature of this Congress [Congress of Religious Men and Women, Montreal, 1954] and the character of its participants, it is evident that the expression *religious life*, whose climate is prayer, designates the life of the evangelical counsels, which seems, moreover, to be emphasized by the text printed at the bottom of the official stationery: *Estote ergo vos perfecti*.<sup>4</sup> But we must not forget that the life of the counsels presupposes the life of the commandments. We must not forget that our life of evangelical perfection is also a life of justice towards God; in other words, a life of religion which is, strictly speaking, the perfect working out of our life as creatures in relation to the creative paternity of God. This is the principal aspect we shall develop in the first part of this paper; in the second we shall

consider that aspect of Christian perfection which the theological virtues alone can give to our religious life.

### *Religious Life and the Virtue of Religion*

By our traditional ways of thinking and by our education we grow accustomed to identify religion with the Christian religion, religious life with the life of perfection. As a result, one aspect—and an essential one—of both religion and religious life escapes us. Religion is a moral virtue founded on justice towards God the Creator, our Creditor. So much emphasis is placed on the love of God as the end of all religious life that we are tempted to forget the specific or formal element of the virtue of religion which is primarily one of justice, not of love;<sup>8</sup> we are tempted to forget that religion is a moral, not a theological, virtue. If we wish to understand the nature of the religious life and the role of prayer as a moral activity, it is necessary for us to recall this elementary truth.

### *God the Creditor*

By His creative act which brings the creature into being, by His conserving act which keeps the creature in being, by His primary causality which permits the creature to act and indeed to be itself a cause, God establishes over each of us a claim so absolute that He has only rights over us, no duty. We are His property. He is the Lord and Master in the ancient meaning of these two words. And He may dispose of us according to His good pleasure and omnipotence. Not only is God an absolute creditor because He has given us everything we have, but He could not cease to be creditor without our immediately ceasing to be. By His creative and conserving activity He is a creditor in per-

petuity. He can only lend us the being that we have; we shall never possess it as our own. St. Thomas calls this *paternity by creation*, which is entirely different from God's paternity by adoption.<sup>9</sup> And it is different because in the sphere of creation nothing can serve as an instrument of God. He alone has the power to give; He is the only lender in perpetuity.

### *The Creature Man—a Debt*

Correlative with God's creative and conserving paternity is that debt which is man. If we were to speak of man as a *debtor*, we would speak only half the truth, since to be a debtor it is necessary first of all *to be*. But for a creature to be is to be indebted, because a creature has its being on loan. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish in man, in so far as he is a creature, his being and his state of debt. Man can be defined as an essential dependence, a perpetual loan from the treasury of being which is God the Creator. Truly we are completely the property of God; we are debts that can never be paid.

### *The Creature-Debt Became Stolen Goods*

A debtor can be an honest debtor if he acknowledges his debt and is resolved to pay it in so far as he is able. But a debtor can be dishonest as well as insolvent; he can be a thief. Now this has been our condition since the time that debtor, which we are as creatures, became a sinner. At root the sin consisted in trying to divest God of the absolute power He has over His creatures and in revolting against the ontological dependence which binds us to our Master and Proprietor. The proletarian of being—the creature—revolted against the only proprietor there is in this sphere of action: God.

*The Virtue of Religious Justice  
of the Creature towards God*

If sin is essentially a theft (we might add, as Revelation teaches us, the refusal of love), the virtue of religion is essentially the payment of the debt we are to our perpetual creditor, God the Creator. The virtue of religion involves both the cognizance we take of our condition of debt and the constant desire we have to pay that debt; it is as well the source of many acts the term of which is God the Creditor.<sup>7</sup> It is not God, however, but we ourselves who profit from the payment of the debt; we pursue the glory of God, but the whole profit accrues to us.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, by the virtue of religion we become just before God, not by paying our debt, an impossible task, but by acknowledging that in our condition of creatureliness we are debts through and through.

*The Religious Life and the Virtue  
of Religion*

In this context we can easily see the first meaning of religious life as such. Essentially, religious life is a state in which we acknowledge a debt, a life in which all rights are God the Creditor's, all duties the creature's. And as the glory of God results from this acknowledgement, the religious life is completely dedicated to giving glory to God; that is, to acknowledging His infinite excellence and majesty and to praising this excellence and majesty with the aim that they be recognized by all other men. The religious life is a dedication of our whole being to God's service; it is the acknowledgement—not by passing acts but by a state of life—of our absolute dependence on God to Whom we owe the whole of ourselves and everything else.

This, then, is the meaning of the religious life in the context of a religion of justice. Now within the same context let us go on to examine the role of mental prayer.

*Mental Prayer, Principle of Growth  
of the Religious Life*

Just as every other kind of life, religious life is something essentially immanent, with its source—and, when it reaches a certain stage of perfection, its term, equally—in the interior of the living thing. Furthermore, since the religious life is a human life and therefore a life immersed in time and subjected to the laws of change, it is characterized by a kind of evolution. By successive stages of growth it passes normally from an embryonic and imperfect state to one of full development. We have already shown that the religious life, because of its essential connection with the virtue of religion, is nothing more than justice towards God, a justice which consists in acknowledging our absolute dependence and in consecrating our entire activity to the glory of the Creator. Now this acknowledgement of dependence is made by two acts which belong properly and immediately to the virtue of religion: the act of devotion and the act of prayer. At the same time, these two acts constitute the essential structure of mental prayer as a moral activity. As mental prayer intensifies the acts of devotion and prayer, so proportionately it brings about the growth of the religious life and orients it toward its perfection. Let us take a rapid glance at these two acts considered as religious or moral activities.

*The Act of Devotion, Justice  
of the Creaturely Will*

Man has received existence and the power to act from God. To the degree

he perceives this constant, unfailing bond binding him to the Creator and making him absolutely dependent on God's good will, man must submit himself totally to the sovereign dominion God holds over him, if he wishes to be just and to give to everyone his due. But the act of devotion, an immanent act of the will and the principal act of the virtue of religion, is precisely the homage of the whole man to God. For by this act man submits his will to the service and honor of God.<sup>9</sup> The act of devotion is the spiritual sacrifice above all other religious sacrifices,<sup>10</sup> because the will-to-serve is at the heart of all other internal or external acts of service. In fact, it constitutes these acts moral acts. Devotion is a will-to-serve which has been deliberately accepted and chosen; a will prepared, come what may, to labor constantly for the honor and glory of God. It is not only an intention to honor God, but a will effective at giving homage and reverence as well. It is a will which yields to the sovereign dominion God holds over all that is man and over all that man makes and possesses. It is, then, perfect justice inasmuch as it is an acknowledgement of dependence and an absolute enlistment in the service of the honor of God: "All for the glory of God" is its maxim.

*The Act of Prayer, Justice  
of the Creaturely Intellect*

Human reason is a participation in the divine intelligence and, consequently, our noblest faculty. It remains, however, a gift: a gift of nature, it is true; yet its whole reality depends on the divine causality for its being and its continuance in being. The act of prayer is primarily a total submission of our reason to its Creator. By this means, it tes-

tifies, in the most perfect way man is capable of, to man's dependence. Prayer, then, is an acknowledgement of dependence and a glorification of the divine wisdom to which man, in the awareness of the littleness of his own vision, submits his own wisdom. Only after this is prayer an act of petition by which man places himself in the interior of the divine government as a quite particular second cause.<sup>11</sup>

*Mental Prayer, Principle of Growth  
of the Acts of Devotion and Prayer*

Religion—and, consequently, its two proper acts, devotion and prayer—starts from an instinctive perception of dependence on a transcendent reality. Normally it ought to develop by substituting for this instinct sought-for and discovered reasons. These reasons permit man to know better that Being on Whom he depends and the infinite transcendence which characterizes that Being. Such awareness, however, demands a constant reflection both on the nothingness of the creature and the extraordinary actuality and totality of God Whom Revelation presents to us as the Creator of heaven and earth: He Who knows all things, is above all things, the Eternal God, Unlimited Wisdom. Reflection goes further. It shows us ourselves not only as nothingness but, if I may so put it, as a nothingness-sinner or a nothingness-in-revolt against the divine transcendence. In contrast to man's revolt and ingratitude, reflection places the divine mercy and infinite love which God has shown in His works of salvation: the Incarnation, the Redemption, the Church. Before this spectacle which prayer holds constantly before the eyes of the soul, must not the acts of devotion and prayer be stimulated and grow in number and in quality?<sup>12</sup>



### *Prayer and the Growth of the Religious Life*

In the religious life envisaged as a state of service, as the life of a being who is essentially a servant of God, his Creator and Lord or Chief, it is easy to see the really vitalizing function of prayer. As our perception of our indebtedness grows, as our conviction grows that sin, the theft committed by the insolvent debtor we are, increases our debt of nature by an offense which only an all-powerful love can erase, our devotion and our prayer take on, more and more, the character of an acknowledgement of total dependence. They engender an interior activity completely oriented towards a manifestation of the glory of God. And this activity is the only justice we can practice towards God. The evidence grows that we are, in so far as we are creatures, nothingness. The evidence grows that we are, in so far as we are sinners, nothingness-thieves. This growing evidence necessarily intensifies our desire of making absolute restitution. That is, we desire both to restore to our Master and Lord the dominion which He exercises over us by right and to consecrate all our natural and supernatural powers to make our state of bondage more real. Since our religious life is essentially a service, explicitly thinking of the reasons for, and the obligations of, that service will unquestionably make more complete the consecration of our life to the worship of God under whatever form the opportunity for service may present itself to us.

#### *Mental Prayer, Principle of the Flowering of the Religious Life*

Every life that starts from a seed normally follows a curve of growth to a peak of perfection, usually designated by the word *adult*. Physically, an adult

is one who has drawn from the virtualities which the biological organism places at the service of our bodily development everything they can give; he is totally realized in the bodily order. Similarly, in the psychological order an adult is one who has developed all the potential of immanent activities, the powers of knowledge and appetite, and has organized them into a whole that is completely at the service of the man. An adult religious life is characterized by the arrival at the height of religious activity where the awareness of our character as God's servants and of the reasons which justify this condition are no longer the object of faith. Nor do they any longer depend on the sayings of our superiors and the reasons superiors give. They have become matters of unshakeable personal evidence.

#### *Religious Adult and Human Adult*

The full development of man's psychological life and of his religious life seem directly opposed. The psychological and moral adult has acquired a sense of independence. He has become his own master so that the organization of his physical and moral life, whether individual or social, is not tied up at every point with that of his parents and family circle. His is a condition of self-sufficiency in so far as such a thing is possible in the human order. On the contrary, the full development of the religious life comes with the perception of dependence. This dependence of the religious individual toward God, his Master and Lord, becomes more and more absolute. The freedom of the religious individual consists of two things: knowing he is the property of God, to whom he owes—and always will owe—everything; and acting in conformity with this truth. This means he is constantly prepared to submit to the wishes

of God on Whom he is dependent, to be God's servant forever. God's Will is his will; God's Wisdom is accepted in advance by his human reason. The religious adult has reached a state of dependence on the Creator in which God's service has become the one and only important thing. He has attained that level of sanctity which St. Thomas identifies with perfect religion,<sup>13</sup> a sanctity which consists in a purification of the soul of self-pride and of his own instincts of independence,<sup>14</sup> a sanctity which links him to his supreme principle in an unflinching consciousness of dependence and submission.<sup>15</sup> The religious man is set apart, an untouchable because he belongs to the Holy of Holies, to Him Who is in no way changed through any temporal and material contact.

#### *The Religious Adult and the Sense of Reverence*

From infancy our education and our Christian customs have placed us in contact with an incarnate God and Redeemer Who has adopted us as His own children. As a result, we tend to forget the transcendent and terrible character of the divine reality and the fright with which it ought normally to inspire us. The consciousness that filled Jacob's soul after his vision of the ladder linking heaven and earth also ought to fill our religious soul: "Indeed the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not. And trembling he said: How terrible is this place! This is no other but the house of God, and the gate of heaven."<sup>16</sup> This sense of fear and reverence before the divine transcendence is rooted in the infinite distance separating us from God. We are nothing and He is all. We are sinners and He is sanctity. And to be unaware of this abyss can involve a familiarity which invites us to consider God

an equal. This would be absurd and, at the same time, wrong.<sup>17</sup> Even Christ's soul, in as much as it is a creature, experiences that consciousness of the creature's littleness before the infinite perfection of God.<sup>18</sup> Reverence, then, consists in the consciousness of our disproportion to God, of our nothingness before Him Who is All. Now whoever perfectly possesses this reverential consciousness necessarily possesses, at the same time and by the same act, the mentality of the perfect servant. He is always at the service of the Master. His attention is so unflagging that the Lord cannot come upon him by surprise in a moment of distraction and forgetfulness. He has become service. At the moment this consciousness of reverence, founded on our condition of creaturehood, is enriched by the Gift of Fear, by which the Holy Spirit puts us in contact with the infinite grandeur of the Holy Trinity, then the religious life truly reaches its full flowering as the life of the prudent and faithful servant who is always there to wait for and to receive the Lord, even if He arrives unexpectedly.

#### *Mental Prayer and the Full Development of Reverential Consciousness*

It is easy to perceive the importance of mental prayer in the full development of reverential consciousness which is synonymous with religious perfection in its strict meaning of moral activity. Only a constant awareness of our nothingness and of God's inaccessibility can engender in our soul an absolute devotion to Him Whose proper name as Creator is Lord, at the same time that it induces us to pray to the Lord, to sacrifice to Him our creaturely wisdom in order to submit completely to His governing Wisdom. As a result, along with the flowering of the attitude of reverence, the two proper and immedi-

ate acts of the virtue of religion, devotion and prayer, reach a peak of perfection. They become the acts of a religious adult.

This, then, is the importance of prayer as the climate of the religious life when it is considered as justice toward God. For the religious life is the life of a creature and, moreover, of a reasonable being entirely consecrated to the service of his Master and Lord. He owes his being to God; he can give God only external glory and thanks for the praises and honors with which the Divine Majesty surrounds him. A debt because a creature, an insolvent and dishonest debtor because a sinner, man perfectly accommodates himself to another, to the transcendent and formidable Creditor, God, when he acknowledges God's sovereign dominion over him in and through his religious activities. Not until he attains, however, such a degree of dependence on Him to Whom he owes all that he loses complete autonomy in his will and in his vision of the government of the universe, does his liberty become a complete service and homage to the divine sovereignty. Only then is the religious a perfect religious. Only then is prayer the climate in which opens and flowers that life of service, which delineates the religious life in its essential features.

## II

### Mental Prayer, an Exigency of the Life of the Theological Virtues

#### *Moral Life and the Life of the Theological Virtues*

WITH THIS second aspect of prayer we leave behind or, rather, we place in the background what is essential to the religious man, the characteristic of servant. Now we focus our attention on

a completely different aspect: that aspect specific to the Christian religious life, which considers in man, no longer the creature he is formally, but the child of God he becomes through his identification with Christ, realized in and through baptism.

But to as many as welcomed him  
(Christ)  
he gave the right to become children  
of God—  
those who believe in his name;  
who were born not of blood,  
or of carnal desire,  
or of man's will;  
no, they were born of God.<sup>19</sup>

"No longer do I call you servant . . . but . . . friends,"<sup>20</sup> said Christ to his apostles, because "... the Father loves you dearly, because you are settled in your love for me and in your conviction that I come from the Father."<sup>21</sup> Now Christ is the giver of eternal life,<sup>22</sup> of eternal glory in an eternal kingdom in the company of the Father.<sup>23</sup>

The life of the moral virtues is acquired; it is the result of man's effort; and if the infused moral virtues supernaturalize moral effort and give it a divinizing value through the intervention of Charity, it is true, nevertheless, that the moral virtues do not have God as their object. Their function is not to establish a life of intimacy between man and God, but rather to make man true, that is to say, perfectly present to himself. On the other hand, the life of the theological virtues is a life lived in the presence of God and a life which is fed on the presence of God. It is crucial that we see the role of prayer in the life of the theological virtues as distinct from its role in the moral life. The moral life yields the means by which we attain our end. The life of the theological virtues already nourishes itself on the end, imperfectly as it must in its life on earth, which is, however, a participa-

tion in the eternal life: *haec est vita aeterna*.<sup>24</sup>

*Prayer and the Growth of the Life  
of the Theological Virtues*

The growth of the moral life consists in our becoming aware of our nature and of the rectification of that nature in relation to the end to be reached. The growth of the life of the theological virtues consists in a growth of the presence of the Holy Trinity in us. This presence is brought about in us by grace, but its increase can come about only *by way of object*; that is, by acts of knowledge and love whose immediate principles are the theological virtues.<sup>25</sup> Here God is not present by His creative causality of the human being, nor even by the efficient causality of grace and the operations of the virtues. God is present as known, hoped for, and loved by an organism of knowledge and of desire which makes us children of God and heirs of heaven.

Now prayer is the quest after, and the exercise of, this presence of God by way of object; it is the activity of Faith, Hope, and Charity. Consequently prayer does not consist in becoming empty, but in becoming filled with God; to empty oneself of self-centered thoughts will never produce the fullness of God's presence. It is by positive act, by acts of Faith in God and His revealed mysteries, by acts of Hope in the ineffable and all-powerful love of God, by acts of Love which have nothing in common with an amorous sentimentality—it is by a progressive intensification of the activity of the three theological virtues that the life of intimacy with God is increased. In this, and exclusively in this, theological or contemplative prayer consists. The growth of our life of the theological virtues normally depends, then, on the intensity of our prayer and the importance it has in our daily life.

*Prayer and the Full Development of the  
Life of the Theological Virtues*

"Anyone who loves me will treasure my message, and my Father will love him, and we shall visit him and make our home with him."<sup>26</sup> In the night of Faith—therefore, in the certitude but also in the evidence of the Trinity by way of object—prayer works for the growth of our theological life. If prayer is persevering, if in spite of obscurities and drynesses it pursues the exercise of, and the quest for, the Three in the soul, then God takes the initiative. He crowns our patience and the perseverance of our poor efforts by infusing the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, Who, without suppressing the enigma of Faith, accompanies our certitude of presence with a taste and a certain mysterious experience of the Trinitarian life itself. The mystery of God's presence seems to open a little; the mystery of His love imposes itself on the soul with new dimensions and intensity. Thus the soul comes to live more with God's life than with its own. This is the meaning of St. Paul's words: "It is now no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me."<sup>27</sup> When prayer has prepared the soul for this gift of God—being identified with Christ—the life of the theological virtues has reached its earthly summit. It has attained what it already was in germ in the grace of baptism: identification with Christ, our Head. This identification is with an adult Christ, continuing His work of redemption and giving here below that eternal life of which intimacy with God is already an anticipation.

*The Life of the Child of God  
and the Gift of Piety*

By the gift of piety St. Thomas links the prayer of the servant of God, which we treated in the first part, with the

prayer of the child of God. For the Creator, revered by man who owes everything and has no rights of his own, is also man's Father. St. Thomas writes:

... the Holy Spirit moves us with a filial sentiment toward God: "You have received," says St. Paul, "a spirit of adoption as sons, in virtue of which we cry, 'Abba! Father!'"<sup>28</sup> Because it properly belongs to piety to render to one's father the duties of a filial cult, we say that the kind of piety which makes us render, at the instigation of the Holy Spirit, our duties to God as to a father is a gift of the Holy Spirit... And to worship God as our Father is more excellent than to worship Him as our Creator and Lord.<sup>29</sup>

Because we are creatures, we cannot help being the servants of God, but God's love has fashioned a grace which establishes a mysterious relationship between Himself and us. The upshot is that the Creditor is transformed into a Father, the servant into a friend and child, and all men, seen in this perspective, become members of a great Christian family. Our tenderness or filial piety toward God becomes a fraternal piety as well. Because of the supernatural with which God has charged them, men become the object of Faith, Hope, and Charity.

Conclusion: The *Our Father* is the great prayer of Christian piety.<sup>30</sup>

### III

#### Necessity of Setting Aside a Fixed Time for Prayer

*The Paradox: "It is necessary to pray always,"<sup>31</sup> "He withdrew all by himself to pray."<sup>32</sup>*

CHRIST ENJOYED the divine presence, and His contemplation was continuous. Yet He passed long nights in prayer.<sup>33</sup> At the moment of His agony He prayed for a longer time and with greater insistence. Before He began his

public life He made a retreat of forty days. His purpose was to teach us that there are times when prayer must become more urgent, when contact with God's presence ought to be more intimate. These are the times when the soul has a more particular need of assurance that God is with him, that God has made His abode with him, that the arduous work he is undertaking will not deprive him of the divine presence. Christ has pointed out this opposition which Martha and Mary symbolize. "Martha, you are fretting and greatly disturbing yourself about many things. There is need of one thing only...":<sup>34</sup> to live in the presence of the Lord, to contemplate Him, to love Him, to hear His voice so that He will increase in us.

Certainly no one can be free of his debts to God by setting aside thirty minutes or an hour of his time for God. Just as certainly, however, this fixed time, set aside for prayer, is absolutely necessary. No one can come to the point of praying always unless he begins by cutting himself off from his constant preoccupations for some determined time to live in an oasis of interior silence in God's presence.

#### *The Time Set Aside for Prayer and Supernatural Hygiene*

Our physical life runs on continuously, twenty-four hours a day, all the days of our life. Certain times of the day are set aside to keep that life healthy. We sleep to refresh our nervous and muscular systems. We eat to recoup our lost strength and increase it. We bathe and wash to give our bodies a chance to breathe better and maintain a harmony of forces which permits our bodies to be docile servants of the soul. In much the same way time set aside for prayer fills, with relation to our spiritual life, these same functions. Pray-



er helps us keep our soul healthy, improve our breathing, compensate for the fatigue action brings, and recoup our strength so that we can take up again our daily work and bring to fruition the tasks we undertake. Prayer, in the truest sense, is the time set aside for the soul's repose, not the repose of inactivity, but a repose that belongs to the genus of play. All our spiritual powers bathe in a supernatural atmosphere; they relax because they are in contact with divine Wisdom, Who, Scripture tells us, "played with the children of men."<sup>35</sup> Time set aside for prayer, then, should be presented by the analogies of hygiene, repose, and food for the soul. It is more than a kind of duty commanded by rule. It is a vital obligation. Independently of every rule and constitution, religious life demands some time be set aside for prayer in order that health be maintained and tasks successfully accomplished.<sup>36</sup>

*Times of Prayer in the Life  
of the Servant of God*

We have seen that prayer constitutes the climate of religious life. We have seen that the wholly essential effort of the religious life is to serve and pay homage to the divine majesty who has created all things. Now the climate of a region does not consist in an uninterrupted series of sunny or rainy days, hot or cold days, but in a happy blend of the two extremes. From these we arrive at a statistical mean which we use to determine whether a region is agreeable and healthy or unpleasant and depressing. Because there are highs and lows, we can take a statistical mean, which determines whether the climate is temperate, torrid, or frigid.

For prayer, the climate of the religious life, to be habitually warm and healthy, for prayer to furnish all the

conditions favorable for that life's rapid and uninterrupted development, the statistical mean temperature must be high. To be so, there must be moments of very great intensity in which the religious soul is aware that he is most intimately linked with God his Creator. He must perceive most sharply the abyss which separates his nothingness as a creature from the divine actuality. He must perceive as well his condition of absolute dependence on God's sovereign dominion. Fixed times set aside for prayer have only this purpose: to help maintain this very high temperature of life of the servant of God so that his service preserves its day-by-day faithfulness and his will, because it is dedicated to the Lord's good pleasure, remains constantly in readiness. Therefore, in spite of the uninterrupted character of the prayer of the servant of God—his religious life composed of acts of devotion and prayer is in fact identified with prayer—certain precise times must be fixed for actually praying if the religious life is to preserve its religious tempo. Such will be the normal means of furnishing for the religious life that warm and healthful climate in which the life of the servant of God flowers in the joy of fidelity to God its Creator and Lord.

*Time of Prayer in the Life  
of the Child of God*

The characteristic life of the child of God is theological; the life of the servant of God is essentially moral.<sup>37</sup> Now a moral life is acquired; indeed, it is the normal result of our human activity. Except for a miracle, it could not exist without activity. In this context, we see very clearly the necessity of intensifying prayer and of setting aside for prayer certain fixed times which facilitate and improve the religious life as a moral life. But of what use is effort

where there is question of a life, whose origin is a pure gift of God and whose flowering as well depends on the pure gratuity of God? It would seem, then, prayer at fixed times is less necessary for the health of our life of the theological virtues than it is for our religious life. And yet who would dare to say that the relations of a servant with his master must be more intimate than those of a child with his father? On the contrary, is it not a necessity of love to multiply these contacts, to tend with all its weight toward an identification with the beloved?

Consequently, the pressure of God's love on us ought to be the source of our fixing a precise time to be set aside for prayer. We should not be motivated by the vague and false feeling of a certain obligation, arising out of a desire to be even with love, of reserving some moments of our day for Him, so that afterwards we can spend the rest of our time on more important or more pressing obligations. For as long as obligation is the source of our contemplative prayer, our prayer is not the prayer of the child of God but of the servant who owes all he is to his master. For the child of God the difficulty should not be to set aside certain times of the day for prayer, but to set aside only certain times. Recall the example of Mary who neglected her work to stay before her God. Furthermore, these moments set aside for prayer ought to be the most restful and satisfying of our day. If circumstances should prevent us from using them, it would be a cross for us to be so deprived.

#### IV

#### Modern Obstacles to the Life of Prayer

**I**F WE WISHED to undertake a detailed analysis of this last theme of our

paper and to investigate the reason why modern civilization is opposed to prayer, we would have to place on trial the mental outlook of our world. Now we do not have to bring suit against the world which surrounds us; we have, rather, to live within the world, without, however, becoming part of it,<sup>38</sup> in order to induce the world to follow Christ toward the Father of all men. Nevertheless, the world in which we live, although we are not of it, has put its mark on us; it has left in our souls some of the notes which characterize it as the twentieth century. These characteristic notes we wish briefly to emphasize as the great modern obstacles of the life of prayer.

#### *The Loss of Awareness of Our Dependence*

Lucifer's cry of revolt was: I will not serve. I will not be God's servant; I do not accept my condition of creaturehood. The individualism and intellectual pride which the progress of modern science has developed in our souls cause us, progressively and unconsciously, to react as Satan did and refuse to accept any dependence no matter what its source. We begin by revolting against our parents, by refusing to accept this particular kind of dependence; we pass on to a refusal of the kind of dependence on society which our human condition involves; we end by refusing to accept our dependence on God. No one any longer wishes to serve anyone. Now, as we have seen, religious life is essentially service; being a religious is identical with being a servant. Prayer, which places us face to face with this primary truth, is disagreeable to our spirits-in-revolt. We prefer to think of the religious life as constituting a superior social class rather than to see it in its true light as a life of constant service of the

Lord, to Whom we owe all and to Whom we ought to return all that we have been given. And because reflection runs counter to our prejudices, we prefer to ignore our condition as creature, as debt, and think of it as little as possible.

*The Loss of Awareness  
of Our Condition as Sinners*

There is another attitude our modern civilization tries to inculcate in our souls. The ideas of progress and materialistic evolution provoke us to consider human vexations as the consequences of imperfect human nature and inept social organization, instead of centering our attention on the true cause: we are sinners. Earlier we saw that sin makes us—already debts simply by being creatures—thieves and destroyers of the order established by the act of creation and by divine government. In relation to our Master and Lord, we have become outlaws. Prayer places us continually face to face with this truth of our faith. The truth humiliates our pride and clouds over our worship of human liberty. As a result, we prefer to labor and spend ourselves prodigally for the progress of humanity, rather than return to the traditional truths prayer continually emphasizes. For in prayer with the eyes of Faith we see ourselves, in contrast to our Master, as servants, small and ugly.

*The Unawareness of the Gratuitous  
Nature of the Supernatural and  
of Our Divine Lineage*

By Christian marriage, we are born in the bosom of the Church of God; by our birth in baptism, we become children of God. Being a Christian becomes as commonplace a fact as being the son of one's parents. And just as

we are habitually unconscious of the gratuity and grandeur of the gifts our parents heap on us, so the grandeur and absolute gratuity of the supernatural life escapes us: *assueta vilescent*. Not only does the grandeur of God's gifts escape us, but very often we consider them very heavy burdens our shoulders are forced to carry—burdens from which those not called to live an authentic Christian life are free. Our life as a child of God becomes an additional burden. Our divine lineage is not thought of as our greatest title to glory nor as our most powerful motive for lovingly drawing near our Father. Instead it becomes in our eyes the sign of contradiction. It keeps us from drawing out of life the joys to be found there. The sight of the duties divine filiation imposes on us saddens us. Neither an unconsciousness of God's gifts nor the psychological deformation resulting from the way we conceive these gifts when we do take note of them is a factor which favors a tendency to prayer. Now both these factors form part of the heritage we have received from the world we live in. Before we shall be able to live as faithful servants of our God and as children who love our Father, we must deliver ourselves from this monstrous heritage. Only then will prayer become a vital need and the moments we set aside for prayer become the best moments of our day.

*The Socialization of the Means  
of the Apostolate*

The modern mentality is social-minded; this is a truth which hits us square in the eye. We cannot do anything good or effective without setting the wheels of social institutions in motion, without working by and in the social order. This is another characteristic of the world we live in. Now prayer, as every-

one knows, is essentially a personal activity. In it the soul is alone before its God. Necessarily prayer is valued too little by the modern mentality. No longer is the accent placed on the apostle's personal sanctity; it is placed on his social qualities. No longer is it important to be as close as possible to God for Whom we work; it is important to be as close as possible to, and as often as possible with, our neighbor upon whom we work. Seen in this spiritual perspective, the time set aside for prayer seems a waste of time; activism engrosses our lives—and scatters them. The result is an emptying ourselves of God, a vacuum which condemns our apostolate to sterility. As long as an equilibrium is not struck between contemplation and the apostolate which should flow from it, prayer will not have its proper place in our religious lives as the servants and children of God.

### Conclusion

In the course of these pages, we have seen prayer involved in two spiritual contexts: the religious life and the theological. We have seen that we are accustomed by our Christian education and our religious experiences to identify these two spiritual contexts even though they are essentially different both in the doctrine they imply and the psychological attitudes they suppose. By its very nature, the religious life is, in effect, a service; it involves an obligatory enlistment by which the creature dedicates to God the worship due Him. In this enlistment, God is absolute Lord, indisputable Master of everything man is and possesses; man is a serf, with all the kinds of dependence this idea implies. On the other hand, the life of the theological virtues is a life of contemplation and love. It is characterized—not by a master-slave relationship—but by the in-

timate and affectionate father-child relationship. The functions of prayer, then, will normally differ as prayer is at the service of the life of the *servant of God* or as it manifests the activity of *the child of God*. This duality of function necessarily transforms the interior structure of each of these prayers. For this reason our procedure has been to see what characterizes the roles of servant and child of God and the individual aspect they present to doctrinal reflection. On this basis we have tried to show the nature and properties of prayer as the activity respectively of the *servant* and the *child* of God.

May the daily recitation of the Lord's Prayer be for each one of us the perfect integration of these two aspects of prayer in as much as it is the simultaneous expression of our service and our love of the Father Who is in heaven.

Translated by W. P. KROLIKOWSKI, S.J.

### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *IV Sent.*, d.15, q.4, a.1.

<sup>2</sup> In what follows, *prayer* will be used to translate *oraison* in its first and general meaning; *act of prayer* in its second; *mental prayer* in its third (tr. note).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, III, 119; *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.85, a.1.

<sup>4</sup> Matthew 5, 48.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.81, esp. a.5.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.191, a.3, ad 2.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.81, a.5, ad 2.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, a.6, ad 2.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.82, a.1.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.85, a.3, ad 1.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.83, aa.1-3.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.82, a.3.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, q.81, a.8.

<sup>14</sup> The original text reads: *instincts de dépendance*. The context seems to demand *instincts d'indépendance*, and it has been so translated (tr. note).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.81, a.1.

<sup>16</sup> Genesis 28, 16-17.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.7, a.1.; *De Veritate*, q.28, a.4., ad 4; *III Sent.*, d.34, q.4, a.3, q.14; *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.19, a.12, ad 3; *Comp. Theol.*, I; *De Spe*, q.1, a.4, ad 2.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *S. Theol.*, III, q.7, a.6.

<sup>19</sup> John 1, 12-13.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 15, 15-16.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 16, 27. Cf. 17, 22-25.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 17, 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 17, 22-25.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 17 3.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *I Sent.*, d.14, q.2, a.2, ad 2 and ad 3; *De Potentia* 9; *In Johan.*, c.2, lect.3; *In I Cor.*, c.3, lect.3.

<sup>26</sup> John 14, 23.

<sup>27</sup> Galatians 2, 20.

<sup>28</sup> Romans 8, 15.

<sup>29</sup> *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.121, a.1. and ad. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Expos. Orationis Dominicae; Comp. Theol.*, II; *De Spe*; *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.83, a.9.

<sup>31</sup> Luke 18, 1.

<sup>32</sup> Mathew 14, 23-25; Mark 6, 46; John 6, 15.

<sup>33</sup> Luke 6, 12.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 10, 41-42.

<sup>35</sup> Proverbs 8, 31.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *S. Theol.*, II-II, q.83, a.14.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *supra*.

<sup>38</sup> John 17, 11-19.

The translations of Old Testament texts have been taken from the Douay-Rheims; the translations of New Testament texts have been taken from the Kleist-Lilly version. The translation of the passage from the *Summa* was done by the translator from the French of Father Régis.

W.P.K., S.J.

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# THE REVIVAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY

SERVAIS PINCKAERS

## I. THE DIFFERENT MOVEMENTS WHICH QUICKEN PRESENT-DAY MORAL THEOLOGY

FOR SOME YEARS NOW, moral theology has entered a new phase in its history. After a long period of peaceful, perhaps too peaceful, exploitations of doctrines and solutions elaborated in the last centuries, it now experiences a new lease on active life, a renewal that brings it up to date. The situation of being brought face to face with the problems, ideas, lines of thought, which a world in ferment produces, forces Christians to a restatement of ethical formulas of other days. They question their ethics textbooks as to the line of conduct to follow in a life where it devolves on them to honestly assume their share in the responsibility of shaping the course of a world in process of evolution. Penetrated as they are by the most stirring aspirations of their own era, they seek advice and directives from the moralists, and they do not always seem satisfied with the answers they read or hear.

But there is, from our point of view, another reason for moral theology "to get back on the job," a reason less apparent but more fundamental than facing up to the modern world and its evolution. Christian morality is, in brief, the terms of an action between God and men, the study of the conjunction of human action and divine action; the latter has the initiative,

and the former is oriented towards union with God. Moral theology can be defined as the reasoned expression of the active quest of God by man. But, this quest, this search through action, starts anew with each man, begins over again at each generation, at each epoch, under a new form, to cope with the problems peculiar to each. God remains always a mystery to us, always new, always to be sought out. And, since He transcends all our categories, since no human language can completely enclose Him within its concepts or its formulas, since no system of theology schematized at a determined period can ever transmit to the following generation an ethics which can fully satisfy, in a certain sense moral theology will always have to be renovated, will always have to be brought up to date.

This is not to say that we could not profit by the experience and the findings of our forefathers or that we should not study their achievement—far from it. But we shall always have to work out for ourselves the subtle reality which each epoch strives to express with the words and ideas at its disposal.

This totally personal regaining of God will even turn out to be the surest method of grasping the true significance of former systems of moral theology, of really understanding them, for, after all, they have no value except as indications of divine reality.

In this perspective, the present-day revival of moral theology seems to be simply an epiphany of divine action in the Christians of today. Restlessness for God drives them. They cannot content themselves with lazily repeating and applying formulas outmoded for them, which do not speak to them as they

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spoke to our fathers. A living God poses a question which they have never heard before, makes them hear a challenge which no human speech could transmit. It is for them to find, under the direction of the Church, their response.

*New Perspectives Opened up  
by Modern Thought*

WHEN PUT TO THE TEST of new exigencies, ethics, as it is usually taught (let us say as in the manuals), has been blamed for many and different kinds of inadequacies. These can be cited here only briefly. An excellent study, a comprehensive and thorough research of the new problems presented to the moralists, will be found in the *Cahiers de l'Actualité religieuse*, under the title of *Morale chrétienne et requêtes contemporaines*.<sup>1</sup> These new exigencies can be marshalled into one or another of two categories which, however, are far from being watertight compartments. First are the exigencies derived from contact with the mentality of the modern sciences; then, there are those which have arisen from new perspectives that have opened up within today's Christianity.

Sociological studies have revealed to modern man a new dimension, as it were, of his being and his mode of acting. He takes into account the sometimes overwhelming influence which human environment exerts on the formation of men's manner of life and on the multiplicity of their reasons for action. This dimension becomes double strength when the perspective of history shows the transforming power of the evolution of societies.

Psychological studies have penetrated the intimacy of man's being and his action. They have reached the point of analyzing his behaviour as if taking a piece of machinery completely apart.

They have brought to light unsuspected zones in our psychological world where secret factors sometimes exert on our mode of conduct a decisive influence, but of which we are unaware when we try to explain our acts.

The forces from the depths of the unconscious combined with the imperceptible influences of the environment in which we live and of its historical origins, would seem to reduce to nothing our claim to act on our own and to act freely, would seem to release us from the burden of moral responsibility. But, on the other hand, if we recognize the existence of a free core at the pivot of our line of conduct which throws off all exterior interference, if, on this basis, we maintain the necessity of an ethics which guides our actions, the question is whether that ethics should not assimilate the best of modern findings and exploit for its own use the materials offered to it. It may be asked whether moral theology is not also obliged, in consideration of new insights which we have on human conditions, to re-examine certain problems which were previously resolved without full knowledge of all the premises involved and which have acquired new hypotheses. Some new problems have arisen whose scope exceeds all that could have been imagined in former times. The enlargement of perspective and the concern of modern man which stretches to the limits of the universe make the framework within which the thought of earlier moralists was activated, seem too narrow, curtailed, it is said, by the boundaries of an outmoded individualism.

It may be asked also, at the sight of men totally engrossed in anxieties about earthly realities in constant state of development under the drive of technical progress, if the movement which ani-

mates and arouses modern man to work can remain a stranger, outside Christian ethics, as it still seems to be—if it has not been deprived of its true significance in the total view of Christian history. This is one among other problems advanced by Canon Thils.<sup>2</sup>

In opposition to this decomposition of man, as it were, into the universe, this dissolution which scientific progress seems desirous to effect, recent philosophy puts in for the human person a claim of specific valuation, intangible, absolute, which places the person with his mode of conduct beyond all conditioning by the exterior world. This is the personalist trend which is expressed under various forms. There is existentialism which, by the phenomenological method, seeks to disclose the ultimate signification, entirely personal, of human activity, and goes so far with a Sartre as to set up man's liberty as actually the creator of our mode of conduct and its values. The philosophy of values which has a large following, especially in Germany, possesses a particular importance for ethics because value is the motive and the end of human action, that from which it receives its true import. Attention must be called here in a special way to the influence of Max Scheler's and René Le Senne's works on Christian moralists.

In the name of this personalist line of thought, objection is made against traditional moralists for stressing the human act as a sort of thing in itself, detached from the acting subject; also for elaborating on this unreal base laws that are abstract, impersonal, and lifeless, which can never fully account for the richness of the concrete factors which constitute our mode of behavior. A plea is made for ethics which will take ourselves into account and speak to us of ourselves. Our personality colors our

way of acting; it cannot be made into an abstraction. In Germany, this trend in moral theology has been marked by certain extreme theories called "situation ethics."<sup>3</sup> Morality would consist essentially only in a loving relation between the human person and the Divine Person in terms of concrete incidents, each a particular. Universal laws would, of course, be valid in the majority of cases but could be infringed under certain circumstances, that is, left to the appraisal of the person concerned. These circumstances would be beyond the jurisdiction of universal laws. All this is so much proof of intellectual shortsightedness. To the great theologians at least, such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, the universal laws, the natural law, the divine law, were so far from being impersonal that they firmly believed to see there expressed, instead, man's most intimate and highest aspirations, his aspirations that are spiritual in the strictest sense, and therefore personal, contrasting with what can be called superficial, the surface movements of the human soul, those in the order of sensation and at the mercy of perpetual flux. Besides, we hold that it is by fidelity to the objective order that the person learns to know God and reveal itself to itself.

#### *Renewal Effected from the Interior of Christianity*

IN A PERSPECTIVE that is Christian in the strictest application of the term, the Biblical revival, with its return to scriptural sources, has brought Bible morality, especially that of the Gospels, face to face with the current exposition of moral theology and it is not always possible to recognize an exact and faithful correlation of one with the other. However, appearances may be misleading. There are in this case two very dif-

ferent approaches which should be allowed to co-exist—the one, scientific; the other, what is called these days *kerygmatic*, ethics as it must be preached, such as the Gospel proclaims. It does not seem just to blame moral theology for speaking a language different from that of the Gospel. But harm is done when scientific terminology invades the sermon and by neat categories supplants the concrete living manner suitable for this function. No one knows how to make the transposition, how to adapt ethics as a science to the function of preaching. There has been in this instance a reversal of the natural order of priorities because ethics as a science has value only inasmuch as, within its own proper perspective, it takes into account its model, Gospel morality, which is a morality which is preached, announced to men.

Add to this the need to organize a properly kerygmatic moral instruction, an ethics which can be preached to men and which will be at the same time closer to the Gospel. The question comes up again whether it is not expedient to re-examine our ethics texts so as to render them, even on the strictly theological level, a more faithful echo of the New Testament morality. For example, it would seem more opportune to center all ethics more directly on the Person of Christ and through Him on the Trinity. This would result in our whole mode of conduct taking its meaning from our union with Christ. It is a similar system of ethics that F. Tillmann in Germany wishes to develop. Morality for him is summed up in the imitation of Christ.<sup>4</sup>

Along this line is still another objection raised against traditional ethics for being too dependent on the categories of pagan philosophers, especially the Aristotelian. This is a problem with far-

reaching effects, one that necessitates careful examination rather than a superficial survey of factors. To state it exactly, it requires recognition of the person primarily responsible for the introduction of Aristotelianism into theology, Saint Thomas Aquinas. The question arises whether Saint Thomas had given way under the influence of the Stagirite to a point where he betrayed Christian morality and thus corrupted the Gospel teaching, or whether he was the powerful genius who reduced Aristotelian philosophy to the service of theology and utilized the materials furnished by the former to build up moral syntheses distinctly theological and Christian. We opt for the second explanation but there is not space here to develop our reasons.

To this Gospel trend is joined the contribution of the liturgical revival now in full swing and generating the desire to pivot Christian living and morality on participation in the sacraments which unite us to Christ. Again it is noteworthy that Scripture puts emphasis on certain virtues which seem almost disregarded in the traditional ethics treatises. Johannine morality is entirely centered on the new commandment of the agape. We lack an ethics which faithfully reflects this primacy of charity in Christian living, as opposed to a morality dominated by preoccupation with avoidance of sin, with its measurements. This lack is the thesis of P. Gilleman's book, *Le primat de la charité en théologie morale*.<sup>5</sup> Some other virtues such as religion and humility deserve to be reinstated in honor.

Desirable also would be a moral theology which would be more closely linked to the life of the Church and open to all her dimensions. The former ethics shows itself too individualistic, preoccupied with one's own personal salvation. It needs to expand to the limits

of the entire Christian community, to the limits even of the universe which a Church called catholic claims to encompass. Along the same line, theology should busy itself more where it has neglected to do so, with Christian layfolk and their concrete preoccupations, their daily solitudes. Questions on marriage are particularly in order at the present moment and it matters much if Christians are shown how to infuse into their whole life a significance and a value distinctly Christian. In all that concerns sexuality, the ethics of the manuals has treated it too much as a diabolical force whose ravages must be curtailed at any price. Ethics seems to have been hypnotized by the sins of the flesh, engaged itself in a meticulous warfare against them to the degree of according them more attention than the great virtues whose breath should animate our Christian life. It would be necessary to re-discover the true significance of sensual life itself along the lines of Christian love without, however, soaring into the ridiculous by misplaced exaltation, or losing sight of the completely supernatural and specifically Christian grandeur of perfect absolute chastity.

Likewise, attention must be called, even if briefly, to a lacuna in the ethics manuals, more serious than is often realized: their neglect of what is called the supernatural, if not their split from it. Moral theology seems to have confined itself, as its essential function, to the study of sin under all its forms. Ethics has become too negative, a morality of prohibitions. The supernatural, which formerly gave morality all its positive meaning (what good comes of levying censures if not to lead to moral perfection?), is seen relegated to a minor branch of moral theology—the ascetical and the mystical—and there become the

appanage of the privileged few, with no great interest for the majority of Christians. But these begin to experience a profound need for an ethics which accords them spiritual nourishment, solid and strengthening. It is to this urgent labor that a periodical such as *La Vie Spirituelle* is devoted.

Special mention must be made here of a book whose French translation has just appeared, P. Häring's *La Loi du Christ*.<sup>6</sup> The author has attempted to answer the demands made by our times on moral theology. The book is written in a language understood by all; it is a manual which has been completely revised and set on a level within reach of laity as well as priests. The author has been at great pains to incorporate into his treatise such contributions from modern philosophy as can be useful, especially the philosophies of value and the history of ethics. The plan of this ethics is original and centered on the concept of morality as man's response to Christ's appeal; on one side, the Law of Christ; on the other, human liberty. It is a splendid effort at revival of moral theology and has the great merit of making that subject accessible to every educated Christian. But it must be admitted that the work is incomplete from a theological point of view. It lacks depth and penetration in its grasp of moral problems; and, in organization of its matter, it is a compilation with rather loose and superficial links. Much material has been put together after a fashion. An urge for unification of ethical topics outweighs analytical proficiency and leads to confusion. Even so, it will not prevent the book from rendering great service.

Finally, we must note a more strictly scientific element in the revival of ethics, the multiplication of historical research on morality. Moral theology has a his-



tory which—no one contests the fact—attained its apogee in the thirteenth century when it took its place among theological syntheses which impose themselves to our day. Mediaeval moral theology is the heir of long centuries of Christian thought and philosophy. To really understand it, and that means nothing less than understanding Christian theology, knowledge of its sources is indispensable—where this thought was nourished, the peculiar problems which it faced, the environment into which it was born, who has supported it, and against whom it has taken a stand. Many long years ago Dom Lottin yoked himself to this engrossing work and he has brought us an impressive series of historical studies full of judicious views on Scholastic moral theology.<sup>7</sup>

Such then are the principal elements which contribute to the present day revival of moral theology. In regard to this revival, we must be on guard against a twofold attitude, equally facile and naive. The very thought of change always starts a division into two camps. Either one believes that everything is going to change, that at last he will be relieved of the difficulties of an unwanted situation where deficiencies are most glaring—the burden of the past can be thrown aside; or, in the opposite position, one bristles before novelty which he supposes entirely contrary to what is so well known, destructive of values which he rates highly. He fears that he will see overthrown a way of life where he is installed in security. The revival of ethics can be neither a complete break with the past nor a lazy repetition of what it has said. It is under obligation to be, paradoxically, at one and the same time traditional and modern. The strongest argument for this is that theology must insert itself into a tradition, of course, but a living one,

and we are living in this day and age. We should be fundamentally disloyal to the Christian tradition if we contented ourselves with repeating in some fashion or other the ethical maxims formulated by our predecessors; those terms of another day have no meaning and are a dead letter unless they are joined to the life that formed them and that life was up to date and modern when it expressed those formulas. It is for us to search out in our life that living reality of Christianity which each generation leaves in legacy as its most precious treasure to the generation which comes after. We should be disloyal, too, to modern thought if we did not transmit to it, with integrity unimpaired, the redemptive message of Christian morality. We would do it no service. We would have nothing to offer if we had not a testament of highest quality to pass on. Tradition, innovation—the two indispensable poles of Christian thought; each one loses all value unless it receives life communicated by the other. Not an impossible amalgam of two contrary realities, but the two aspects under which appears to us the divine message confided to the vigilant care of the Church, *nova et vetera*.

## II. PERSPECTIVE PROPER TO A CHRISTIAN ETHICS

AT THE CLOSE of this rapid survey of the different currents of thought which contribute to the revival of moral theology, we would like to call attention to a point which seems central to us, a principle of reference without which there is grave risk of entanglement in the confusion and in the perils of an easy-going, misleading syncretism with modern thought and worldly aims. Before attempting any further study, the perspective proper to Christian ethics must be discriminated: what gives it its

distinctive character. Before setting oneself as a guide, one must know where he is going.

### *The Return of Faith to Primary Sources*

There is much talk these days of "return to primary sources." There is return to Biblical sources, patristic sources, mediaeval sources of theology. That is all to the good and this method should not be allowed to lapse. But, too often, the return is only to the books, without taking into account that the primary source which inspired these writings is present today to us Christians; that these documents of a former time cannot be really understood unless the researcher finds in himself the omnipresent source, the Spirit of God promised to Christians. All the great revolutions in modern thought have come to pass in the same way, by a return to primary sources effected by going beyond, and even counter to, the traditional philosophical doctrines of their day, by a return to the living source of the spirit and the heart of man. Descartes discovered the *cogito* and the *cogito* was in the first person; Rousseau stripped human nature down to its heart-foundation. For us Christians, the ultimate of our nature is God, the living and inexhaustible source, creator of every nature; our *cogito* is the *credo*, the act where God attains to us personally and illuminates us, He the Sun of the mind.<sup>8</sup> This is not that *credo*, the act of faith, as all too often it is imagined, which is rather only the notion of faith, an abstraction and a skeleton-outline, but that act achieved, constituted in its reality so rich that it transforms us for the length of our life, overwhelming and reinvigorating all our mental outlook. There is not involved here the faith which would go begging to reason for a glimmer of intelligibility, but the act

which irradiates in us mysteriously that divine light of which reason is only a reflected flash. The Middle Ages had grasped well the illuminating nature of faith, they even proclaimed it the propelling force of intellectual research: *fides quaerens intellectum*. They had so vividly experienced the intimate bond which unites our intelligence to faith, as daughter to mother, that the formula could be inverted to read: *intellectus quaerens fidem*.

### *New Dimension Revealed by Faith*

AN EFFORT can now be made to indicate the new and typical perspective which faith opens on ethics. A new dimension is revealed to us which overturns our preconceived ideas and which is bound to give its later signification to our principles of conduct and to the words which express these. An example that has become classic may serve—the faith of Abraham. Abraham loved his son Isaac. Here we certainly have a natural, normal affection; nothing about it to startle us. Nevertheless, at God's instigation, this love takes an unexpected turn: Abraham is willing to sacrifice, to kill Isaac. Did he have the feelings of a father or of an assassin? Did he love Isaac or did he hate him? He loves him, that fact is positive, but with a love unknown on earth. The conflict of Abraham's love and his gesture of apparent hatred show us the intervention and the birth in him of a sentiment which transcends human love: he loved Isaac with a divine love. But in this case the words shatter under the thrust of their meaning and fail to express the new reality which grapples with them and forces its way through them. Was Abraham's feeling that of love or hatred? Taking these words in their human connotation, it is impossible to resolve this improbable paradox of a father immolating his cherished son.

Nevertheless, we believe that the affection that Abraham had for Isaac was correctly termed love, that the label pertains to it in the full sense; yet it can be said at the same time that Abraham did not love Isaac, that is to say, with a purely human and carnal love. It is in this respect that, in the eyes of men, his love takes the form of hatred. A new feeling is born, alike and at the same time quite other from human love, which can be called human love only in an analogical acceptance, as the Scholastics say. This new kind of reality Abraham had experienced, had received through his faith. Faith had revealed to him a new dimension which was to inform and transform his every act.

But Abraham is the type and figure of a future reality which was realized in Christ. The same problem was to pose itself about the relations between Christ and His Father. Did the Father love Christ? If the answer is affirmative, then an objection will be raised that it is a strange sort of love that nailed Christ to the cross after having beaten Him to the ground in Gethsemane. Christ's worst enemies could do nothing against Him unless the Father had been willing; He had gone so far as to outline it in advance in Holy Scripture. Did the Father hate the Son? He loved Him; that is certain, the Father who is the source of all paternity and all love, but He loved along a dimension absolutely new to us, the characteristically divine dimension into which we are introduced by faith.

Throughout the length of the Scriptures, the impact of words and actions, of affirmations and denials, the paradoxical union of extremes, all force us to lift ourselves above purely human affections that we may understand God. Christ reproaches the Pharisees for their practices transgressing the divine com-

mandment to honor father and mother; but He Himself declares that anyone who does not hate his father, mother, and all his family cannot be His disciple. He promises us life; He proclaims Himself life itself which was before Abraham; He fails miserably on a cross, abandoned by all. At the Last Supper He promises joy to His disciples, and that very night, most despondent sadness engulfs them. But He had said that His joy is not that which the world gives. It is another joy, divine.

As for Saint Paul, his ethics is dominated by the idea of our assimilation, our conformation to Christ, dead but alive again. We are obliged to die with Christ to be restored to life with Him, to kill the old man in us so as to bring to birth the new man. But just what is this new man, this Christian restored to life? It is not a man animated either by affections or virtues that are purely human even if the loftiest. We are obliged to die first of all to our own proper affections. It will not do to pray with beautiful words, the words must penetrate down to the realities they signify for these realities are, to say the least, baffling to our limited minds and our too self-contained hearts. To die with Christ in faith indicates that we pass through anguish and the sense of total loss—pleasures, family, friends, homeland, strength and efficiency—to our very soul, to the point where Christianity appears to us as death pure and simple under the appearances of suicide. But the man reborn from death is indeed the new man, quite other in a sense from the man living according to the world, and yet like him in as much as he is the divine completion of that which we are; just as Christ's glorified body resembles and yet is quite different from His mortal body, for He can die no more. In their turn, the

terms which describe our life and our action are going to take on a new meaning and a connotation which can be understood only by those believers to whom their faith will give the import of the divine dimension. In consideration of all this, it is not surprising that the Gospel, as Paul preached it, should appear as a stumbling-block to the Jews, folly to the Greeks, that is to say, to the world. We shall never be able to rid ourselves of the upheaving character of Christian morality which the intervention of God has introduced into the lives of men.

#### *Supernatural Ultimate*

**Y**ET, AFTER ALL, to claim that at the point of departure for moral theology, this new dimension, the supernatural, is clearly distinguished and thrown into relief where faith points the way, is a procedure that corresponds well, whatever one may believe, with Saint Thomas's manner of approach who, beginning his *Secunda Pars* by the treatise on man's final end, concludes there that man's beatitude consists in the possession of a higher good, transcending all that he can imagine or can attain to by himself—in a word, the supernatural. Now it is the ultimate end that orders, penetrates our whole mode of conduct, gives to all our actions their moral meaning. This finality, this new dimension which Christianity with its faith introduces into man, is going to give its specific signification to our moral theology and entirely impregnate it. We shall be obliged to do everything according to faith, according to God's way of thinking which faith bestows on us.

#### *Dare to Take the Initiative*

Such will be the criterion and the center of reference for every truly Chris-

tian ethics, the order of the God of Revelation in faith. Acting in this spirit, it will not suffice for the Christian moralist to insert into his ethics such material as modern philosophy and science supply; he cannot content himself with pruning away theses and opinions that are incompatible with Christian faith. That would be no more than hitching on to the tow line of the world. The Christian moralist must dare to take the initiative. He, alone, through his faith, perceives the deep meaning of human things, their sense divine; he alone can impart to human actions, or indicate to them, the impulse which will bring them to true completion. Thus, Saint Thomas Aquinas was not satisfied with commenting on Aristotle's *Ethics* as he found it. He had recourse to it as a quarry for useful materials to erect a decidedly Christian morality, one which was at the same time worthy of the human intelligence. The moralist need not be over-fearful of human reason, also a "child and handiwork of God." Still, there must be no lulling oneself with illusions; the task is not easy. That is because God is not a reality that has come to rest; He does not let Himself be held and manipulated like a proposition or a principle that our mind has worked out. He will remain always for us here below the God of Mystery, of unexpected initiatives. His ways are not those of men.

#### *Put Life Again into the Meaning of Words*

**T**HE FIRST TASK, then, of today's moralist must be a rediscovery of Christian realities, of the Christian meaning which has to be infused into human reality. This involves a revival, a kind of resurrection for the meaning of the words which express our reflection on human conduct. We ask what these

words signify today, what do these worn-out words evoke in us—charity, virtue, justice, purity, temperance, etc. Often they are distorted notions and, having lost their original vigour, notions that are dried up, abstract, lacking in vitality. All their power of evocation has been squandered; they were ideas nearly always conceived under the sway of completely human realities which no longer have any meaning for us and less than they obtained in the speech current at their birth. What is there less loving than to love someone for "the love of God"? Charity has depreciated down to the gift of an alms. Its name evokes for us the opulence of the rich who, by a gift which costs them nothing, profit by the poor to enhance their self-esteem and the misery of the man who accepts with the alms the humiliation of being a parasite of the rich. Charity itself has become almost a parasite of justice, a deputy when the other defaults, good at the most to extenuate the weaknesses of a poorly organized social order, when it does not serve as a mask for deep-seated injustice. Of course, Christian charity is still alive—magnificent examples can be cited—but it has lost its place as queen of the virtues.

Now take this destitute word 'virtue,' so disfigured in our eyes that it has lost everything except the doubtful power of arousing in us, by sly approach, the wary solicitation of the demons who people the kingdom called the 'fair virtue'; a virtue yielding under extreme boredom that breaks down those who have been prevented from tasting the joys and pleasures of life; a virtue embarrassed under the gibes which taunt it as naiveté and hypocrisy until the moment comes that it very nearly believes itself really such. There was a time when virtue signified strength and its brightness put demons to flight.

Chastity, purity, innocence. If they

are spoken of, it is usually because of the success and triumphs of their adversaries who deploy them, as so many enslaved prizes of war, to enhance their own charms by a subtle play of contrasts. So many novels present a chaste woman, a pure young girl, as object of difficult conquest who excites anew satiated desire. Our literature does not believe in virtue. It has not the least interest in virtue. It believes that virtue has nothing to say for itself.

Justice has descended to the level of commercial bookkeeping where God<sup>4</sup> rarely puts in an appearance except to ratify contracts and countersign a balance sheet (often faked). The sellers have now reached the interior of the temple and we carry on in a business-like way even with God.

Faith has also fallen from her pedestal. From being royal she has become cringing and reason rarely bothers any longer to throw her a disdainful, patronizing glance. Faith has lost the pride of place she held in former days and a cloud has covered the radiant countenance the Lord had given her. If, on occasion, she asserts herself against the pretensions of arrogant reason, she appears so awkward as to suggest guilty conscience. Sometimes, things reach a pass where she gives a loud shout, too loud, like those afflicted with inferiority complexes who strive in vain to thrust from the heart an insecurity which rankles.

Granted that these are caricatures; still they haunt the subconscious and warp the mentality.

It is evident that the Christian moralists have their work cut out for them. There must be given back to these virtues, to ethics as a whole, to its vocabulary, their pristine vigor and their conquering force. Certainly, it is a superhuman project; but to the Lord belongs its initiative. To us, belongs the



response to His call and the labor in this vineyard with all the intelligence and all the talents with which He has endowed us.

*Saint Thomas as Model*

AS WE PROGRESS in this work of renovation of moral theology, we shall often realize that our fathers have already said what we are discovering—that, many times, they have expressed these things better than we shall ever be able to do. We shall thus rediscover the original meaning of the old texts which at first we could not understand because the language and line of thought were no longer ours; they pertained to a civilization dead to us. But, having learned what can be called the common denominator of all Christian thought, its supernatural dimension, we shall be capable of a fresh insight into the authentic meaning of all Christian texts and capable of restoring to words of an earlier day the living significance they possessed for their authors.

For this project, it would seem that the most competent model to which today's moral theology can look for inspiration would still be Saint Thomas in his *Summa Theologica*.<sup>9</sup> The mighty structure of this work, the astounding thoroughness of its analyses, the marvelously clean strokes of the outlines, the unshaken soundness of its foundation, all belong far more to our modern mentality and its exigencies than the moral theology of the intervening centuries when narrow-mindedness often cooped itself within meticulous details, and lost contact with the key theses which guarantee solid incorporation into the larger whole of theology. But, here again, it will not suffice to parrot the words of the *Summa*, just to provide a gloss for its texts. The words alone cannot transmit to us the living reality which they

signify, inasmuch as the language and the turn of mind of mediaeval Scholasticism is situated psychologically at the very antipodes of our present day of thinking. The Thomistic texts will speak to us and we shall really understand them only if we have personally found again by faith the God who inspired Saint Thomas and whom no one will ever rediscover for us.

*Translated by F. A. McGOWAN*

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Casterman, Paris, 1954. Several other publications have given a survey of new trends in moral theology, notably: G. Thils, *Tendances actuelles de la théologie morale*, Gembloux, 1940; the periodical *Lumière et Vie* in its February 1953 number under the title "Crise de la morale"; Ph. Delahaye, "Théologie morale d'hier et d'aujourd'hui," *Revue des Sciences religieuses*, 27 (1953), 112-130. Particular mention should be made of the many works of Canon Leclercq which have contributed on a large scale to posing the problem of a revision of practical ethics in regard to the contemporary problems and the definite needs of the faithful.

<sup>2</sup> G. Thils, *Théologie des Réalités terrestres*, Bruges, Paris, 1949.

<sup>3</sup> His Holiness, Pope Pius XII took a stand against "situation ethics" in an allocution which can be found in *Acta S. Sedis*, 44 (1952), 415-419. Its teaching was formally forbidden in seminaries and papal universities, *Acta S. Sedis*, 48 (1956), 144-145. Obviously, in this article, we can only skim over this important problem, just call attention to it.

<sup>4</sup> F. Tillmann, *Der Meister ruft. Die katholische Sittenlehre gemeinsverständlich dargestellt*, Düsseldorf, 1949. F. Tillmann, *Handbuch der katholischen Sittenlehre*, 4 v., 4th edition, Düsseldorf, 1950.

<sup>5</sup> P. Gilleman, S.J., *Le primat de la Charité en Théologie morale*, Louvain, Paris, 1952.

<sup>6</sup> B. Häring, C.S.S.R., *La Loi du Christ*, v. I, Tournai, 1955. The second volume is in preparation.

<sup>7</sup> Particular mention should be made of his *Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 4 v., Louvain, 1942-1954; his *Principes de Morale*, 2 v., Louvain, 1947, and *Morale fondamentale*, Tournai, 1954. Concerning the history of moral theology, cf. Th. Deman, O.P.,

*Aux origines de la Théologie morale*, Paris, 1951.

<sup>8</sup> To forestall any ambiguity, it must be made plain here that we do not understand the term 'person' and its derivatives in the narrow sense as opposed to 'object' and 'objective,' or in an individualistic sense, but in the wide sense as the human person having an essential need of an object to attain to its perfection, just as God is also, of course, 'objective' to us. This is the same as that which distinguishes *credo* from *cogito*. In *credo* we are not alone; it is an act where we submit ourselves or we vow ourselves to another than

ourselves in a movement which, nevertheless, has come from our innermost being. By this is introduced into *credo* our relation to the Church which transmits to us God's message and His life and guarantees its integrity. The person is not the judge of faith; it passes judgment on the person. However, there is no faith which is not personal.

<sup>9</sup> On the subject of Saint Thomas's ethics, reference must certainly be made to *Initiation théologique*, Paris, 1953, which gives a complete exposition of his moral theology, all the while bringing it into line with important modern problems and with Scriptural sources.

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# ANNUAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY, 1956

JAMES COLLINS

THE TRANSFER of this annual survey to CROSS CURRENTS provides an opportunity for briefly reaffirming its basic aim. Very few people in philosophy would care to follow Auguste Comte's curious plan of cerebral hygiene or the deliberate exclusion of everything currently being produced in the field. We realize that there is a vital dependence of the individual philosopher upon what his contemporaries are doing, not only in philosophy itself but also in the other disciplines which are significant for his study. This interdependence of minds holds good for philosophical traditions, as well as for individuals. There

is no privileged kind of philosophy which can legitimately exempt anyone from his responsibility to consult with others and thus to keep alive to the actual state of research and speculation. If a man does allow himself to be cut from the going concern of philosophy, he soon finds that his historical views are hopelessly out of line with the best scholarship and that his own doctrinal thinking is lacking in significant relation to men of his time. Even when allowance is made for the distinction between a philosophy and its exponents, there is something questionable about any viewpoint which seems to encourage the insulated mentality. To work positively toward an understanding of the best contemporary work being done in philosophy, and to examine the areas of fruitful interchange between the Christian philosophical traditions and the other major positions, are among the permanent concerns of this survey.

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*With the present article, Prof. Collins of St. Louis University begins the first of a projected series of annual reviews of philosophy; published each year as independent articles, they should serve, cumulatively, as indispensable guides to an understanding of contemporary philosophical literature. It is by virtue of the joint practice of his sweeping and exact command of the necessary details of historical scholarship and of his critical sensitivity to crucial problematic strains in major doctrinal contexts that he is able to render so valuable a service to students of philosophy.*

*Prof. Collins has won rapid recognition as one of the most distinguished historians of modern and contemporary philosophy in the United States today. He has published three major works within a period of three years: "The Existentialists," "The Mind of Kierkegaard" (Regnery), and "A History of Modern European Philosophy" (Bruce), and contributed his annual review to THOUGHT from 1951 to 1956.*

In this way, perhaps a small contribution can be made toward what Morton White has recently termed the work of reunion in philosophy. There are more factors involved in this problem than White himself reckons with, since his own attention is focussed mainly upon the points of intersection between naturalism, linguistic analysis, and logical empiricism. These are admittedly the only philosophies taken seriously by wide groups of English-speaking philosophers, but every international congress of philosophy sharpens the need for keeping existentialism and phenomenology within steady focus. Furthermore, the findings being made by philosophical scholarship in the areas of history often have a direct bearing upon pres-

ent discussions, even when the influence of the history of philosophy is systematically bracketed. Our philosophical conscience requires us to be responsive to all these aspects and, if possible, to bring them together in a common perspective.

1. *The Greeks and Christian Philosophy*

Sterling P. Lamprecht. *Our Philosophical Traditions*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. Pp. xi, 523. \$5.50.

Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Translated by John Warrington. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1956. Pp. xx, 388. \$1.85.

A. J. Festugière, O. P. *Epicurus and His Gods*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 100, \$2.25.

Richard Kroner. *Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. Pp. 251. \$5.75.

Etienne Gilson. *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. New York: Random House, 1956. Pp. x, 502. \$7.50.

F. C. Copleston, S. J. *Aquinas*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955. Pp. 263. \$.85.

Victor White, O. P. *God the Unknown*. New York: Harper, 1956. Pp. viii, 205. \$3.50.

St. Thomas Aquinas. *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*. Books I, II, III. New York: Doubleday Image Book, 1956. Book I: *God*. Translated by A. C. Pegis (pp. 317, \$.85). Book II: *Creation*. Translated by J. F. Anderson (pp. 351, \$.95). Book III: *Providence*, printed in two Parts. Translated by V. J. Bourke. (Part One, pp. 278. \$.85. Part Two, pp. 282. \$.85).

H. D. Gardeil, O. P. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas, III: Psychology*. St. Louis: Herder, 1956. Pp. xiii, 303. \$4.00.

ONE OF THE PRACTISED hands at the broader presentation of philosophy is Professor Lamprecht, who stresses that philosophies become influential through forming a tradition, and that their influence is exerted as components in civilization. This viewpoint is worth pondering at a time when some philosophers are pushing their analytic techniques to the point of breaking continuity with the past and isolating their problems wholly from the common concerns of men. As Lamprecht remarks, the "technique of freedom is, not immunity from the influences of traditions, but understanding of the import of traditions." Although he himself is most at home with modern empiricism and naturalism, he keeps the pluralistic meaning of "traditions" throughout this history of philosophy. None of the chapters extends beyond 25 pages, but within this space a concise and literate description is given of the thinker's chief doctrines. Equal treatment is accorded to the Greek period and to medieval philosophy. The decisive influence of Christianity upon the latter is recognized, although Lamprecht gives a Paulinist interpretation of the rise of Christianity and depreciates the experiential element in Christian philosophies. He is most effective in dealing with his own field of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought and with American philosophy since James.

Lamprecht views Aristotelian philosophy as a naturalistic study of the structure and potentialities of nature and man's conformity to the structural uniformities. This is the Aristotle of the Renaissance logicians and the contemporary naturalists, who do not emphasize the inquiries which Aristotle made into causes which are eternal, immutable, and separate. These inquiries are made chiefly in the *Metaphysics*, a new translation of which serves as volume

1,000 in the Everyman's Library. Working with advice from Sir David Ross, the translator has reorganized the work for modern readers. The book now begins with the philosophical lexicon, then gives the survey of previous Greek philosophy and the nature of metaphysics, before moving into more particular topics and culminating in the study of the prime mover. Recent discussion of the propriety of such terms as "substance" has not affected this translation, which nevertheless is very readable, due to the rearrangement of some of Aristotle's sentences and the dropping of some of his parenthetical remarks into footnotes. This clean, English text will remind readers that philosophy does not make progress by forgetting its giants or dismembering them.

Except to specialists, Fr. Festugière's works on the Greek religious ideal and the Hermetic tradition are almost unknown in America. One can sample his independent scholarship, however, in his short book on Epicurus. Being free from N. W. DeWitt's preoccupation with finding Epicurean influences in St. Paul, Festugière concentrates directly on the Greek pagan sources and enters penetratingly into the religious outlook of Epicurus and his Hellenistic age. This period was faced, in a specially acute fashion, with the perennial problem that man is unhappy and wants to become happy. The Stoics found a solution in political activity and union with the cosmic mind, but Epicurus counselled a withdrawal from public affairs, elimination of all fears, and moderation of desires to the natural minimum. He regarded *deisidaimonia* or perpetual fear of divine powers a major cause of fear. He did not want to banish the gods, but only the constant terror in the minds of men, thinking about the gods. Not having a revelation from the God of love and fatherly concern, he could

only achieve tranquillity by denying that the gods have any interest in or control over the affairs of mortals. His standpoint is not the atheism and licentiousness customarily attributed to him, but a non-providential theory of human happiness based on the absence of mutual relations between the gods and men.

No analysis of Epicurean philosophy is made in Professor Kroner's work, even though it is relevant to his theme. His book is announced as being the first of three volumes dealing with "speculation and revelation in the history of philosophy." Judging from the 25-page Introduction to the entire project and from the quality of this first volume, this will be an historical investigation of the first rank. Kroner concedes to Hegel that religion and philosophy are ultimately concerned with the absolute, but he assigns an independent origin to revealed religion and refuses to assimilate it to the Hegelian dialectic or any other philosophy of religion. With Gilson, he would admit the mutual influence of revelation and speculation, but his purpose is to trace it throughout the history of philosophy and not primarily in the medieval period. Moreover, he sees nothing final about any medieval solution of the problem of reason and revelation, and is highly doubtful of any perfect reconciliation. Krone holds that the normal condition between revealed religion and philosophy is one of tension, conflict, and mutual influence, and hence he appeals with Kant to a certain self-limitation of reason in order to secure the object of belief. But whereas the act of faith is a natural one for Kant, Kroner treats it as being in some sense a gift of the revealing God. A more precise analysis of his general position must await the appearance of the volumes dealing respectively with the medieval and modern periods.

The first volume culminates in the



observation that "Aristotle reached the utmost limit of speculative theology; only Biblical revelation surpassed this height of thought." Aristotle did not fully appreciate the nature of the human person or the providential knowledge and creative power of God. From a few scattered remarks, Kroner would seem to be preparing the ground for an interpretation of medieval philosophy in two main phases: as basing all speculation upon revelation in the pre-Thomistic era, and then as following Thomas in substituting the authority of Aristotle for that of revelation in matters speculative. Presumably, the Thomistic God will relapse to the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic level, will not be the personal creator of Biblical faith, and thus will bear responsibility for the eventual breakdown of medieval thought.

It may have been with the generic possibility of such an account in mind that Professor Gilson recast his book on St. Thomas and emphasized the Biblical sources of so many of his views on God. Four basic points underlie the new presentation. First, Gilson's interpretation of the history of philosophy pivots around the contrast between the philosophies of essence and the distinctive philosophy of existence developed by Aquinas. Second, the doctrine on God is central, precisely because it is organized around the divine subsistent act of existing, its causal significance for finite beings, and its transcendence of finite conceptions. Third, a correlation is made between our human way of knowing the finite act of existing by means of a judgment and our human way of affirming the being of God by means of a causal inference and existential judgment. Finally, Gilson sees Aquinas as a theologian for whom philosophy is distinct in kind from sacred doctrine, and yet developed with the aid

of revelation, according to the order of sacred doctrine, and in accordance with the resolution of problems raised by the latter science. For instance, Lamprecht follows the philosophical order of explaining Thomistic doctrine, going from finite things up to God, whereas Gilson retains the theological order of exposition, except for a preliminary chapter on the underlying metaphysical positions. This new English edition is enriched by Fr. I. T. Eschmann's "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works," which provides the most recent bibliographical information about the authenticity, genre, and chronology of the writings. This book is now the essential instrument for grasping the philosophical thought of St. Thomas and the findings of scholarship on his works.

Among the points in Gilson which will arouse discussion is his view that those who follow a philosophical order of presenting Thomistic doctrine "either substitute the philosophy of Aristotle for that of St. Thomas, or else, as is happening in our own days, flatly contradict the philosophy which they pretend to teach. . . . In brief, it is to present a *philosophia ad mentem sancti Thomae* as though it were a *philosophia ad mentem Cartesii*." These consequences will follow for anyone who is taking either a purely historical or a theological approach to the philosophy of St. Thomas, and who fails to adhere to the theological context and order used by St. Thomas himself. This settles nothing, however, about those who are working on their own risk in philosophy and who are trying to use the suggestions from St. Thomas in their own study of the issues. In the latter case, there is no dialectical or historical law operating to make them either revert to the Aristotelian notion of form or accept the Cartesian view of natural reason. Properly philosophical evidence can be advanced against following either of these

paths, and this same evidence entails an order of demonstration distinctive of philosophy. In his explanation of Aquinas for the Pelican Philosophy series, Fr. Copleston maintains both that it would be artificial and disingenuous to ignore the theological approach of St. Thomas and also that, "if we are considering Thomism as a living and developing philosophy, it is the philosophical positions themselves which count." From this perspective, he brings out the experiential factor more emphatically than does Lamprecht and indicates the points where present-day linguistic philosophers will find some common problems with those who have reflected on Aquinas.

Fr. White's essays are divided into three sections: the nature of theology or human discourse about God, special theological issues having some comparative aspect, and the question of church unity. The two essays entitled "The Unknown God" and "Prelude to the Five Ways" are of primary interest to philosophers. They stress a point which is often omitted from Thomistic manuals on natural theology or else embalmed in axioms which convey no urgency to the reader. We can demonstrate the truth of the proposition "God exists," but the divine act of existing and the divine nature always transcend anything we can think or say about them. Although we can determine the validity of some propositions about God, they never add up to a grasp (non-quidditative or otherwise) of what God is in His own infinite being. The *viae* or ways to God are reliable paths, but only because they enable us to acknowledge and respect the unknown God. There is an impressive convergence of emphasis on this doctrine by Gilson, White, and Josef Pieper (CROSS CURRENTS, Fall, 1953). But even this doctrine has to be reworked by contemporary philo-

sophers, due to the new factors introduced into the modern awareness by Cusanus and Calvin, Pascal and Nietzsche, all of whom meditated on the unknown God and the hidden God.

The Doubleday Image Book translation of St. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, under the alternate title: *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, is a solid addition to the series. The English versions are based on the most accurate texts, and succeed in conveying something of the spare and sober prose of the original. Each translator provides a basic bibliography and an explanatory introduction, together with footnotes, references to sources and secondary studies. A rough correlation can be made between the three books now published and the themes of God, His creation of the world and man, and our moral life under providence. But the frequent cross-references of both St. Thomas and his translators serve as a reminder that this is a work of synthesis, and that the particular questions are being studied within the context of some dominant metaphysical and theological principles. The very wide range of arguments, objections, and evidence considered by St. Thomas in this work would have resulted merely in an encyclopedia, were it not for the controlling influence of his view of being as existent, of a creative and providential God, and of revelation as God's life-giving word to man.

Although Fr. Gardeil's text book is the third volume of this series, it is the first one to be put into English. It consists of an explanation of the Thomistic philosophy of the soul and a 55-page selection of readings from various works of St. Thomas. More than the usual amount of attention is paid to self-knowledge and a consideration of the soul as *mens* or personal, reflective spirit. Not much is said about one issue of interest to many American philoso-

phers: how to relate a doctrine on the soul to a more comprehensive theory of man, and where to locate such a doctrine with respect to metaphysics and philosophy of nature.

## 2. *Agencies of Transition in Philosophy*

Alan Gewirth. *Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace*. Volume II: *The Defensor Pacis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Pp. civ, 450. \$8.50.

Giorgio de Santillana. *The Age of Adventure*. New York: New American Library Mentor Book, 1956. Pp. 283. \$.50.

Paul O. Kristeller. *The Classics and Renaissance Thought*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. Pp. 106. \$2.50.

George Sarton. *Appreciation of Ancient and Medieval Science during the Renaissance*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955. Pp. xvii, 233. \$5.00.

J. A. Weisheipl. *O. P. Nature and Gravitation*. River Forest, Illinois: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1955. Pp. viii, 124. \$3.50.

Marjorie Nicolson. *Science and Imagination*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press Great Seal Books, 1956. Pp. iv, 238. \$1.75.

Richard Peters. *Hobbes*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956. Pp. 272. \$.85.

ONE OF THE MAJOR obstacles hindering work on the transition from medieval to modern culture and philosophy is the vast number of sources still in Latin. Hence translations of major works from the late medieval and Renaissance period carry a significance beyond the immediate project. Professor Gerwith follows up his study of Marsilius of Padua's political philosophy with the first complete translation of the influential antipapalist political treatise, *The Defender of Peace* (1324, a half-century after the death of Aquinas). The Introduction offers an inter-

pretation of this book and its role in the growth of modern political philosophies. With its stress upon coerciveness as the defining note of political institutions and upon the absolute authority of the will of the whole people, Marsilius' work opened the way for the absolutistic and voluntaristic notions of the state. It did so, however, without denying some kind of primacy of spiritual values and the divine origin of revelation, and thus fell short of advocating a completely secular view of social life.

This latter view is expounded by Machiavelli for whom, as Professor de Santillana observes, man's life has lost all supernatural connotation and his political action all norms, except the control of human energy within nature. Santillana's own comments on the "momentary cosmos" of the Renaissance express his enthusiasm for the age, and tend to drown out the individual voices of the Renaissance writers themselves. He takes short samplings from seventeen men, ranging from philosophers like Cusanus and Bruno to the scientists, artists, explorers, and mystics who crowded the age. The editor remarks that the tension between past and future is very strong in the Renaissance mind. In Bruno's words, this mind may be a stump from the past, but it is a stump destined for a new blooming.

The problem of cultural ambivalence is tackled in two notable lecture series by Paul Kristeller and George Sarton. In his Martin Classical Lectures at Oberlin, Kristeller challenges the conventional notion of Renaissance humanism. This movement was not primarily a scientific or philosophical one but a cultural and educational program, centered around the classics and, at most, moral philosophy. The Aristotelian tradition in natural philosophy held its own during the Renaissance, largely be-

cause of its solid content and the absence of a comparable, teachable doctrine, until the coming of the new physics in the early seventeenth century. Kristeller regards the humanistic core as neutral and capable of being oriented in opposing ways, religious or anti-religious. The weakest point in this reappraisal is a failure to define "pagan" any more closely than as a literal return to the gods of antiquity, leaving out the decisive point of how human life is conceived in relation to nature. The pioneer historian of science, George Sarton, devoted his Rosenbach Lectures to the Renaissance attitude toward ancient and medieval science. Through a close bibliographical study, he established the extent and vitality of Renaissance knowledge of earlier discoveries in the three fields of medicine, natural history, and mathematics. One notable feature was the absence of any wall between science and the humanities, a point which Sarton exploited in favor of his view that the history of science brings out the liberal aspect of science. "Our aim is to humanize science and the best way of doing that is to tell and discuss the history of science." The scarcity of courses in the history of science indicates that this way of humanizing the sciences has not yet been seriously tried.

The philosophical value of a comparative approach to the major field untouched by Sarton—physics—is shown by Fr. Weisheipl. He makes a careful historical study of the natural philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, the late medieval views on impetus, the conflict between Newton and his followers over a causal interpretation of gravitation, and the mathematical theory of relativity. He lays great stress on the distinction (which the Newtonians did not observe) between a natural philosophy and a mathematical theory of nature, that

is, between a study of nature in terms of causes and the use of mathematical correlations for events. From the standpoint of literary history, Professor Nicolson establishes that the history of science is valuable also for the humanities. Especially the introduction of the telescope and microscope into England by Thomas Digges had a strong impact upon the imagination of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers. The Gulliver who always carried a "pocket-perspective," which could magnify the small and bring distant objects closer, became a potent symbol of man as perilously yet excitingly situated between the two infinities. The Pascalian cry about man in relation to the spiritual and material infinities was not an isolated religious utterance, but was integral with the growing scientific awareness of the small and the large cosmos, in visible ways that went far beyond the earlier tradition.

One of the best examples of the catalytic effect of the new science upon the philosophic mind and imagination is Thomas Hobbes. In the first general study on Hobbes in twenty years, Richard Peters indirectly confirms Kristeller's thesis about locating the replacement of Aristotelianism at the very end of the Renaissance. Hobbes's readings in Copernicus and Kepler, together with his visits to Galileo and Mersenne, aroused in him the vision of a new mechanical philosophy. "What excited him was the possibility of deducing consequences from the law of inertia in spheres to which it had not yet been applied—sensation, psychology, and politics." Yet he wavered between a conventionalist and an evidential theory of truth, and hence between founding first principles on analytic definitions or on sense evidence. Peters brings out this ambiguity well enough, but in turn re-

mains undecided between finding the ground of certainty in psychological habituation or in empirical verification. By itself, a mastery of the language of science cannot settle this matter today, any more than in the time of Hobbes.

### 3. *The Adventure of Rationalism*

Stuart Hampshire. *The Age of Reason*. New York: New American Mentor Book, 1956. Pp. 186. \$5.0.

Georges Poulet. *Studies in Human Time*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. 363. \$5.00.

Gottfried, Leibniz. *Philosophical Papers and Letters*. Translated and edited by Leroy Loemker, 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. x, 1228 (continuous pagination). \$12.50.

Gaston Grua. *La Justice humaine selon Leibniz*. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956. Pp. xii, 415. 1,600 francs.

Isaiah Berlin. *The Age of Enlightenment*. New York: New American Library Mentor Book, 1956. Pp. 282. \$5.0.

Crane Brinton, Editor. *The Portable Age of Reason Reader*. New York: Viking Press, 1956. Pp. xii, 628. \$2.50.

Gabriel Bonno. *Les relations intellectuelles de Locke avec la France*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 263. \$2.50.

A. R. Desautelsfi, S. J. *Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*. Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1956. Pp. xvii, 256. \$4.00.

Constance Rowe. *Voltaire and the State*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 254. \$4.00.

John W. Chapman. *Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal?* New York: F. C. Green. *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Study of His Life and Writings*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. Pp. 476. \$5.00.

Gottfried Martin. *Kant's Metaphysics*

*and Theory of Science*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1956. Pp. viii, 218. \$4.50.

Richard Kroner. *Kant's Weltanschauung*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. xi, 119. \$2.00.

Milton Nahm. *The Artist as Creator*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. xi, 352. \$5.50.

Johann Goethe. *Faust, Part One*. Translated by B. Q. Morgan. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. xiv, 127. \$75.

Gilles-Gaston Granger. *La mathématique sociale du Marquis de Condorcet*. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956. Pp. viii, 178. 660 francs.

Jean Lacroix. *La sociologie d'Auguste Comte*. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956. Pp. 115. 240 francs.

Antoine Augustin Cournot. *An Essay on the Foundations of Our Knowledge*. Translated by M. H. Moore. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956. Pp. lxx, 615. \$9.00.

Jeanlouis Cornuz. *Jules Michelet: Un aspect de la pensée religieuse au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*. Geneva and Lille: E. Droz and Giard, 1955. Pp. xxvii, 408.

UNLIKE THE MENTOR BOOK on the Renaissance, the one on the seventeenth century has editorial comments which minister to the selections, rather than cover them with a brilliant inundation. Professor Hampshire is not only an analytic philosopher in his own right but the author of a book on Spinoza, and hence is thoroughly familiar with the era. His presentation is outstanding, by reason of the aptness and sufficient length of the readings, the high quality of the translations (many of them done by himself), and the disciplined helpfulness of the editorial information. Yet the publisher advertises this period as the "conflict of science and religion," a description which would have aroused some further discussion from Descartes, Pascal, and Leibniz, and would



have left Diderot wondering what their was left for him to do a century thereafter.

Readers of CROSS CURRENTS (Summer and Winter, 1955) are already familiar with two chapters from Georges Poulet's explorations in literary and philosophical criticism. Mindful of what Bergson says about the distinctive nature of the modern awareness of temporality, he traces this consciousness through French literature from Montaigne and Descartes to Valéry and Proust. And for the English edition, he adds a brief survey of American reflections up to Eliot, but stopping short of the crucial instance of Faulkner. In what may be the most sustained and nuanced analysis of all the documents pertaining to Descartes' famous dream of 1619, Poulet discerns three strands which later on fuse together in the mature Cartesian philosophy. First, the self is distinguished from the events in the extended world, so that scientific and philosophic mechanism can develop to the full, without encroaching on the spirit (against Hobbes). Next, a substantial and existential core of the self is set off even from the multiplicity of its momentary thoughts. Finally, God's creative activity is needed, not to prolong duration but to give us the existential act at every new and radically discrete instant. There is a similarity between this conception of a perpetually renewed act of creation and Pascal's religious exhortation of constantly regaining actual grace. The passage to the eighteenth century is marked by an elimination of God's instantaneous activity, for which Diderot seeks a substitute in the intoxication of feeling and the enlargement of memory. Poulet suggests that Diderot divorces the Leibnizian theory of unconscious perception of the entire universe from its theistic basis.

Since the July-uprising execution of the German Catholic scholar, Kurt Huber, the leadership in Leibniz-studies has passed to the United States and France. Professor Paul Schrecker's microfilm collection of Leibniz manuscripts from the Hanover archives has made a center of research at the University of Pennsylvania, and Philip Weiner's *Leibniz Selections* (Scribner, 1951) is a notable translation. It is now joined by the even more ambitious project of Professor Loemker, who has been laboring for many years in this field. His two volumes provide the materials and the scholarly guidance for entering the intellectual world of a philosopher notoriously difficult to understand. Leibniz was torn between the basic analytic work on the foundations of knowledge, the synthetic systems demanded of philosophers in his age, and the concerns of international order to which he was dedicated. He parcelled out his views in small measures, rather than achieved a massive systematic treatise. One must look for his thought in farflung correspondence, brief articles, unpublished sketches, and a few long but occasional works. Loemker makes a judicious selection among this mass of materials, and prefaces the texts with a 100-page systematic analysis of Leibniz' thought which provides the necessary orientation for the contemporary reader.

Leibniz' interest in jurisprudence was central and lifelong. His father was a professor of law; his own doctoral thesis was on perplexing cases of law; his first employment was gained on the strength of a legal work (included, in part, in the Loemker collection); he was constantly engaged in practical diplomacy, legal history, and legal theory. Yet until now, very little has been done to explain his philosophy of law and correlate it with the rest of his thought. This

task is now accomplished by the late Gaston Grua, who completes his earlier book on Leibniz' theory of universal jurisprudence with this study of human justice. Universal jurisprudence establishes certain perfectly general and univocal definitions of justice, which apply equally to God and to man. Hence the twin fruits of such a science are theodicy and the theory of human justice. Leibniz was perhaps the most daring of the rationalists, due to his conviction that a deductive theodicy and an apparently inductive human jurisprudence are derivable from a universal set of definitions of justice. One can mount the ladder inductively from private justice to public justice to universal justice, or one can see that the principle of sufficient reason constructs a descending ladder from the universal definition of justice to its expressions in the state and in private dealings. It was this hope of extending his logical and metaphysical principles into the realm of human personal and social acts which sustained Leibniz' mighty efforts at securing the harmony among states, churches and philosophical systems.

Since the eighteenth century could not observe this logic at work in society or the individual consciousness, it launched a great debate about how far reason must be supplemented by other means in order to realize social happiness on earth. Two recent collections of sources help us to follow this discussion. Berlin's *Mentor* volume places the emphasis almost exclusively upon the British empiricists, with only a quick glance at the French and German Enlightenment. The balance is redressed in Brinton's *Age of Reason Reader*, which is the best single-volume selection now available on all phases of the Enlightenment. There are political documents, utopian dreams of the heavenly city, religious and philosophical

speculations from Jonathan Edwards to Holbach, and Voltaire's delightfully malicious letter congratulating Rousseau on "your new book against the human species."

While it is usually admitted that Locke made the greatest impression upon the French *philosophes*, it is not so generally recognized that this contribution was a repayment for what French thought of the seventeenth century had given to Locke himself. The source materials in the Lovelace Collection of Locke's papers have now been exhaustively scrutinized by Gabriel Bonno for what they can yield about Locke's intellectual relations with France, during his own lifetime. Not only during his stay of four years in France but also during a lifelong reading of books and exchange of correspondence, Locke kept informed on all facets of French life—the practical inventions, religious troubles, pharmaceutical advances, literature, monetary policies, scientific theories, and Biblical studies, as well as the philosophy. There is no better way of appreciating the breadth and liveliness of his mind than by examining the evidence Bonno has gathered.

Locke's library contained the initial volume or so of the *Mémoires de Trévoux*, which first appeared in 1701 (three years before his death) and contained a long notice of his *Essay*. This was the famous Jesuit journal, which served an informative and critical purpose right through the main years of the French Enlightenment, down to the suppression of the Society in France (1762), and for a while thereafter under other auspices. Catholic scholarship, which until now has been singularly deficient in Enlightenment studies, is beginning to grasp the significance of at least this publication. Fr. Desautels gives a clearer general description of the trends exhibited in the volumes up to

1734, and intends to follow up with a study of the remaining years. He explains the position of this representative journal toward philosophy (Cartesianism, Leibniz, Locke), science (Newton and his popularizers), moral questions (Pascal, Bayle, and naturalism), theology (Quietism and Gallicanism), and Scripture (Fontenelle, Richard Simon, and Dom Calmet). On all these issues, he has uncovered problems which require further detailed treatment. For instance, the reception of Newtonian philosophy in France cannot be fully charted until more is known about Fr. Castel, the physicist on the staff of the *Mémoires*.

Desautels stops with 1734, since this date marks the appearance of Voltaire's *Philosophical Letters* and a consequent stiffening of the critical side of editorial policy. Miss Rowe also regards this book as a turning point, this time in the political development of Voltaire himself. In it, he used a description of British institutions to criticize the French political system and clergy. Although this has often led to the charge of unpatriotism, Rowe suggests that he was engaged in redefining patriotism in terms of a freely chosen homeland and a state which respects individual rights, the rule of law, and the welfare of the entire people. In comparing his position to that of Mill's liberalism and democracy, however, Rowe fails to weigh Voltaire's often contemptuous attitude toward actual individuals, especially if they happened to belong among the common people and not the intellectual elite. In this respect, Professor Chapman finds it easier to defend the liberal sympathies of Rousseau, who taught Kant to respect the humanity of the simplest person. But a problem does arise, when one considers the way in which the Rousseauvian general will prevails over the will of any group

of individuals or even over the totality of individual wills. Chapman admits that Rousseau's political theory was not adequate to his psychological and moral respect for individual freedom. There are totalitarian consequences in his view that constant mutual surveillance and a civic religion should be employed deliberately by the state to intensify the social sentiment. Chapman does not regard the general will itself as a totalitarian concept, since it represents the common and unselfish aim of the whole people, by contrast with the egoistic aims of individuals and groups. Nevertheless, he grants that Rousseau locates this will in the state as a distinct political entity, rather than in society, and that there is a dangerous ambiguity in treating the individual now as the psychological self and now as a moral-social self. In securing the primacy of unselfish aims in general, the state founded on the general-will theory is apt to regard particular opinions as selfish, simply on the grounds of their being entertained by particular individuals and groups.

A purely analytic study of Rousseau does not prepare the reader sufficiently for the original sources, however, since they are impregnated with the man's personal dreams, feelings, and escapades. A bibliographical introduction is not only recommended by Rousseau himself but also required by the personal type of writing which he has left for our inspection. Hence it is very helpful to have Professor Green's full-dress study of his life and writings, incorporating the findings of twentieth-century research and the testimony provided in the massive, twenty volumes of Rousseau's correspondence. Green brings to this task not only a thorough familiarity with the French mind but also that just balance between sympathy and critical appraisal which assures an au-

thentic portrait. The biographer does not follow his subject's habit of reconstructing the story from analytic reverie, but gives us Rousseau in his actual behavior and in the actual structure of his works. Here is a well-executed ground-map of the swirling country of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Gottfried Martin, who is Professor of Philosophy at Mainz and co-editor of *Kantstudien*, has produced a modest, concise, yet revolutionary book on Kant. Most of the British commentaries on Kant grew out of the Marburg tradition of regarding him primarily as an epistemologist and theorist of science. In 1924, however, Max Wundt published a study bearing the then scandalous title: *Kant as a Metaphysician*, and it was followed by several monographs by Heinz Heimsoeth on the metaphysical themes in Kant and his close acquaintance with the metaphysical tradition in Germany. These scholars found that Kant did not quickly discredit metaphysics and dismiss it from his mind, but that he continued to ponder over its problems throughout his life. He never took Hume's advice to consign the metaphysical tomes to the flames, because he saw that even a metaphorical book-burning never really settles the issues.

By devoting the first part of his book to Kant's theory of science, Martin is careful not to exaggerate the metaphysical concern but to fit it into the context of Kant's views on Newtonian science. But he draws upon Ockham, and Suarez, Leibniz and Wolff, to show that the Kantian conception of the unity of the world is intelligible only by reference to the tradition in metaphysics and natural philosophy. In the second part, Martin examines the way in which Kant can deal meaningfully in speculative philosophy with things-in-themselves, God, and the self. We can think con-

sistently and significantly about them even when we cannot strictly know them, and this we can do in virtue of an analogical transference of concepts from the experiential world. Despite his caution, the author seems to overstate Kant's continuity with the past, at least on the following three points. First, he underplays the sharp differences among the actual thinkers in the metaphysical tradition prior to Kant, and too readily assimilates the entire history of metaphysics to the post-Leibnizian ontologies. Next, he does not distinguish as rigorously as does Kant himself between the real and the objectively real, in the sense of what is or can be an object of knowledge. Neither Kant nor Aquinas accepts the Wolffian and modern Scholastic assimilation of the real to the objectively real, the true to the objectively true. Finally, Martin fails to grasp the significance of Kant's *substitution of analogy for causality* as the positive instrument for gaining a meaningful theoretical concept (but not knowledge) of God. It is precisely because he makes this substitution that Kant must conclude that we can think conceptually about God but cannot know him in any judgmental and inferential way. On this basic issue, Kant and many modern Scholastics part company with Aquinas in making analogy into an autonomous source of meaning concerning God, and then finding it impossible to validate the inferential approach to God. These criticisms are only intended to indicate how fruitful and provocative a book Martin has given us on Kant.

Richard Kroner's essay (first published in German in 1914) is conceived in the Heidelberg spirit, which helped to pave the way for the recent metaphysical interpretations of Kant. He presents the Kantian philosophy primarily as an ethical voluntarism, a defense of the

primacy of the individual moral will over all other aspects of man. Kroner makes a contribution toward showing that the Kantian epistemology and theory of science are not self-enclosed doctrines, and that the metaphysical issues point toward a moral interpretation of the real. Kant's third *Critique* looms large in Professor Nahm's study of artistic production, especially the first half on "the great analogy." The latter refers to the many theories of art which are governed by the comparison of the artist and his artefact with God and the world. Nahm's thesis is that the theological belief, either in the Platonic maker or in the Judaeo-Christian creator, nourished the conception of the artist's dignity and his inspiration. If the artist is viewed in reference to a divine maker, then he is seen as working according to rules and as having some inspiration from a divine agency outside himself. But if the artist is taken as an analogue to God strictly as creator, then the artistic function is conceived as one of free creation and his originality as expressive of his active self. Nahm suggests that there has also been a steady naturalizing of the theory of the artistic process, as reflected in the emphasis which Kant placed upon imagination as the source of inspiration and upon the connection between moral and artistic freedom. Unaccountably, Nahm gives no hearing to Goethe on the question of artistic production. Morgan's new prose translation of *Faust, Part One* can be depended upon to convey the sense of the original, without pretense of reproducing the poetic line.

Four recent publications on Condorcet, Comte, Cournot, and Michelet, serve as a reminder that the problems raised by rationalism and the Enlightenment were creatively discussed in France right down to the time of Bergson. Granger gives a full description of

Condorcet's social mathematics, which resulted from an application of the theory of probability to social action and which underlay the theory of progress. Starting with a mathematical analysis of the behavior of *homo suffragans*, man the voter, Condorcet gradually developed the ideal of a science of social and historical man which was equally as ambitious as Hobbes' plan, but which was founded on probability and not on strict mechanical reasons. Comte went even farther in his conception of a mathematically organized science of human choices and traditions. Jean Lacroix's concise essay recognizes that the scientific and the moral-religious aspects of Comte have an equally deep rooting in the idea of humanity, in opposition to J. S. Mill's view that the Comtean religious writings were the accidental products of an unsteady mind. Lacroix makes the critical point that positivism "tried to escape from naturalism without admitting an authentic transcendence of man with respect to nature." The outcome was a paradoxical suppression of God and clericalization of society—a solution which is equally repugnant to Christian theism and to naturalism.

Antoine Cournot was also trained in mathematics and learned to temper his initial rationalism through a study of social experience. But Cournot has remained obscure, except for students of mathematical economics. Professor Moore now offers a complete translation of his major philosophical treatise, *An Essay of the Foundations of Our Knowledge*. The translator wisely prefaces it with a 70-page Introduction on Cournot's life and chief philosophical positions. He was a moderate rationalist or critical realist, admitting with Kant both some intelligible laws and the limiting influence of experienced fact. Unlike Kant, however, Cournot viewed the laws as intellectual expres-



sions of an order which is present in things themselves and does not come from the mind. The events of experience disclose a certain structure and order, which serve as the objects of science. However, the disclosure is never complete, so that knowledge remains always approximative and developing. Like Charles Peirce, Cournot accepted the objective presence of contingency and chance in nature, so that probability-analysis is indispensable. Instead of converting the calculus of probabilities into a natural metaphysics and religion of humanity, after the pattern of Condorcet and Comte, he inferred the reality of an intelligent God distinct from the natural world, which reflects His purpose and beauty of mind. Since Cournot regarded chance and contingency as objective surd factors, however, he concluded that God must somehow be limited.

The nineteenth century French historian, Jules Michelet, persuaded many people to abjure Christianity as being incompatible with the liberal and republican spirit. By way of reaction, his views also confirmed many Christians in their sterile attitude of protest against modern political life in France. Perhaps it required a century's perspective to make possible Cornuz' exhaustive analysis of Michelet as an aspect of the religious thought of the nineteenth century. His mind was ravished by Vico's vision of providential laws operative in history, and yet it was perpetually disturbed by the actual records of any particular period. As a resolution of this tension, Michelet came to regard the French Revolution as the visible embodiment of God or justice, and to reject any outlook or institution maintaining a transcendent claim which looks beyond this visible absolute. Under historical inspection, the dislocation between the political and spiritual forces

in France is seen to have rested upon a pitifully vague and fragile basis, and to have called for critical evaluation rather than condemnation.

#### 4. Ideology and Existentialism

- Henry D. Aiken. *The Age of Ideology*. New York: New American Library Mentor Book, 1956. Pp. x, 283, \$.50.
- Sidney Hook. *Marx and the Marxists*. New York: Van Nostrand Anvil Book, 1955. Pp. 254. \$1.25.
- Friedrich Nietzsche. *The Birth of Tragedy, and The Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Francis Golffing. New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1956. Pp. x, 299. \$.95.
- Walter Kaufmann. *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. Pp. 319. \$1.45.
- Perry D. LeFevre. *The Prayers of Kierkegaard*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. ix, 245. \$3.50.
- T. H. Croxall. *Meditations From Kierkegaard*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955. Pp. 165. \$3.00.
- T. H. Croxall. *Kierkegaard Commentary*. New York: Harper, 1956. Pp. xix, 263. \$3.00.
- Karl Jaspers. *Reason and Existenz*. Translated by William Earle. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. Pp. 157. \$3.50.
- Jean-Paul Sartre. *Being and Nothingness*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. lxix, 638. \$10.00.
- Gabriel Marcel. *Royce's Metaphysics*. Translated by V. and G. Ringer. Chicago: Regnery, 1956. Pp. xix, 180. \$4.50.
- Edgard Sottiaux. *Gabriel Marcel, Philosophe et dramaturge*. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1956. Pp. 219. 99 Belgian francs.
- Carl Michalson, Editor. *Christianity and the Existentialists*. New York: Scribner, 1956. Pp. xiv, 205. \$3.75.
- John Macquarrie. *An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Hei-*

degger and Bultmann. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. xii, 252. \$3.75.

John Hutchison. *Faith, Reason, and Existence*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. xiii, 306. \$4.50.

THE PUBLICATION of four well-edited soft-cover books on aspects of the nineteenth century testifies to an increasing realization of the richness of that age and our close dependence upon it. Professor Aiken calls it "the age of ideology," not exclusively in the sense of rationalization of motives but in a more complex meaning. In the wake of the Enlightenment, many thinkers abandoned the view of an independent order of things and a permanent structure open to reason, and with it went the older notion of the work of philosophy (which still remained strong, however, in a Cournot). They came to regard philosophy as a normative determination of new standards, expressive of a personal decision and commitment of the individual thinker. For men like Fichte, Comte, Marx, and Nietzsche, as Aiken remarks, "history and science are themselves instruments of cultural change, to be used deliberately for the purpose of reconstituting Western man's attitudes toward his tradition and, hence, toward himself." Aiken offers readings in the major patterns of ideological speculation, including Mill, Spencer, and Mach, on the positivist side. Of course, the Marxists give a more pejorative meaning to "ideology," by stressing the relativity of any opposing doctrines to a particular and transient socio-economic arrangement. Sidney Hook, who has a long-standing familiarity with all the involutions of Marxian thought, uses his Introduction to the Marxist Reader to trace out the movement from Marx himself to the orthodox and revisionist Socialists, and the debate between

Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. He centers the ambiguous legacy of Marxism in its polyvalent approach to ideology. The Marxists do not distinguish carefully between four aspects of ideas: their origin, meaning, social acceptance, and validity. Hook observes that some good work has been done on the first three points by Marx, but that they do not in any way decide the validity of the ideas in question. As with other books in the Anvil series, the Introduction far outruns the actual selections in value.

The two newly translated works by Nietzsche are prime examples of ideological writing, in the complex meaning of the term. They aim at reconstructing the reader's attitude toward the standard of moral and esthetic values. For this purpose, they give a psychological account of the origins of moral judgment and Christianity, without distinguishing an imaginative account of how values might have been formed from the question of the validity of those values. Golfing's new translations are a welcome aid in studying the protean mind of Nietzsche and his several modes of ideological argumentation. Nietzsche also figures as one of the grandsires of existentialism, in Walter Kaufmann's collection. The editor includes not only the usual philosophical leaders, but also such literary existentialists as Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Camus. He does a genuine service in translating for the first time Heidegger's "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," in which the distinction between all previous metaphysical efforts and Heidegger's own enterprise is proposed. Despite the editor's depreciation of the religious side of existentialism and his consequent omission of Gabriel Marcel, his readings make a good introduction to the philosophical and literary existentialists.

The watershed for the religious as-

pect of existentialism is found in Kierkegaard. The two collections of his prayers and meditations by LeFevre and Croxall bring us beyond the maze of pseudonymous styles, indirect communications, and polemics, to the heart of his life, which was one of prayer and wrestling with God. Now that the biographical, philosophical, and existentialist aspects of Kierkegaard have been sketched, it is appropriate to have these books on his personal belief. LeFevre gives both a systematic analysis of his religious thought and a finely sifted collection of his prayers, many translated now for the first time. Croxall ransacks the unpublished papers for longer meditations, which show how closely knit the poetic and the dialectical factors were in Kierkegaard, even at the center of his devotional life.

In his *Kierkegaard Commentary*, Croxall continues the investigations of his earlier *Kierkegaard Studies* (1948). His present book is a special sort of commentary. It does not follow the text of any particular work by Kierkegaard, but focusses upon certain key terms, such as existence, pleasure, repetition, and religion. From this standpoint, the book is an expanded glossary, with parallel passages. But the order in which the concepts are discussed corresponds to the three stages in the Kierkegaardian dialectic of esthetic, ethical, and religious existence. Thus Croxall moves from such esthetic themes as music and boredom to the ethical realm of duty and marriage, before coming to Christology and religious authority. This is not an introductory account, but an invaluable, advanced discussion of comparative texts on the spheres of existence.

Three recent translations of books by the existentialist philosophers continue to make their thought more accessible. Jaspers' lectures were first delivered in

Holland, after he had paid the price of political independence under Hitler. The first lecture is the clearest statement of the typical existentialist treatment of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard as dialectical extremes, somewhere *between* whom one must develop his own thought. For the existentialists, the conflict between these great men is a salutary thing: it brings the latent issues out into the open, and it forces the prospective philosopher to try his own hand at working out a resolution. In the remaining four lectures, Jaspers gives a lucid statement of his notion of God as the Encompassing, of truth as communicability, and of the tension between reason and its limits.

After having issued a trial run of a few chapters in 1953 (*Existential Psychoanalysis*), Hazel Barnes now presents her complete translation of Sartre's fundamental book. Its availability in English will correct the view of those who have known him primarily through his little essay on humanism, his novels, and his plays. The present treatise, with its close technical defense of a position, cannot be written off as the product of café philosophy. At the same time, those who may have expected to find it concerned with the moral and political problems thronging his more literary writings, will be disappointed. There is a view of morality implicit in this book, but it is formally concerned with speculative questions about the nature of knowing and being, of freedom and social relations, at the theoretical plane. The subtitle of the present book: "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology" will also cause thoughtful readers to pause, not only because of its preoccupation with the ontological question but also because of its method. Sartre is the most phenomenologically oriented existentialist, and most of his difficulties

about man's efforts at transcendence and about the being of God stem from his effort to base an ontology and a metaphysics upon phenomenology, as he understands this discipline. This raises the problem of how neutral is the method of phenomenology and what modifications must be introduced, even at the methodological level, to make a legitimate and also determinate use of this method for a realistic and theistic purpose. The translator has added a pithy Introduction and a glossary of distinctively used terms.

The fact that Gabriel Marcel's book on Royce had its French publication in article form, as long ago as 1918, points up the fact that he served his philosophical apprenticeship 20 years before Sartre and did so within an idealistic climate. His study of Royce is still a valuable and well-balanced historical account, which pays more attention than is usual to the Roycean theory of interpretation and of God as the absolute community. In the Foreword written for this English edition, he refers to the Roycean philosophy as a transition between the older absolute idealism and contemporary existentialism. The theory of a community of interpreters of signs paves the way for the I-Thou relation among finite persons and between men and God. This is one of the master-themes in Marcel's own philosophical and literary work, as Fr. Sottiaux brings out in his compact exposition. After examining the imperfect modes of communion and participation, as set forth in Marcel's theory of existence and objective sharing in knowledge and action, he then concentrates upon the more perfect modes of personal sharing among men and with the absolute Thou. In a final chapter, Sottiaux retraces all the major issues, but does so this time in terms of their concrete presentation in Marcel's plays. Since Marcel himself has

often testified about the unique way in which his dramatic work anticipates his more theoretical analyses and also confirms them, this joint view of him as philosopher and playwright is a rewarding and authentic perspective.

*Christianity and the Existentialists* is the first major American Protestant statement on existentialism. After commenting modestly on the hazards of treating such a highly individualized group as the existentialists in a single work, the editor then invites inspection of the special contours developed by Kierkegaard (essay by H. R. Niebuhr), Unamuno (Mackay), Berdyaev (Spinka), Marcel (Casserley), Heidegger (Dinkler), modern art (Tillich), Hölderlin and Rilke (Hopper). In most essays, the accent is placed upon the individual himself and his attitude toward religion, with a maximum of clarity and a minimum of technicality. Although there is frequent mention of Jaspers and Sartre, there is no sustained account of their criticism of Christianity. This omission is compensated for by the reports of Dinkler and Hopper on Heidegger and his relation with both theology and poetry. Tillich's essay is also notable, both for its provocative attempt to classify art forms, in respect to existentialism and religion, and also for its one theoretical conclusion. Due to his view that philosophy asks questions about being and describes man's situation, whereas only theology gives answers concerning God, he is obliged to conclude that there is no Christian existentialism as a philosophy. "As long as an existentialist is theistic he is either not existentialist or he is not really theistic." This dichotomy does not arise from the existentialist sources themselves, which admit no rift between the method of asking questions and of answering them, but from Tillich's own difficulties about a philosophy of God.

His reservations are understandable in the light of Heidegger's impact upon the theology of Rudolf Bultmann, which Macquarrie explains in a clear fashion. Bultmann finds a ready-made ontology in Heidegger's views on man, as a being distinct in kind from the world around him. He sees a special affinity between the Heideggerian notions on unauthentic and authentic existence and the Biblical doctrine on man as fallen and renewed by faith. Macquarrie grants that this rapprochement has the advantage of making the Christian message relevant at least for some thinkers in our day. But he also warns that, in becoming a reflective analysis of human existence responding to faith, theology may easily be detached from any historical basis and transcendent reference. It may become only a highly specialized department of existential philosophy, or even find itself circularly related to it. This criticism is made at a more fundamental level than the problem of demythologizing Scripture, which is only an application of the general relation of theology to existential philosophy. Professor Hutchison's philosophy of religion tries to establish a safeguard against any assimilation of theology to existential philosophy, by holding that in principle, philosophy cannot attain any independent knowledge of God. Hence he treats all proofs of God's existence as so many explications of the content of faith, albeit explications conducted in a rational fashion. On this basis, Hutchison and Tillich would conclude that no philosophical theism is possible, in the sense of establishing a distinctive and demonstrative way to God from naturally available evidence. This aspect of the present situation should be kept in mind in any discussion by existentialists and Thomists concerning the order and evidence of philosophical inference to God.

# 5. *Language, Metaphysics, and Value*

- I. M. Bocheński, O. P. *Contemporary European Philosophy*. Translated by D. Nicholl and K. Aschenbrenner. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956. Pp. xviii, 325. \$5.00.
- H. D. Lewis, Editor. *Contemporary British Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. xiv, 501. \$6.00.
- Gilbert Ryle et al. *The Revolution in Philosophy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. Pp. 126. \$2.50.
- Antony Flew, Editor. *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956. Pp. xi, 265. \$4.25.
- Ernest H. Hutten. *The Language of Modern Physics*. New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 278. \$3.75.
- Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, Editors. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*. Vol I: *The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Pp. xiv, 346. \$5.00.
- R. B. Braithwaite. *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Pp. v, 35. \$75.
- Nathaniel Lawrence. *Whitehead's Philosophical Development*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956.
- William Earle. *Objectivity*. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. Pp. 157. \$4.00.
- E. W. F. Tomlin. *Living and Knowing*. New York: Harper, 1955. Pp. 285. \$5.00.
- Louis W. Norris. *Polarity: A Philosophy of Tensions Among Values*. Chicago: Regnery, 1956. Pp. x, 242. \$4.50.
- Charles Morris. *Varieties of Human Value*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. xv, 209. \$5.00.
- Paul Edwards. *The Logic of Moral Discourse*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955. Pp. 248. \$4.00.
- Maurice Mandelbaum. *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955. Pp. 338. \$5.00.



George F. Thomas. *Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy*. New York: Scribner, 1955. Pp. xvi, 539. \$5.75.

William E. Hocking. *The Coming World Civilization*. New York: Harper, 1956. Pp. xiv, 210. \$3.75.

W. E. Arnett. *Santayana and the Sense of Beauty*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1955. Pp. xv, 252. \$4.50.

TEACHERS OF THE COURSE in contemporary philosophy will welcome Fr. Bocheński's textbook, which meets the need for a brief but relatively comprehensive survey of the European philosophies of our day. Apart from a chapter on Croce and sections on James and Dewey, all the philosophers are German, French, and British. Of course, both Whitehead and the logical empiricists are now influential in America. The European emphasis is rewarding, since it brings to our attention men like Brunschvicg, Dilthey, Scheler, Hartmann, and Lavelle. The stress is upon exposition, and the few criticisms are quite muted. There is an excellent 55-page bibliography, but some of the books mentioned in it are also now in English. One major omission is: *Contemporary British Philosophy*, the first two series of which were edited by J. H. Huirhead (1924, 1925) and have served as staple reference works. Under the editorship of H. D. Lewis, the third series now brings us abreast of what has been going on in Britain since 1925. Instead of the autobiographical approach of the earlier series, this one plunges directly into philosophical analysis, with an appendix reserved for the biographical facts. In some ways, this is a loss, since the individual paths to philosophy are always significant. Or else it may be, as H. J. Paton suggests in the one concession to an earlier and more genial mode of writing, that all the paths are

now basically of standard manufacture. About A. J. Ayer's first book, he reminisces:

He exposed the nature of Logical Positivism, if I may so express myself, in all its naked horror, and he did so with a plausibility worthy of John Stuart Mill at his best. His doctrine, as I imagine he would now agree, was rather too simple; but it was a great achievement, especially at his age, to sum up a whole trend of thought (however mistaken) in brief compass and so to produce a philosophical classic which marks a milestone in modern thinking... While I have always distrusted overbold assertions about the Whole, I have never ceased to believe that in philosophy analysis is 'only a means to synopsis.

These sentiments have an archaic air, alongside of the great bulk of essays in the volume, which as a whole concentrates upon the analysis for its own sake. There are no grandiose presentations of a system, but workmanlike solutions of particular puzzles about tenses, sensation, punishment, and worship. Logical empiricism and linguistic analysis are most in evidence, although a more metaphysical approach is recommended by Copleston, Ewing, and Hodges.

Two other cooperative ventures throw further light on the present state of British thought. *The Revolution in Philosophy* traces the several phases in the intellectual shift from the period of Bradley and the Hegelians to the linguistic atmosphere of today. There are brief descriptions of Bradley, Frege, Russell, Moore, the Vienna Circle and Wittgenstein, and the most recent trends. Gilbert Ryle agrees with Paton that the impetus came largely from the shock administered by the physicists and by the revolt of the philosophers themselves against psychologism. On the positive side, Ryle lists the recognition that the

atomic units of thought belong within the context of the judgment, the distinction between meaning itself and the images that carry it, and the intentional reference of thought to the real. These are aspects which have still not received an evaluation from the standpoint of a realistic philosophy. Professor Flew's collection contains articles published since 1946 by representatives of what he now calls conceptual analysis, rather than linguistic analysis. "Concept" is used here rather broadly to include the judgmental act and the proposition. What interests British writers today, as well as many Americans, is language in actual usage in statements.

E. H. Hutten conceives of a philosophy of science as being primarily an analysis of the linguistic usage of the physicists. Hence he offers a reflective study of the semantic structures and models employed in classical physics, thermodynamics, quantum physics, and scientific method. He faces the usual difficulties concerning formulations of the verifiability criterion, but argues that all of them are useful to some extent and that the problem of finding "a logically adequate, and comprehensive, criterion, is a technical problem of logic." This is so, granting some original decree that there must be such a criterion, but this decree or proposal is not itself a purely technical problem within logic, as Hutten implies. He makes a number of foundational decisions along the way, and then regards both these decisions and their consequences and problems as purely technical questions. For instance, he states that he will refer to experience only in the sense of experiment, and that philosophical argument must be based on the knowledge which science alone can provide. But the difficulties which can be advanced against these proposals and their

consequences are not merely indicative of particular work still to be done within the system: they affect the bases of the system and its decisional pillars themselves.

There is a refreshing awareness of this foundational issue in the essays edited by Feigl and Scriven, from their work at Minnesota. Feigl stands pat on some points: the distinction in principle between analytic and synthetic propositions must be maintained, and the two-valued logic must be taken as the only significant one for scientific constructions. But as for the criterion of meaning, he admits that even more liberal interpretations are required, and that it must be regarded as a proposal and not as a proposition. This removes the objection about self-validation, but at the cost of giving the principle only a practical justification. Going still further, Feigl restricts it to the function of distinguishing factual sentences from formal ones and from those having purely emotive meaning. In a remarkable concession, he now grants that the meaning criterion holds against only one kind of metaphysics and one kind of natural theology: the purely transcendent or a priori sort. He allows that an inductive metaphysics and experiential natural theology are not sheerly meaningless, and that they are not eliminated by the principle of verifiability in its present formulation. He now falls back upon Newton's rule of parsimony or the need to choose the theory having the greatest formal or factual simplicity and expediency. The question which can now be asked is whether superfluity within a given scientific system is sufficient for elimination of a doctrine from philosophy.

The Minnesota group is engaged in some very searching self-criticism and revision. It now repudiates phenom-

alism and regards logical empiricism as equivalent to a critical, empirical realism, having affinities with the positions of Lovejoy and Sellars. It accepts from psychology a "nomological" conception of meaning and knowledge. There can be free construction of a network of concepts and their postulational laws, as long as they are tied down in some few places to data of immediate experience. "If this be metaphysics," Feigl boldly announces, "make the most of it! But surely it is not the sort of metaphysics that will generate unanswerable problems or unsolvable riddles of the universe." I regard these modifications in current logical empiricism as highly significant, reflecting the influence of American pragmatic and naturalistic currents upon the classical formulas of this school. R. B. Braithwaite's Eddington Lecture on religious belief denies that statements containing reference to God are meaningless or even emotive. He assimilates them to moral statements, and treats both of them as conative assertions of intention. The next step in the inquiry would seem to be to consider whether the practical resolve is regulated by any cognitive recognition of a speculative sort.

The most impressive example of a metaphysics growing out of recent physics is Whitehead's philosophy. But many bewildered readers of *Process and Reality* have wondered whether the obscurity is due to their own lack of preparation or to Whitehead's lack of clarity. Nathaniel Lawrence suggests that the difficulties are due to both sources, and that one's comprehension of *Process and Reality* can be increased by watching its themes develop in the earlier and less complex writings. He follows the growth from the rather narrowly conceived philosophy of nature of 1919 down to the broad cosmology of White-

head's chief work. There is some criticism introduced, especially in noting the conflict between a realistic and a conceptual view of natural objects, but it is kept wisely subordinate to the main task of furnishing guidance for appreciating the mature thoughts of Whitehead.

From different aspects, his philosophy can be regarded as one of objectivity, organism, and polarity, key notions which are also found in some recent works in metaphysics. William Earle makes a careful study and defense of the objectivity of knowledge, using techniques from Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann. He establishes the essential relatedness of mind to the world, and shows reflectively the difference between the cognitive subject and its object. This also leads him to vindicate the speculative nature of knowledge, against Dewey and Nagel, although he is unfortunate in retaining the misleading terminology of the "spectator" relation to the thing known. E. W. Tomlin agrees with Whitehead in regarding the universe as organic, and mind as basically identical with the life process. The identity need not be taken in a pantheistic or panpsychic way, however, since his main point is that biological forms of life are continuous with the conscious forms of life in man and presuppose a spiritual source and goal. Norris seeks to determine the specific principles whereby polarity can resolve the problems and conflicts in philosophy. Instead of making a Hegelian justification of his dialectic, he recommends it by its actual ability to make meaningful the tensions between the subject and the object of knowledge, the universal moral law and the inviolable individual agent, and other specific issues. Two special features of this theory of polarity are its tendency to treat all polar opposites as

values, and its confidence that the polar tensions are susceptible of a kind of calculus.

On the latter score, Professor Morris has done some significant work. He prepared a questionnaire containing one-paragraph descriptions of thirteen ways of life, which he then submitted to college students in the United States and foreign countries for personal rating, in accord with the way they would like to live. The findings seem to indicate that valuations are multidimensional or based on more than one trait in the valuer and the way of life, that therefore a study of values must be an interdisciplinary enterprise, that preferential behavior takes account of both personal wants and social needs, and above all that the domain of values has an orderly structure open to intelligent appraisal. Although he sees these results as encouraging a quantitative study of value-choices and a general theory of behavior, Morris does not press too far the case for his own logical empiricism and the unity of science.

The books by Paul Edwards and Maurice Mandelbaum show that the linguistic and phenomenological analyses of moral judgment can be helpful, as long as neither method is absolutized. Edwards combines the emotive with the naturalistic theory of morality, since he recognizes both the emotion of approval and the reference to descriptive fact involved in our moral judgments. He oversteps the limits of the linguistic method, only when he treats the "natural" reasons for a moral judgment as being synonymous with a "naturalistic" justification. These two terms have to be kept distinct in moral inquiry, however, since one can require natural reasons, without accepting either a substantive or a methodological naturalism as the interpretative principle of the fac-

tual basis. Mandelbaum explores some of the levels of moral experience which are open to phenomenological study. His mention of Butler, Sidgwick, Scheler, and Ross among his sources indicates that a formal linguistic criticism of intuitionism still leaves a wealth of descriptive materials to be evaluated and enlarged. His aim is not to determine a normative standard directly from particular instances, but to discover the generic traits of all moral judgments, from which a common structure and standard may then be ascertained. The easy transition from the natural to the naturalistic is present in Mandelbaum also, but it does not dominate the investigation.

Christianity's relation to moral and cultural life is examined by Thomas and Hocking. Thomas emphasizes the Biblical foundation of the main judgments in Christian ethics. But he repudiates Emil Brunner's contention that the Christian has no need for a natural moral philosophy. The specific principles and content of moral judgments are not given ready-made in revelation, and require a discriminating use of philosophical reasoning. Hocking sees certain signs that the state is growing impotent, at least as a moral force, and that man is making a passage beyond modernity. The modern principle is the I-think of Descartes which, pushed to the extreme, leads to theoretical and practical solipsism. Hocking agrees with Marcel that there can be no effective communication among human persons apart from our common participation in the life of God, the absolute Thou. He seems to agree with Toynbee about a future amalgamation of all the universal religions, although he would also like to keep their unique values and historical roots.

Arnett brings out the full role of art

and esthetic appreciation in Santayana's philosophy. Art has the traditionally broad meaning of a method of altering the environment to enhance our satisfactions, only one of which consists in the enjoyment of beauty. Santayana's naturalism deliberately divorces actuality and being from existence or material power, so that it can speak easily about ideal and even supernatural values, without implying that they have any distinctive existence.

#### 6. Humanisms in Education

H. I. Marrou. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956. Pp. xviii, 466. \$7.50

Richard P. Metzger. *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 527. \$5.50.

Perry Miller. *Errand into the Wilderness*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. x, 244. \$4.75.

Perry Miller, Editor. *The American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry*. New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1956. Pp. xi, 346. \$1.25.

A. Dwight Culler. *The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman's Educational Ideal*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. Pp. xiii, 327. \$5.00.

A. J. Boekraad. *The Personal Conquest of Truth According to J. H. Newman*. Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1955. Pp. 327. 180 Belgian francs.

Wm. Oliver Martin. *The Order and Integration of Knowledge*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956. Pp. viii, 355. \$6.50.

Gerard Smith, S. J. *The Truth That Frees*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956. Pp. 79. \$2.00.

**P**ERHAPS NO ONE except a product and leader of the French educational system (he is now professor at the Sor-

bonne) could produce the sort of history of ancient education which H. I. Marrou has given us. It shows a perfect command of the sources, a delicate sense of proportion, and an intellectual enthusiasm for the subject—traits which make the book itself a contribution to one's classical education. The latest scholarship is summed up in the 100 pages of notes, one of which describes Spengler's opus as "a monumental work of murky error shot through with dazzling sparks of illumination." The main text describes the growth of the classical educational ideal from its misty beginnings to its full expression in Plato and Isocrates, the stable pattern of the Hellenistic age, the adoption of Greek education in the Roman schools, its transformation by the early Christian educators, and its ultimate destruction by barbarian invasions. There is a modern tone about the discussion of over-emphasis on sports, the social status of teachers, technology and humanistic culture. Even the translation of technical terms is done in an arresting way: the Sophists' *phrontisterion* is a "thinking shop" (although an American would call it quite literally and baldly a "thinkateria"). Marrou gives a fine statement of the ideal of classical humanism, which supplied the materials for the Christian schools of the following era.

The first chapter of the Hofstadter-Metzger volume sketches in the medieval background lightly, but only as related to the American scene. The authors treat the Civil War as a kind of dividing line, with the present view of academic freedom developing in the post-bellum years. There is an instructive contrast between Marrou's description of education in antiquity and the conditions prevailing in America since the Civil War. The educational ideal today is not limited to a special elite, but is



broadly aimed; it does not concentrate upon man in his private and interior life, but as a citizen and social agent; it is not primarily moral and rhetorical, but scientific. Hofstadter and Metzger take a monolithic and past-tense view of all educational programs in which the religious and moral aspects have a place. But the Christian educator need not be the prisoner of one set of past traditions, since scientific humanism today offers the same challenge as did the rhetorical humanism of antiquity and the Renaissance. In all these historical instances, a new conception of education must be found and past forms criticized.

Professor Miller stresses the religious motivation of the early American society and also underlines the ambiguity in that motivation. Puritan America had a sense of divine mission, but it was not sure whether it was going on an errand for the edification of the brethren in England or was sent to work out its own destiny, in a unique way. Gradually, the second interpretation gained ascendancy, bringing with it responsibility for controlling nature and ordaining life toward God. In his *Anchor Book* anthology, Miller brings together some vivid expressions of this double preoccupation, as found in the political writings, sermons, and poetry of the age.

Newman's insight was that the Christian educational ideal had to remain a complex one, expressing both our presence in the world and our movement toward God. Professor Culler thinks that there is an inner conflict between the humanistic and religious aspects. This interpretation is understandable, when one compares Newman's sensitive and bold statements with those of other Christian educators of his day. But awareness of the complexity and difficulty of synthesizing the religious and the

scientific outlooks is not the same as regarding them (consciously or not) as irreconcilable. Newman worked on the premise that the actual separation between them need not set the pattern forever, and that creative thinking in education can do for our age what the schools of the Patristic period did for classical humanism. That the basis for any advance beyond religious separatism depends upon one's personal appropriation of truth, is the main finding in Fr. Boekraad's book. Whatever their disagreement over the success of Newman's synthesizing efforts, both of these scholars have succeeded in rescuing Newman studies from the doldrums of repetition and eulogy. Their method is to give Newman the benefit of a careful, formal reading, to work out from his real intellectual background in both Alexandrine Platonism and British empiricism, and to make good use of the manuscript sources.

Professor Martin's book is concerned formally with the philosophical resources for achieving an integration in education. He agrees with John Wild and other American realists that there are many knowledges and methods, that real grounds can be found for ordering them, that the work of finding the bases of intellectual order and unity belongs to metaphysics, and that its findings are not esoteric but available for educational use. He defends the irreducibility of realistic metaphysics to either Hegel's absolute or to the naturalistic method. But he becomes vague and hesitant in trying to relate metaphysics to the philosophy of nature and cosmology. Fr. Smith's *Aquinas Lecture* views education as a training of men in freedom, not through irresponsible decisions but through the responsible cultivation of the arts and sciences. He seeks to awaken a reflective attitude toward the knowl-

edge already in our possession, so that we will have a love for the good use of that knowledge and ultimately for the end to which intellectual life is ordained, in a union with God.

### 7. Notable Reissues

**A**LTHOUGH THE FIRST EDITION of Leon Roth's *Spinoza* (second edition, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1954, pp. xvi, 250, \$2.75) appeared in 1929, it is still an admirable presentation of the great Dutch philosopher. There have been advances in the Spinoza background, as seen by Wolfson, and there have been linguistic approaches, but Roth holds his own as a metaphysical commentator familiar with the seventeenth-century situation. The Liberal Arts Press of New York has issued the four following editions of philosophical classics, all well-edited and reasonably priced: George Berkeley's *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, edited by C. M. Turbayne (1957, pp. xxiv, 104, \$.75); David Hume's *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, edited by C. W. Hendel (1957, pp. lxiv, 155, \$.75); Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, edited by L. W. Beck (1956, pp. xxiv, 168, \$.90); J. G. Fichte's *The Vocation of Man*, edited by R. M. Chisholm (1956, pp. xx, 154, \$.75). The Hume volume has an unusually helpful Introduction, and the Fichte volume has been extensively corrected from the older translation. Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. 412, \$1.45) is considerably revised from the original edition and takes advantage of Kaufmann's own recent translation of major portions of Nietzsche's writings. This is the basic study of Nietzsche in English. It defends, and perhaps over-defends, him from charges that were

current during the Hitler rule of Germany, and restates his intellectual relations with Socrates, Darwin, and Wagner.

Morris R. Cohen's selections from Charles Peirce: *Chance, Love, and Logic* (New York: Braziller, 1956, pp. 318, \$5.00), appeared originally in 1923, a good decade before Peirce's collected papers were issued. The Cohen collection, along with John Dewey's essay on the pragmatism of Peirce, has a place in the history of American thought and continues to provide a sound introduction to the logical and metaphysical speculations of a seminal mind. Under the title of *The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead* (Chicago: University of Chicago Phoenix Book, 1956, pp. xvi, 296, \$1.50), Anselm Strauss chooses some chapters from the three posthumous works of Mead. Although he was associated with Dewey and made some notable contributions to the theory of time and society, Mead's views made even slower headway than Peirce's. He stressed the nature of the human act, as uniting the individual to his environment, and always viewed action within the social context of interrelated minds. His social pragmatism has not been without influence upon the American phase of logical empiricism. Under the editorship of Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and C. W. Morris, the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (vol. I, parts 1 and 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, pp. 1-339, 340-760, \$6.00 each, \$11.00 the set) now gathers the first ten fascicles within two hardcover volumes. Along with essays by the editors on the unity of science, the theory of signs, and scientific empiricism, there are important contributions by John Dewey, Ernest Nagel (on theory of probability), and Brunswik (on the conceptual framework of psychology).

When these pronouncements on the unification of sciences are compared with the more recent essays by logical empiricists, however, it can be seen that the program has been considerably tempered and modified by the pragmatic and naturalistic movements in America. The second edition of Rudolf Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. x, 258, \$5.00) contains five supplementary essays, including his remarks on ontology and pragmatics. The proposal is made to express the pragmatic relation of a person and a sentence in terms of a semantic, theoretical concept. Carnap still feels a strong need for general and theoretical principles, but their specific nature has yet to be elaborated.

The reprinting of F. R. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology* (2 vols., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956, pp. xvi, 422, 276, \$8.50 and \$5.50) may bring to notice an essay in natural theology which has never been thoroughly discussed. Tennant rejects the ontological argument and the purely rationalistic theology pendant to it. His own approach is empirical, somewhat in the sense of the eighteenth-century British scientists and divines. He explains the rationality of the universe in terms of a cosmic theology, which is broad enough to include the Darwinian findings as one of its phases. Thomists will find his criticism of Aquinas interesting, because it centers around the problem of the divine infinity. It is clear from Tennant's remarks that he is puzzled by the historical origins of the spe-

cial Thomistic meaning for infinity, that he does not give this meaning its metaphysical connotation, and that he remains troubled by the relation between a metaphysically good God and a God who satisfies our moral desires. Lucien Price's record of *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: New American Library Mentor Book, 1956, pp. 320, \$.50) reveals another speculative, Cambridge mind in its more informal moments. The dialogues convey Whitehead's charm, but also his vagueness on historical and religious questions. Jean-Paul Sartre's *No Exit and Three Other Plays* (New York: Knopf Vintage Book, 1955, pp. 281, \$.95) also includes the texts of: *The Flies*, *Dirty Hands*, and *The Respectful Prostitute*. The combination of freedom and futility, to which his theory of being leads, is here given concrete form. Heinrich Zimmer's *Philosophies of India* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956, pp. xvii, 687, \$1.95) contains the full text and plates of a notable attempt to synthesize the art, philosophy, and religion of India. An explanation and criticism of Sartrean atheism and other forms of contemporary impersonalism are given in Martin Buber's *Eclipse of God* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957, pp. 152, \$1.15). Buber never separates the fate of our conception of man from that of God, so that he is more personal than the Indian systems of religion and yet joins humanism with a personal relation to God, in order to overcome the social frustration of the protagonists in Sartre's dramatic world.

# Notes on other Publications

## 1.

*The End of the Modern World* (Sheed and Ward). This recent book by Romano Guardini (originally composed as a series of lectures introducing the thought of Pascal) presents a vast and somber thesis. Guardini contends that a new "world," radically different than any envisaged or experienced by man in the past, is coming into existence and that this new "world," fashioned by technology and characterized by the reduction of man to the collectivized mass, poses the ultimate question of good or evil—of survival or destruction. This "absolute decision" arises out of man's domination of nature and out of the total power that is now coming into his hands. It is rendered dangerous and acute by man's failure to master himself—by the absence either of the character or of the ethic which would ensure the right use of power.

Guardini makes this grave, and even eschatological, analysis of the new era that is now opening up against the background of our historical past. Heretofore, man grasped his *place* in the universe and he could approach nature and build his culture under conditions that made human existence and growth a feasible experience. The Ancient, Medieval, and Modern epochs all gave man a sense of belonging, though the "world pictures" of each differed in the dimensions of the universe they comprehend and in the place assigned to man. Now, however, we attend the dissolution of the Modern world (with its inherited traditions, its basic but unacknowledged Christianity, its optimism) and we witness a sharp break in

the continuity with the past. Technology has radically transformed man's environment, just as science has radically altered his "world picture," and contemporary man finds himself rootless and displaced in an alien universe. It is here that we come to the crux of Guardini's analysis and of the contemporary problem: the monstrous development of technological power accompanied by the displacement and estrangement of man.

Guardini offers no facile solution for this problem nor any reassuring prophecy about the future. He emphasizes the impending danger; he draws a stark picture of the collectivized society to come; but at the same time he sees a certain clearing of the air—a removal of the ambiguity and dishonesty that corrupted the Modern world. Man henceforth will face the real issues and the consequences. He will be put unequivocally to the test and his survival, if it is to be, will be the work of his virtue. For the Christian this will have a special meaning. His faith in God and his obedience will be shorn of all secular compromise. And with trust and courage he will stand before the dangers of the new age.

It is difficult to make a criticism of so profound a theme as Guardini has elaborated. He is best, perhaps, when he discusses the *weltanschauung* of the Modern world—its attitude toward nature, culture, and man himself—and when he describes the new conditions that now confront contemporary man. With penetrating insight and wisdom he cuts through all superficiality and lays bare the heart of that momentous transition we all are experiencing. In

that respect his book cannot but help to clarify and even to reveal the meaning of our times. Nevertheless, one may ask if we can speak of the new age (or of any age) in terms of so final and absolute a turning point in the destiny of man—in terms of the mystical Armageddon. This point is raised with hesitation, conscious as we must be of the terrifying potentiality for destruction inherent in our technological age. Yet it is prompted by a sense of historical continuity and human resilience (though civilizations may rise and fall) which it is hard to cast off. The post-Modern world *may* display, as Guardini thinks it does, those features which pertain to "the essence of the End," but this is an historical judgment which is not easily affirmed and it is one which our long historical experience would seem to modify.

## 2.

*Directions in Contemporary Criticism and Literary Scholarship*, by J. Craig La Drière (Bruce) ought not to be overlooked by anyone seeking to understand the present position of literary studies. The chief advantage the book has over recent mid-century estimates of the state of modern criticism is its author's high professional competence in the history of literary theory. Without going into much detail in the limited space at his disposal, he manages to illuminate the current situation by a compressed survey of developments since Arnold's time, and even manages to suggest the place of our period in the whole history of literary studies. This historical perspective enables La Drière to escape fashionable commonplaces about our criticism and come up with some surprises. For example, he maintains that both friends and enemies of the recent trend to close analytical criticism have overestimated

the efficiency and rigor of its methods. The reason is that we are still in what Eliot called the "Arnold Period," a period of a new struggle toward *method*. Not having achieved a fully satisfactory method as yet, we nevertheless tend to be overimpressed by what we have achieved.

The great direction of the "Arnold Period," says La Drière, is away from and out of Romanticism. Since Arnold, critics moving in this new direction have been asking for more knowledge; but until recently they have contented themselves with asking for more knowledge of particulars (literary history) rather than knowledge of universals (literary theory). Hence the great weakness of modern criticism is lack of theory and the consequent reliance on *ad hoc* procedures, procedures which are still compared to those of Aristotle or the Alexandrian critics. Any method or any disdain for method implies a theory, and the development of an adequate method will require an adequate theory.

An important part of an adequate literary theory will be a theory of criticism. La Drière combats the widespread notion that recent criticism is too restricted in its audience, and not sufficiently concerned with the common reader. On the contrary, he observes, most modern criticism is directed toward undergraduates or to persons about to address undergraduates. The result has been, in practice, a weakening of the cognitive intensity of our criticism, and an increased concern with cajoling a reluctant audience; and in theory, an assumption that the only function of criticism is to teach and that criticism is fundamentally a rhetorical rather than a scientific operation. La Drière maintains that criticism is a form of thinking before it is a form of discourse, and that if there is not enough criti-



cism written by specialists for specialists (as there is not enough today) the quality of all criticism will deteriorate.

Despite confusions and dangers, La Drière views the present and future with cautious optimism. The successes and failures of modern scholarship have at least got us closer to a basic problem—that of determining the formal object of literary studies. The criticism of Pound and Eliot has helped a great deal to establish a formal object, and if we are still in the Arnold Period the increased interest in literary structure shows that we have moved on to new positions, positions which look forward to the end of the Arnold Period.

Any serious students of literature should find this little book challenging; beginners ought to find its bibliographical footnotes especially helpful.

### Correction

In the last issue of CROSS CURRENTS (Vol. VI, no. 4, Fall 1956) the word "hyperamnesia" erroneously appeared in an article by Jacques Maritain (page 311, column 1). Since its exact apposite, "hypermnnesia" was intended, and necessary to the legal sense of his argument, we wish to call attention to the error and offer our apologies.

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